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THE EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY:
TOWARD A COMMON FOREIGN POLICY, A COMMON 
DEVELOPMENT POLICY, AND EUROPEAN UNION
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
The European Community is the most highly developed and most 
important regional intergovernmental organization in existence. The 
Community (also referred to as the European Economic Community, European 
Common Market, EEC, or EC) is an economic and political union of nine 
European nations^ that provides for an ever closer union of the member 
states for an unlimited period of time. Its permanent institutions not 
only apply and administer the treaties that constitute the legal founda­
tion of the union, but also make and revise policy as the integration 
process continues.
The European Community is actually the combination of three 
communities that share the same institutions. The three communities are
The original six member states are Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, France, Italy, and West Germany. Denmark, Ireland and the 
United Kingdom became active members in 1973.
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Economic 
Community (EEC), and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom)•
The ECSC was created by the Paris Treaty of April 18, 1951, and the EEC 
and Euratom by the Treaty of Rome of March 25, 1957. The stated purpose 
for the creation and maintenance of the three, which together constitute 
the European Community, is to put an end to national prejudice, discrim­
ination, and armed conflict in Europe; to open up the economic frontiers 
that had previously divided Europe into small, protected markets; to 
harness the constructive energies of the European peoples; to make the 
Community a single economic area; to recover collectively some of the 
world influence the Western European nations had lost separately; to 
become a strong force for peace and a generous provider for the world’s
2poorer nations; and to contribute to world stability and law and order.
The European Community is, without question, an important world 
actor. Collectively, its member states have a population greater than 
either the United States or the Soviet Union, and a share of inter­
national trade and aid to developing nations which exceeds that of the 
United States. Although the Community is not a "superpower" politically 
or militarily, its economic strength in an emerging era of increasing 
global economic interdependence lends it potential importance as a 
foreign policy actor. Granted, regional governmental organizations are 
far from being ready to replace nation-states as prime actors in inter­
national relations. The Community's successes in its external relations
2The European Community Information Service (Washington, D.C.), 
The European Community; The Facts (February, 1974), p. 2.
do not as yet give cause to believe that bloc-a-bloc multinational 
relations will replace traditional bilateral interstate relations as the 
prime focus of foreign policy analysis. Such a development is, however 
embryonic, a significant one, and the Community offers the best example 
to date of a movement away from bilateral to multi-lateral foreign 
political and economic policy-making.
This work will focus on the Community's external relations.
The general thesis of this dissertation is that in recent years, the 
Community has stagnated internally, but has progressed markedly in its 
external affairs. There are many plausible reasons for this development, 
but none of them offers satisfactory explanation if taken out of the 
context of the Community's past experience and present situation. The 
presentation of the theoretical statements and evidence to support the 
claim that the Community has stagnated internally while seemingly con­
centrating further integration in its external affairs will follow in 
later chapters. This chapter will first provide a brief history of the 
Community, an explanation of the structure of its institutions and 
decision-making procedures, and a summary of what is known of the pre­
sent state of integration in the European Community.
The European Community: 1945-1969
The end of World War II and its resultant suffering and devas­
tation reawakened the movement to unite the nations of Europe. If for 
no other reason, Europeans were determined to find a way to prevent 
another war on the continent and the effects brought on by unlimited
3nationalism. The difficulties in post-war economic recovery exacer­
bated the problems imposed by narrow national boundaries, and the 
inability to compete with American trade in the world market enhanced 
the arguments for European union. The American Marshall Plan, which 
began in 1948, gave those who favored European union a first glimmer of 
hope.
One aim of the Marshall Plan was to promote economic integra­
tion. The organization created by the Marshall Plan, the Organization 
for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), was to be a supranational 
body, but British reticence kept it from being what France and the 
Benelux countries hoped for and what the Americans had designed it to 
be. Moreover, the OEEC was limited in scope and suffered due to the 
unanimity rule. This meant that when decisions as to common action
3There are several good historical-normative accounts of early 
European integration movements. John Patrick Corbett, in Europe and the 
Social Order (Leyden: Sijthoff, 1959), assumes the perspective of a
rationalist social philosopher, focusing on normative considerations and 
priorities he feels do and should underlie European unity, particularly 
what he calls the "principles of social order." Corbett sees rapid, 
extensive, accelerating and above all systematic change for Europe. A 
former President of the EEC Commission, Walter Hallstein, in United 
Europe: Challenge and Opportunity (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University
Press, 1962), expresses his views as to how economic integration can be 
turned to political ends, and outlines the necessity for a re-definition 
of U.S.-European economic, political, and military relationships.
Altiero Spinelli's The Eurocrats: Conflict and Crisis an the European
Community (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1967), is a description of
the centers of European action and construction. Spinelli analyzes the 
extent and importance of European-level bureaucratic and interest group 
interactions, and argues that more active and systematic efforts should 
be made by the Commission to mobilize the support of political groups in 
the European Parliament, national political parties, and private European 
movements.
could be negotiated, they were almost always at the level of the lowest 
common denominator. The Hague Conference of May, 1948, sponsored by the 
International Committee of the Movement for European Union, ended in 
agreement only to support traditional forms of cooperation among 
European states. The conference did assist, however, in laying the 
groundwork for the Council of Europe which was formed in May, 1949. The 
European "federalists" and those who supported some immediate form of 
European unification were confronted by nation-state rivalries and those 
favoring a gradual approach to the question. It seemed as though these 
obstacles could only be overcome by a substantial shock to post-war 
Western Europe.
The shock came in May, 1950. Robert Schuman, the French Foreign 
Minister, formally proposed that Franco-German coal and steel production 
be combined under a common high authority in which participation would 
be offered to all other European countries. Schuman justified his plan 
in economic terms, but his primary motive was political. Schuman later 
admitted that the French proposal was "to end Franco-German hostility 
once and for all."^
The Schuman Plan was approved by the French Cabinet in hopes 
that by entrusting part of their sovereignty to a supranational author­
ity, individual nations would lay the basis for an eventual political 
union in Europe. Negotiations between the nations responding to the 
Schuman Plan (France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and
^F. Roy Willis, France, Germany, and the New Europe 1945-1963 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965), p. 80.
Luxembourg) began in Paris on June 20, 1950, and culminated in the sirn- 
ing of the Joint Declaration on April 18, 1951. This formally initiated 
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The ECSC High Authority 
began operations on August 10, 1952. The ESC Treaty provided for the 
abolition of customs duties and other restrictions in the movement of 
coal and steel between the member countries. It also contained a set of 
common rules meant to control cartels and to regulate mergers, measures 
to harmonize transport rates, and measures to control production and
C
prices during economic crises."
The drive toward further European unity suffered a setback 
when, in 1954, the proposed European Defense Community and creation of a 
European army were defeated in the French National Assembly.^ These 
proposals were replaced, in part, by the creation of the Western Euro­
pean Union (WEU) and the admission of West Germany into NATO in 1955. 
Although political and military integration plans were thwarted, 
economic integration success in the ECSC was sufficient for the foreign 
ministers of the Six meeting in Messina, Sicily, in June, 1955, to call 
for even further economic integration. The eventual outcomes were two 
new treaties that were signed in Rome in March, 1957, and entered into 
force on January 1, 1958. Known as the Treaty of Rome, the treaties 
added to the ECSC the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and the 
European Economic Community (EEC). The three Communities each had
5For background, see Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe; 
Political Social, and Economic Forces 1950-1957 (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1958).
^For detail, see Chapter V of this dissertation.
separate executive bodies (Commissions) but shared some common institu­
tions: the European Court of Justice, the European Parliamentary
Assembly (later called the European Parliament), and the Council of 
Ministers which made all important policy decisions for all three 
communities.
Euratom progressed little in the beginning. Differences 
between the member states as to the scope and direction of its research 
activities and serious budgetary difficulties hampered Euratom’s 
development.^ Despite initial progress, the ECSC was overtaken by a 
serious coal crisis in 1958, competition from cheaper imported oil, and 
difficulties in the steel industry. Quite the contrary, the EEC was an 
immediate and unexpected success. In its first four years, tariffs on 
industrial goods were cut by 40 percent, significant progress toward a 
common external tariff was achieved, and the member states agreed on 
initial steps toward the free movement of workers and capital, and on 
rules for competition. Further, agreement was reached on financial and
g
marketing arrangements for a common agricultural policy.
Successful integration in the economic sectors brought on yet 
another attempt at political unity. The "Plan Fouchet" proposed foreign 
and defense policy coordination through a treaty for political union.
The de Gaulle-initiated proposal was negotiated for two years, but
^See, Jaroslav G. Polach, Euratom: Its Background, Issues and
Economic Implications (Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, 1964).
g
More on this period may be found in Michael Curtis’s Western 
European Integration (New York: Harper ?ind Row, 1969) and Roger
Morgan’s Western European Politics Since: 1945: The Shaping of the
European Community (London: B. T. Batsford, 1972).
8
collapsed in 1962 due to French refusal to include the British and Dutch 
insistence on it. This cleavage was exacerbated the following year by 
the French veto of British entry into the Community.
The Community experienced its greatest crisis in 1965. The 
Commission proposed that the financing of the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) should be made independent of the member states. At about 
the same time, it also recommended a substantial increase in the budget­
ary power of the European Parliament. The immediate break occurred in 
June when several of the member states (notably Italy) refused to commit 
themselves to a definite settlement on financing the CAP, an issue on 
vdiich France was most adamant. But deeper issues lay behind the con­
flict. The major problem involved the willingness of the member states 
to introduce majority voting in the Council of Ministers during the 
third stage of transition provided in the Treaty of Rome (which began
9in 1959). In September, 1965, French President de Gaulle announced he 
would not accept majority voting, proposed changes to decrease the power of 
the Commission and ordered a boycott of Community institutions. When 
France walked out of the Council of Ministers, the Community came to a 
standstill.
The crisis was finally resolved by a compromise reached in 
Luxembourg in January, 1966. France agreed to resume active participa­
tion in the Community after the Six agreed to disagree concerning 
majority voting in the Council of Ministers. The "gentleman's agreement"
9Roy Pryce, "Customs Union and Economic Union in the EEC," in 
John Calmann (editor). The Common Market (London: Anthony Bland, 1967),
pp. 43-57.
in the Luxembourg Compromise had the effect of maintaining the unanimity 
rule and immediately increasing the power of the Council of Ministers 
and decreasing that of the Commission. The weighted voting system still 
remains a formal part of the Council of Ministers, but it is virtually 
never used. To date, each member state retains the right of veto in 
the Council. France did not win completely. In return for the 
Luxembourg compromise, France softened its demands concerning the CAP, 
getting from the other states only a program of work which promised pro­
gress toward completing the CAP.
Economic integration continued to progress despite further con­
flict between the member states (Britain’s second attempt to enter the 
Community was again answered by a French veto in December, 1967). The 
customs Union was completed ahead of schedule, the decision to progres­
sively introduce a value-added tax and a five year economic program 
were worked out, and some progress was made on the common transport policy,
There are many studies of European economic integration. Most 
analyze European integration’s impact on growth rates, productivity, in­
vestment patterns, and the transnational movement of economic factors. 
Leading exançles include Ingo Walter’s The European Common Market; Growth 
and Patterns of Trade and Production (New York: Praeger, 1967), Lawrence
B. Krause’s European Economic Integration and the United States (Washington: 
Brookings Institute,1968), .zud A. Lamfulussey’s The United Kingdom and 
the Six (Homewood, 111.: R. B. Irving Co., 1963). There are those, how­
ever, that focus on the institutions and policy in regional economic inte­
gration. James W. Meade et. al., Case Studies in European Economic Union: 
The Mechanics of Integration (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962),
examines the Belgium^Luxembourg Economic Union, Benelux and the ECSC, 
attempting to answer the question: "What economic arrangements must be
made in an economic union in order to make it work affectively?" In The 
Common Market :Economic Integration in Europe (Philadelphia: J. B.
Lippencott, 1965), Finn B. Jensen and Ingo Walter provide succinct sum­
maries of policy and institutional problems, particularly on regional 
policy, social policy, competition, coordiation of national taxation and 
counter-cyclical policies, and monetary integration. D. L. McLachlan and 
D. Swann provide a systematic and exhaustive account of competition policy
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Further, on July 1, 1967, the merger of the commissions of the three 
Communities into one Commission was accomplished. In the external 
affairs of the Community, significant successes occurred also. The 
Community spoke with one voice in the Kennedy Round of GATT, which con­
cluded successfully in 1967. The Six renegotiated the Yaounde Convention 
with the African "associate s t a t e s , a n d  added a substantial number 
of trade agreements, notably with Morocco and Tunisia, in 1969.
In many ways, 1969 was a watershed for the Community. De 
Gaulle's resignation in April of that year finally paved the way for 
expansion and British membership. Moreover, the Hague Summit of the 
Heads of State and of Government of the Six in December, 1969, set new 
goals for political and economic union in the Community. Before dis­
cussing this further, it should be instructive to briefly consider the 
institutional and decision-making structure of the Community.
The Institutions
The Six major institutions of the European Community are the 
Council of Ministers, the Committee of Permanent Representatives, the 
Commission, the European Parliament, the Court of Justice, and the 
Economic and Social Committee (and Consultative Committee). In general, 
the Council of Ministers fulfills a legislative role, the Commission an
^^(the goals sought in the Treaties, 
the problems encountered, the common policies developed and their 
effects) in their Competition Policy in the European Community; The 
Rule in Theory and Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967)
■"■̂ See Chapter VII of this dissertation.
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executive role, the Court of Justice has the power of judicial review 
on the Treaties, and the Parliament, Economic and Social Committee, and 
Consultative Committee are advisory groups to the Council and Commis­
sion. The Committee of Permanent Representatives has the responsibility 
of preparing the deliberations of the Council. All institutions are 
located in Brussels, Belgium, except the Court of Justice which is
located in Luxembourg, and the European Parliament which meets both in
12Luxembourg and in Strasbourg, France. (See Figure 1.1)
The Commission
The Commission is the "guardian of the Treaties". It is res­
ponsible to see that treaty provisions and institutional decisions are 
properly implemented. It has the authority to investigate, issue an 
objective ruling, and notify the government concerned (subject to veri­
fication by the Court of Justice) of the required corrective action. As 
the executive arm of the Communities, the Commission is directly invested 
with specific powers by the Treaties. It also has been granted substan­
tial additional powers by the Council to implement enactments based on 
the Treaties (these powers are referred to as "derived Community law").
The Commission's powers can be summarized as falling in three major areas. 
First: the Commission prepares implementing orders for treaty pro­
visions or Council enactments. These fall into the following categories: 
regulations (which are binding in every respect and have the direct force
12General descriptions of the Communities' institutions may be 
found in A. H. Robertson, European Institutions: Co-operation:
Integration: Unification (New York: Matthew Bender, 1973); and in
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of law in every member state), directives (which are binding on the 
member states but leave to the national authorities’ discretion as to the 
mode and means), decisions (which are binding in every respect), recom­
mendations (which are binding as to ends but not to means), and opinions 
(which are not binding). Second: the Commission applies the rules of
the Treaties to particular cases (concerning both governments and pri­
vate firms) and to the administration of Community funds. Generally, 
these rules involve such things as preventing cartel formations and mar­
ket dominance, limiting state subsidizations, and discouraging discrimina­
tory fiscal practices. The Commission manages several large funds, 
including the European Social Fund, the European Development Fund, the 
"Cheysson Fund," and the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee 
Fund. Third: the Commission administers the safeguard clauses in the
Treaties. These so-called "escape clauses" provide only the Commission 
the authority to grant waivers ("derogations") at the request of a member 
state when special problems or circumstances exist for them.
Structurally, the Commission consists of 13 members who are 
appointed by agreement of the member governments. By an official agree­
ment, each member state has at least one of its nationals on the Commis­
sion, and the President of the Commission rotates between the member 
states. The Commissioners are required to act fully independently of 
both the national governments and the Council of Ministers. The Council 
cannot remove any Commissioner from office. This may be done only by the 
Parliament's passing a vote of censure, in which case the entire 
Commission must resign as a body.
The Commissioners have working for them a General Secretariat,
14
a Legal Department, a Statistical Office, 19 functionally specific
Directorates-General, and a small number of specialized services.
Their staffs total over 7,000 civil servants from the nine member
states. The major importance of the Commission is that it is the
initiator of Community policy and the exponent of Community interest.
It is responsible to see that Community policy forms a single con- 
13sistent whole. (See Figure 1.2)
The Council of Ministers 
The Council of Ministers is the Community's main decision­
making body. It is made up of representatives of the member states.
As a rule, each government sends one minister although it may on 
occasion send more than one. Membership varies according to the sub­
ject matter under consideration. The member states' foreign ministers 
are considered the main representatives on the Council, but meetings 
are often composed of ministers of Agriculture, Transport, Finance, 
Industry, etc. The Council usually meets three or four times monthly.
It has a permanent secretariat (staff of 1,200) and the Committee of 
Permanent Representatives to assist in the preparations for the meetings. 
The chairmanship of the Council rotates among the member states every 
six months. The present rotation began in the first half of 1973 with 
Belgium and follows this order: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, United Kingdom.
In theory, decision-making in the Council is by a weighted
13See David Coombes. Politics and Bureaucracy in the European 
Community: A Portrait of the Commission of the EEC (London; George
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majority vote. The larger states, Germany, Italy, France, and the 
United Kingdom, have ten votes each, Belgium and the Netherlands five 
each, Ireland and Denmark three each, and Luxembourg two. Of this total 
of 58 votes, 41 votes are required for passage. Should the vote concern 
anything that did not come first as a proposal from the Commission, those 
41 or more votes must have been cast by at least six member states. In 
practice, almost all decisions are made by seeking unanimity, although 
the treaties require this in only a few instances (such as admission of 
a new member). The gentlemen’s agreement of the Luxembourg Compromise 
is still in force. Rather than give up veto powers, the member states 
have preferred the practice of seeking unanimity on council decisions 
during marathon sessions. These sessions continue around the clock with­
out interruption until consensus is reached by "splitting the difference" 
or, as is more usually the case, by "finding the lowest common denominator." 
All Council decisions on matters included in the Treaties must be based 
on a Commission proposal. Commission proposals can be amended by the 
Council, but this requires a unanimous vote.^^
The Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER)
The Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) consists 
of the nine member states’ ambassadors to the Communities and the staffs 
of the ambassadors which are composed of experts in various fields of 
Community interest. These staffs are arranged in multi-national action 
groups and working committees. Basically, their role is to do the
14See, P.-H.J.M. Houben, Les Conseils des Ministres des 
Communautés Européennes -(Leyden: Sijthoff, 1964).
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groundwork for the Council meetings by reviewing all Commission pro­
posals and reporting to the Council areas of agreement among the national 
viewpoints. As such, the COREPER provides a function similar to that of 
a Congressional Committee. Although the COREPER does not hold formal 
hearings, the Commission can and does provide them further information 
and support for Commission proposals. Given the great volume of Council 
business, COREPER recommendations carry great weight and influence. The 
COREPER has been an important institution since 1958. Its existence was 
not provided for in the Treaties (it did not even exist for the ECSC), 
but the Treaty of Assession in 1973 confirmed its existence and gave it 
a legal basis. (The COREPER will be discussed in more detail in Chapter V.)
The European Parliament 
The major roJ.e of the European Parliament is as a consultative 
body and watchdog over the Commission, charged to insure it does not
adhere to any one national position or lose sight of the "Community
interest." The Parliament consists of 198 members appointed from and 
by the national legislatures (36 each from France, Germany, Italy, and 
the United Kingdom; 14 each from Belgium and the Netherlands; 10 each 
from Ireland and Denmark, and six from Luxembourg). The Parliament is 
constituted to be truly Community in character, having European-level 
political party groups but no national groupings. The Parliament meets
seven or eight times a year for a week at a time. Between sessions, its
various functional committees meet in camera to discuss issues concerning 
the Community and obtain information from other Community institutions.^^
^^See, Murray Forsyth, The Parliament of the European Communities 
(London: Political and Economic Planning, 1964).
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The Parliament has the right to put written and oral questions 
to Commissioners and the Council of Ministers. In 1973, a Question Time 
was introduced to increase the dialogue with the executive organs.
The Parliament has limited but gradually increasing budgetary 
powers. In 1970, the "free" part of the budget (money to maintain EC's 
institutions' functioning) was brought under "the final word of the 
Parliament." Although the funds involved are small by comparison to the 
total Community budget, they have great political significance. Control 
of operating funds is a matter to which all Community institutions are 
quite s e n s i t i v e . T h e  powers of the Parliament are likely to increase 
dramatically in and after 1978. In July, 1976, the European Council 
decided to hold the first direct elections to the European Parliament in 
May or June, 1978, and also to increase substantially the size of the 
Parliament. The new body will have 410 seats. The seat allocation will 
be as follows: 81 for each of the four largest members (Germany, France,
Italy, and the United Kingdom), 25 for the Netherlands, 24 for Belgium,
16 for Denmark, 15 for Ireland and 6 for Luxembourg. Having a directly 
elected European Parliament and the accompanying increase in political 
power substantially increases the chances of a much stronger role for the 
Parliament in the near future.
The European Court of Justice
The Court of Justice consists of nine judges. They are appointed
^^Emile Noel, "How the European Community's Institutions Work," 
Community Topics 39 (April, 1973), pp. 9-10.
17James Goldsborough, "EEC Reaches Accord on Europe Parliament," 
The International Herald Tribune, July 13, 1976, p. 1.
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at the consent of the national governments for terms of six years. The
nine judges are assisted by four advocates - general. The Court insures
the observance of law and justice in the interpretation and application
of the Treaties, and laws passed to implement the Treaties. The Court
may give judgment on appeals brought by a member state, the Council, the
Commission or any person or company affected by a Community decision.
In that sense, the Court of Justice is the Community "Supreme Court."
The Court's decisions are binding and final, and cannot be appealed in
18the national courts.
The Economic and Social Committee 
The Economic and Social Committee (ESC) is a consultative body 
having no powers of decision or initiative, but it does influence decision­
making in the Community. Tlie Commission and the Council are required to 
consult the ESC on most major policy proposals. In addition, the ESC 
sends published opinions to the Commission, many parts of which are 
included in later Commission proposals sent to the Council. The Committee 
consists of 144 members selected from labor, business, agriculture, 
consumer, and family organizations. Seats are allocated by nation;
Germany, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom, twenty-four each; twelve 
each from the Netherlands and Belgium; nine each from Denmark and Ireland, 
and six from Luxembourg. Most of the ESC's members are high officials 
in interest groups which have offices and staffs located in Brussels as 
well as throughout Europe.
18See, Gerhard Bebr, Judicial Control of the European Communities 
(New York: Praeger, 1962). Also, Stuart A. Scheingold, The Rule of Law
in European Integration: The Path of the Schuman Plan (New Haven, Conn.:
Yale University Press, 1965).
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The ESC is divided into three groups. Group I contains business 
organizations (such as the Union des Industries de la Communauté 
Européenne (UNICE). Group II is the labor unions' section; its largest 
member is the European Trade Union Confederation. Group III is made up 
of agricultural groups (e.g. the Committee of Professional Agricultural 
Organizations in the EEC (COPA)), professionals, consumer groups, and 
family groups.
The ESC functions only for the EEC and Euratom matters. A 
similar group, the "Consultative Committee", advises the Council and 
Commission on ECSC affairs. Constituted similarly to the ESC, the 
Consultative Committee has 81 members.
The "European Council"
In recent years, an unofficial institution has developed in 
the Cbmmunity. Motivated by a concern to deal at the highest level with 
difficult political problems that had stalemated the Council of Ministers, 
the heads of state and of government of the member states began holding 
periodic summits to discuss Community issues and problems. This body, 
popularized as the "European Council", is an extremely important actor 
in the Community. So far as institutional structures are concerned, 
however, it may be little different than the Council of Ministers, attended 
by Prime Ministers rather than Foreign Ministers. Like the Council of 
Ministers, the European Council's chairman rotates between the member 
states every six months; the nation chairing the Council of Ministers also 
chairs the European Council. When the European Council meets (generally 
every four months), both the COREPER and the Council of Ministers serve 
to prepare the meeting. (The European Council will be discussed in more
21
detail later in Chapter IV.)
The Decision-Making Process
By virtue of the Treaties, the Commission can make regulations 
and decisions, and can submit resolutions to the Council, but these must 
be made collegiately. Majority voting is used in the Commission, and 
the minority always abides by the majority decision. The Commission 
draws up decisions and proposals in two stages. After consulting with 
political circles, (e.g. the European Parliament, top civil servants, 
and the Economic and Social Committee and various employers and workers 
groups),the appropriate Directorate-General prepares an opinion on its 
own, generally through a long, time-consuming series of meetings. When 
general policy guidelines (based on the prepared opinions) have been 
determined and approved by the Commissioners, the second procedure is 
initiated. The concerned Directorate-General holds meetings with groups 
of experts from the national governments and often informally confers 
with representatives of the COREPER. In addition, members of the 
Commission meet with representatives of interest groups and other 
Community institutions in committees, many of which have become insti­
tutionalized (e.g., the Short-Term Economic Policy Committee, the 
Budgetary Policy Committee, the Mediunt-Term Economic Policy Committee, 
the Nuclear Research Advisory Committee, the Committee on Vocational 
Training, the Committee on the Free Movement of Workers, and the Committee 
on Social Security for Migrant Workers). The results of these meetings 
are reported to the responsible Commissioner who, in turn, reports them 
to the entire Commission.
When the Commission sends either a memorandum of general scope
22
or a proposal on a particular point, the Council will first refer it
to the COREPER. The COREPER can only recommend action to the Council;
all decisions must be made by the Council of Ministers. On matters of
relative less importance and when the COREPER and Commission are
unanimously agreed, the Council will adopt the decision without debate.
On more important matters or those having political implications, the
Council will debate the issue. At such times members of the Commission
attend the Council meetings (as a right) to defend their proposals.
Consultation with other Community institutions i.e., the Parliament and
ESC, generally takes place before the debate (but usually only if required
by the Treaties). Decisions and regulations of the Council are binding,
19subject only to review by the European Court of Justice.
A Return to Community History; 1969-1973 
Two important events occurred in the Community in 1969. First, 
the election of George Pompedou as French President to succeed de Gaulle 
paved the way for British entry and enlargement of the Community. Second, 
the European Council meeting in the Hague in December, 1969, called for 
"completing, deepening, and enlarging the Community." It formally 
declared the Community's 12-year transition period to be at an end in 
December 31, 1969, and approved a plan to finance, by 1975, a Community 
budget totally from proceeds of the common external tariff and a small 
part of the proceeds of the value-added tax. The agreement also gave 
limited control of the Community budget to the European Parliament.
The Hague Summit also produced proposals for the creation of an
^^Noel, pp. 11-12.
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20economic and monetary union and a renewed attempt at political union.
The economic and monetary union proposal prompted a report the following
year by a committee chaired by Luxembourg Prime Minister Pierre Wemer.
The "Wemer Report" set a target date of 1980 for a high degree of
coordination of national economic policies, a harmonization of budgetary
policies, a Community currency, a unified capital market, and Community
21intervention into regional policies. Also, in December, 1969, a 
marathon Council session produced agreement on financing a common agri­
cultural policy.
Membership negotiations opened in 1970 to include the United 
Kingdom, Denmark, Ireland, and Norway. Also in 1970, the common foreign 
trade policy became operational and political cooperation meetings began. 
The following year produced a common fisheries policy and the generalized 
system of preferences for 91 developing nations. The Assession Treaty 
enlarging the Community was signed in 1972, but the people of Norway 
rejected membership in a popular referendum and Norway declined member­
ship. In 1973, Ireland, Denmark, and the United Kingdom began actively 
participating in the Community, giving the Community the membership and 
character it has today.
The European Council (heads of state and of government of the 
nine member states of the European Community) issued in its final 
communique of the 1973 Paris Summit the resolve "...of transforming.
20The latter is discussed in more detail in Chapter V.
21Glenda G. Rosenthal, The Men Behind the Decisions; Cases In 
European Policy-Making (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1975), pp. 101-125.
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before the end of the present decade and with the fullest respect for 
the treaties already signed, the whole complex of relations of member 
states into a European union..." and "...request{ed} the institutions 
of the Community to draw up a report on this subject before the end of 
1975...". The reports, published by the Commission, European Parliament, 
Economic and Social Committee, European Court of Justice, and specially 
commissioned reports by Belgian Prime Minister Leo Tindemans and the 
Dutch government (the "Spierenburg Report"), all strongly advocate 
European union. For example, all except the ECJ report make special 
mention of the need for the Community to formulate and implement a com­
mon foreign policy for and on behalf of the nine member states. The 
recent reports of the Community institutions indicate greater consensus, 
a stronger resolve by political leaders, and expectations for European 
union higher than ever before.
Yet, since the 1973 Paris Summit, European integration seems to 
be nearing a standstill. Despite the optimistic tone of the various 
reports on European union, the decision for direct elections to the 
European Parliament by 1978, and the communalistic rhetoric to come out 
of the European Council, attempts at reaching economic and monetary union 
have met an impasse (or, perhaps, nine separate impasses). The nine 
member states differ in their various market mechanisms, labor structures, 
and consumer mentalities to the extent that goal conflicts abound. The 
Community members cannot decide whether the European Community should 
concentrate on fighting inflation or fight unemployment by expanding 
economic growth. No concensus exists as to whether it is best to take 
steps to minimize energy costs or to safeguard energy sources. Strong
25
differences exist as to whether the currencies of the nine should be 
tied together or should be susceptible to manipulation by each government 
as a national economic control mechanism. Were the Nine able to reach 
agreement on the basic goals, they would still be far apart concerning 
the means to be employed to reach those goals. The probable accession of 
Greece, and later Spain and Portugal, should serve only to exacerbate 
these differences. Indeed, many of those most knowledgeable of Community 
affairs now argue that a step backward has been made in economic and 
monetary affairs.
This assessment is not a new one. Doubts concerning the pos­
sibility of economic and monetary union pre-date the Hague Summit, which 
gave birth to the Wemer Report. The Economic and Social Committee of 
the European Community stated in a published opinion in 1969:
A correct assessment of the results already obtained calls for 
an appreciation of the enormous difficulties involved in merging 
the different national economies into a single union which leaves 
a way open to political union. There is no denying, however, that 
the Community has for some time past been faced with difficulties 
over and above those which the progress of integration itself would 
normally entail. The situation is uncertain, and progress towards 
economic union is marking time. There are many reasons for this 
regretable state of affairs but the main one is that the Member 
States hold profoundly different views on essential political 
issues such as the enlargement of the Community, the powers of the 
European Parliament, the implementation of treaty rules on voting 
within the Council, the work to be done by EURATOM. There is 
evidence that these conflicting opinions may well herald a return 
to nationalism and paralysis for the Communities; because it looks 
as if, contrary to our long-cherished belief, economic integration 
does not necessarily lead to political union. On the contrary, if 
economic integration is to advance heyond the customs union, there 
must be a political will.^^
22"Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee," February 26-27, 
1969, pp. 7-8.
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Later assessments also attest to the fact that little progress 
has been made in the Community's internal affairs. The European Parlia­
ment recently called the lack of progress toward a common transport 
policy "disappointing," the lack of political will to arrive at a common 
position on energy a sign of "weakness and impotence" of the Community 
and of renewed competition between the nation states. The Parliamentary 
report further charged that "the lack of progress toward economic and
monetary union was largely attributable to the failure of the Council
23{of Ministers} to take decisions..". The Parliamentarians' assessment
of the state of integration in the economic and monetary affairs of the
Community was negative:
Coordination of {the} economic policies of the Member States {is} 
inconsistent; {there are} now more restrictions in movements of 
capital than at {the} beginning of {the} '60's; only limited pro­
gress {has occurred} in EC structural policy and fiscal harmoniza­
tion. {The} European Monetary Cooperation Fund plays {a} subsidiary 
role. Ireland, Italy, and {the} United Kingdom play no part in the 
EC's exchange-rate mechanism. Cooperation between the central banks 
of the Member States {is} satisfactory.^**
The unsuccessful attempt to achieve a passport union in the 
Community provides another example of the state of integration in the 
Community's internal affairs. Indeed, the original effort has now been 
reduced to an attempt to standardize the size, color, and format of the 
member states' passports. Even this effort is now bogged down due to 
disagreements as to which languages should be used, in what order they
23"Report on European Union," The European Parliament Working 
Papers, Document 174/75, 7 July 1975, p. 5 ff.
24Secretariat of the European Parliament, Europe Today: State
of European Integration, April 15, 1976, para. 4.163.
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25should appear, and what color the external cover should be.
Speaking before the European Parliament on July 7, 1976, Max van
der Stoel, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands
and then the new President of the Council of Ministers, provided his
assessment of the state of European integration:
There was a time, not so long ago, when the European Communities 
included a motto in their flag, which ran: 'completion, enlargement
and strengthening'. This was at the time of the summit conference 
at The Hague, when we reached agreement on the conclusion of the 
EEC's transitional stage, on the accession of new members and on the 
prospect of an economic and monetary union. All this happened at the 
end of the sixties and at the beginning of this decade.
Now, a few years later, one cannot but notice that the motto 'comple­
tion, enlargement and strengthening' has been replaced by the motto 
'stagnation, decline and elusion.'
Stagnation: especially as regards the construction of the common
market and its development into a real economic union, there has been 
a long period of virtually complete standstill. The Communities' 
institutions have been unable to produce any new, creative legis­
lation; no new policy areas of any significance have been transposed 
from the national to the Community sphere. The Community apparatus 
is still operative but seems to be sterile and ineffectual. There 
is a lack of imagination and decision-making and I know only too well 
that this discouraging picture is, first and foremost, characteristic 
of that institution of the Communities referred to as the Council of 
Ministers. However, this stagnation and ineffectualness have also 
affected other bodies of the Community.
Decline: the blight of stagnation did not come by itself, as was to 
be expected, it was accompanied by an even greater blight, namely 
the decline, disintegration and impairment of the Community's patri­
mony. These signs of disintegration are produced day by day, and as 
the economic problems currently facing the Member States become more 
serious and more persistent, so will the danger of recession at 
Community level become even more acute than it already is. I am not 
only referring, or not even referring primarily, to the degeneration 
of the rules whereby the Community institutions should operate, or to 
the institutional interplay as provided for in the Treaties. No,
I am especially referring to the signs of disintegration affecting 
the member States' economic and monetary policies. It is in this
25Based on interviews with officials in the COREPER, June -
July, 1976.
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field that the dangers which are threatening the Communities 
should without any reservation be termed very serious. The 
realities which at one time were to have formed the basis for our 
European solidarity now seem to be the cause of differences, of 
our growing apart and the parting of our ways.^®
Stagnation in the Seventies: Barriers to Continued Integration
Attempts at further integration in the European Community have 
been frustrated by various conditions, personalities, external problems, 
but particularly by two broad categories, political barriers and 
economic barriers. Political barriers include differing foreign policies, 
different ideological and political party structures, nationalism and 
ethnonationalism, perceived relationships of the member states to the 
Community, and the issue of collective security. Economic barriers con­
sist of different national economic problems, different economic philo­
sophies, the questions concerning energy, and the persistence of simul­
taneously high unemployment and inflation.
Political Barriers 
Foreign Policy Differences. West Germany and France represent 
the two extremes among the Community states. Germany has pursued a more 
cautious, conservative approach toward non-member states, and has been 
the staunchest ally of the United States. In contrast, France has pursued 
policies antagonistic to the United States (particularly concerning NATO, 
nuclear power, and weapons), and has been quick to take definitive stands 
on conflict in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. The United Kingdom 
has modified but continued its independent aloofness from the Continent,
26I received the text (an English translation) of the speech while 
visiting the Dutch Foreign Ministry in The Hague, July, 1976.
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but it more closely resembles German conservatism than French unpre­
dictability. The best example of EC political disharmony occurred 
immediately after the Arab Oil Boycott. The divergent reactions, all of 
which were nationalistic in character (and which nearly destroyed the 
Community), ranged from the almost immediate acquiescence of the French 
to the dogged refusal of the Dutch to alter their foreign policy vis-a-vis 
Israel. Concerning the developing countries, France, Italy, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom often openly favor their former 
colonies, while West Germany, Denmark, Ireland and Luxembourg have no 
inclination or reason for such favoritism.
Expansion. A related political problem concerns the anticipated 
expansion of the Community. Greece is now negotiating for EC membership 
and Spain and Portugal have expressed the desire to join by the 1980s. 
There is growing concern among Community leaders as to what effect the 
fragile political structures and poor economies of these states will have 
on European integiation after the Community expands to twelve. The 
expansion would require massive capital transfer to the poorer states 
depleting the stronger states in order to achieve economic balance in 
the Community. The alternative would be to continue national economic 
policies widening the chasm between rich and poor in the EC. The "Nine" 
realize that admitting the three Mediterranean states is economically 
unsound. It will, at best, retard integration; at worst, it may cause 
the Community's undoing. Politically, however, the Community cannot turn 
down the requests for admittance as long as the applicants "fulfill the
30
27conditions of democracy" as required in the Treaties of Rome.
Internal Political Pressures. Sizeable opposition to the 
Community still exists in some of the member states, particularly 
in Britain and Denmark. Anti-marketeer forces in those states draw 
politically on the failures of the Community to deliver the promises of 
the pro-marketeer forces. Political leaders in those states tend to be 
more conservative and less willing to risk new integrative programs. 
Additionally, Britain, France, and Belgium must contend with ethnona- 
tionalist movements within their borders. The British have the most 
serious troubles with open warfare in Ulster and Welsh and Scottish
28nationalists clamoring for local autonomy up to outright independence.
France contends with similar though smaller forces in the Brittany,
Normandy, and Gascony regions of France. Belgium still must respond to
a serious cleavage between the Flems and Walloons. Hugo Schiltz, leader
of the Flemish Nationalist Volksunie Party argues that the only rational
solution to govern Belgium is to create a federal state of two nations
29with Brussels as a separate neutral district. What must be considered 
with all this is that many leaders of the member states now have tenuous 
holds on their goveimments, governing from the minority or holding
27William Drozdiak, "EEC Sees Problems If Three Countries 
Admitted," The Washington Post (November 4, 1976), Section A, p. 5.
28A 1976 poll in the Scottish Daily Record indicated nearly one- 
half of all Scots favored cutting ties with Britain completely and 
setting up an independent nation. The Washington Post (November 30, 1976), 
Section A, p. 11.
29European Community 201 (May-June, 1977), p. 38.
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insecure coalitions. Economic insecurity has eroded the political 
support for den Uyl of the Netherlands, Tindemans of Belgium, Britain's 
Callaghan, and France's Giscard d’Estaing. Schmidt's liberal coalition 
in Germany won by only eight seats in the last election in the face of 
growing conservative opposition. Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreatti 
heads a minority government. National leaders are not disposed to risk 
innovation toward more European integration when their own political 
survival is in question.
A related political problem has to do with relatively strong 
Communist Parties in France and Italy. These parties have major influ­
ences on the labor unions in those countries and an increasing influence 
in their governments. They now have the greatest power and support 
since the period immediately following World War II. The Italian 
Communist Party, led by Enrico Berlinguer, has a membership of 1.7 
million, and received 34 percent of the vote in the 1976 parliamentary 
elections. The French Communist Party's George Marchais leads one-half 
million members who won 20 percent of the vote in the 1973 General 
Assembly elections and have, by all estimates, grown considerably stronger 
since that time. The gains of the Communists in the South of Europe 
compared to relative weakness in the North reflect the stronger class 
structures and absence of Democratic Socialist parties to buffer left 
from right in France and Italy. In addition, these states are still far 
behind their Community partners in overhauling tax structures and seive- 
like collection procedures that favor the rich and permit the amassing 
of huge f o r t u n e s . T h e  growing left in the South while Germany, Denmark,
^^The Washington Post (September 19, 1976), Section A, p. 1.
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and the Benelux countries reassess their heavy expenditures on welfare 
programs and inch to the right creates another political barrier to 
further European integration.
Collective Security. There are quite different national per­
ceptions among the member states concerning collective security.
Germany, Denmark, and the Benelux countries are either happy with NATO 
as it is or would like to see even more United States involvement in 
NATO. France continues to opt for an alternative to dependency on the 
United States in NATO and for a more independent national defense.
Ireland staunchly refuses military involvement preferring to remain 
neutral. Britain and Italy have cut back in troop strengths in response 
to their badly sagging economies. West Germany, with its 495,000 troops, 
is the only European NATO member not considering troop cuts. The dif­
ferent philosophical attitudes toward defense and considerations brought 
about by economic necessity pose a further political barrier to European 
integration.
Economic Barriers
Economic Problems. Economic recovery has been very slow in the 
European Community states. The general difficulty has been the phenomenon 
plaguing the entire developed world: simultaneous increases in unemploy­
ment and inflation. The major concern has been how to strengthen economic 
growth without kindling more inflation. Inflation has been serious in 
1976 in all states except West Germany (3.9 percent). Inflation rates 
in France, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Ireland were 9.7 percent, 14.7
33
31percent, 18.4 percent, and 20 percent respectively. Unemployment has
been equally high and rose in 1976 in Germany, France, Denmark and
Belgium; 943,686 were unemployed in Germany, and 955,352 in France in
32September-October, 1976. Fluctuations in currency exchange presented
further difficulties. In 1976, the Deutschmark rose 9 percent over the
dollar, 21 percent over the French franc, and 38 percent over the pound 
33and lira. The plunge of the pound and lira make products from the 
United Kingdom and Italy such bargains, they now threaten to destroy 
the customs union. Further, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy have 
refused to participate in the EC’s government currency float, making 
that economic central instrument nearly powerless. Finally, some 
Community economic policies, e.g., guaranteed farm prices which require 
the stronger states to underwrite the weaker (notably the United Kingdom 
and Italy) have caused considerable resentment on the part of the stronger 
members. For exançle. United Kingdom food imports from the EC get a 40 
percent subsidy. The Germans are now asking why they should turn over 
decision-making to EC institutions staffed by those from countries who 
can’t keep their own houses in o r d e r . I n  general, these economic pro­
blems have exacerabated differences between the member states and have 
been barriers"to further integration. They have helped to create an
^^artha Plummer, "Roy Jenkin’s Task - Rebuild the EEC," The 
New York Times, (January 30, 1977), Section XII, p. 2.
32The Washington Post (November 27, 1976), Section D, p. 9.
33Michael Cetler, "W. Germany: Edgy in Europe," The Washington
Post. (October 30, 1976), Section A, p. 12.
34Plummer, Section XII, p. 2.
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environment of uncertainty in which political and economic leaders have 
assiduously avoided any decision-making involving economic risks.
Economic Philosophies. Many of the Nine differ significantly 
in their choice of strategies to solve their economic problems. For 
example, Denmark, Germany, and the Benelux countries have opted to empha­
size fighting inflation, with remedies for high unemployment getting 
lesser consideration. On the other hand, France and Italy emphasize 
keeping employment as high as possible with less regard to inflation 
(and failing in both in 1976). Britain made a major decision to rely 
heavily on a predicted 20 million tons of North Sea oil, but suffered a 
setback when only 12 million tons could be counted in 1976. Other 
economic philosophies are now being seriously reexamined. For example, 
the Dutch economy has been declining steadily this decade. Yet the usual 
yardstick for economic decline had been a trade deficit —  and Holland 
has none (due mainly to its reserves of natural gas). A Dutch political 
advisor noted:
... we are clearly in decline. We are in the process of losing our
competitiveness in industry, of pricing ourselves out of the market
in shipbuilding, machine tools, metals and textiles. That means 
still more out of work and on welfare. The strong balance of pay­
ments simply means we still have a margin for more nonsense.
The "more nonsense" refers to the vast welfare system in the Netherlands.
On any one day 18 percent of the work force (740,000) are sick, on sick
leave, or disability leave. Added to the 240,000 jobless (6 percent),
the unproductive percent of Holland's labor force amounts to 24 percent,
twice what it was five years ago. For this reason and because Dutch
35Quoted from: Michael Getler, "Holland Gets the Feeling 
Something Is Wrong," The Washington Post (November 27, 1976), Section D, 
p. 9.
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business capital investment has gone from 8 percent to 0 percent in the 
last ten years, there are signs of a more conservative shift away from 
welfare programs, similar to what has happened in West Germany and Sweden.
Energy. Given Europe's almost total reliance on external 
sources of energy, this policy sector is an extremely important economic 
factor. The member states take different positions on energy pricing 
and supply. For example, France and Belgium want to minimize oil prices, 
Denmark has preferred to secure guaranteed supplies with less attention 
to price. The Netherlands, with reserves in natural gas, and the United 
Kingdom with its North Sea oil have taken and continue to take more inde­
pendent attitudes toward energy. Economically, however, the Nine are 
more sensitive (and more vulnerable) to OPEC than to each other's 
policy differences. For example, the OPEC decision in Doha, Qatar, on 
December 16, 1976, to raise oil prices had the effect of raising the 
price of gasoline in the United Kingdom by three cents per gallon. In 
addition, it effectively lowered France's projected growth rate from 4.5 
percent to 3.9 percent for 1977 by increasing the rate of inflation by
one-half percent. France, which imports 82 percent of its energy, was
36hit hardest, followed closely by the United Kingdom and Italy.
Summary. The economic and political barriers discussed above 
have contributed to an atmosphere of uncertainty and caution in the 
Community. Member-state and Community decision-makers have been largely 
unable to make decisions to further integrate the Community internally 
for fear of the risks involved. Attempts at further integration in the
36Jim Hoagland, "Serious Consequences for Europe from Oil Price 
Increase," The Washington Post. (December 19, 1976), Section F, p. 1.
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Community have not been totally frustrated, however. Despite (or, 
perhaps due to) the stagnation in the Community’s agricultural, 
industrial, financial, transport, and social sectors, significant pro­
gress has been achieved in the external relations sectors of the 
Community. This work is intended to investigate this phenomenon and 
offer some explanation for its development.
CHAPTER II
THEORY AND METHODOLOGY
In order to better understand the process of European integra­
tion, both historically and presently, it is important to discuss 
political integration theory. This discussion will provide a better 
understanding of the several attempts to explain the Community's pro­
gression and its probably future. It will also facilitate the presenta­
tion of my explanatory model concerning the Community's relative success 
in external affairs, while its internal affairs have stagnated.
Finally, the research methodology of this dissertation will be described.
Theory
International regionalism has been a major area of concern in 
international relations for the past twenty years, and theories con­
cerning the possibilities, stages, and dynamics of regional integration 
of nation states into larger units are numerous. Almost as numerous 
are the attempts to categorize various schools of thought. For example, 
Altiero Spinelli suggests three "designs" for European integration: the
37
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Functionalists, the Confederalists, and the Federalists.^ Steven
Wamecke concentrates on the American "sources" in his discussion of
2 3three major academic theories: those of Karl Deutsch , of Ernst
4 5Haas and of Leon Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold. Charles Pentland
has suggested four schools: the "pluraliste," the "functionalists,"
See Altiero Spinelli, The Eurocrats: Conflict and Crisis
in the European Community (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1966),
pp. 10-17. See also, David Calleo, Europe's Future: The Grand
Alternatives (New York: Horizon Press, 1965).
2Steven Wamecke, "American Regional Integration Theories 
and the European Community," Integration 1 (1971), p. 9.
3In particular, Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communi­
cation (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1966) and International 
Political Communities: An Anthology (New York: Doubleday, 1966).
^Haas' seminal work is The Uniting of Europe: Political,
Social, and Economic Forces 1950-1957, (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1958). See also, Ernst Haas, "The Uniting of Europe and the 
Uniting of Latin America," Journal of Common Market Studies V (June, 
1967), pp. 315-343; "The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections
on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing," in Leon N. Lindberg and 
Stuart A. Scheingold (eds.), Regional Integration: Theory and Research
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 3-42.
^Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, Europe's Would-Be 
Polity: Patterns of Change in the European Community (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970).
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the "neo-functionalists," and the "federalists."^ These are probably 
the most frequently suggested categories; I have chosen them as a means 
of organizing the following discussion of the utility and inadequacies 
of regional integration theory.
Pentland's four schools are not mutually exclusive or neces­
sarily at odds with one another. Indeed, it is useful to view each of 
the four as having relatively more explanatory capabilities depending 
upon which aspect or stage of the integration process is the concern of 
the study. For example, the pluraliste have more to offer to explain 
the beginning and initial stages of regional integration, but fail to 
address or address too briefly that which maintains and keeps the process 
going or to what end the process is intended.
The functionalists and neo-functionalists concern themselves 
little with the initial or final stages of regional integration, but 
concentrate instead on the dynamics of operating and expanding the pro­
cess. Similarly, the federalists' concerns are of greatest utility as 
to final stages and end-products while offering little as to initiating
Charles Pentland, International Theory and European Integra­
tion (New York: The Free Press, 1973). Pentland's typology of the
four major schools is based on the end product to which the integration 
process is expected to lead and on which major conditions are seen as 
bringing about the process of change. According to Pentland, the fed­
eralists and neo-functionalists believe the end-product of integration 
to be the state-model (respectively, a federal state and a supra­
national government), and the pluraliste and functionalists think that 
the community-model is the end-product. Both pairs are divided, however, 
in terms of the types of independent variables employed to explain the 
process of change. Federalists and pluraliste focus on the direct 
processes or political variables, and functionalists and neo-functionalists 
concentrate on indirect processes, particularly the socio-economic 
variables.
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the process and linking means-to-ends. Viewed this way, each school 
makes an essential contribution to understanding the entire process of 
regional integration and should be considered.
The Pluraliste
The pluralist approach to integration sees a "community of 
states" engaged in a "continuous process of sensitive adjustment to 
each other’s actions, supported usually (although not necessarily) by 
the socio-political behavior and attitudes of their populations."^ The 
approach centers on several variables important to the formation of the 
community of states: historical, cultural, economic, social, political,
and diplomatic exchanges among those states.
Of the major integration theorists, Karl Deutsch best repre­
sents the pluralist approach. In his Political Community and the 
North Atlantic Area, Deutsch puts forth several underlying definitions
Q
central to his approach:
1. The Security community: A group of people which has become
Integrated'.
2. Integration: "The attainment within a territory of a sense 
of community and of institutions and practices strong enough 
and wide-spread enough to assure for a long time dependable 
expectations of peaceful change among its population."
3. Sense of community: "A belief on the part of individuals 
in a group that they have come to agreement on at least 
this one point that common social problems must and can 
be resolved by processes of peaceful change."
^Ibid, p. 29.
g
Karl Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: 
International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 5-6.
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4. Peaceful change: The resolution of social problems
normally institutionalized by institutionalized pro­
cedures without resort to large scale physical force":
5. Amalgamation: "The formal merger of two or more pre­
viously independent units into a single larger unit with
some type of common government after amalgamation."
Deutsch further amplifies his central concept of the "security
community":
A political cummunity is not necessarily able to prevent war within
the area it covers... Some political communities do, however, eliminate
war and the expectation of war within their boundaries...A security- 
community, therefore, is one in which there is real assurance that 
the members of that community will not fight each other physically, 
but will settle their disputes in some other way.®
The concept of the security-community largely centers on the linkage 
between transactions and conflict. According to the pluraliste, this 
linkage process involves certain characteristics: First, some form of
communication must be taking place. Normally these are positive inter­
actions, although hostile or negative communications represent a type 
of communication system. Second, something of common interest must be 
present about which two parties can communicate. The mutual interest 
presumes both the physical capabilities to communicate (exchange mes­
sages, trade, etc.) and an identification of interests to allow 
meaningful communication to occur. Third, interacting nations are 
important to each other and, therefore, their basic relationship (as 
defined by the communication) is different from those with whom they do 
not interact. Fourth, high inter-nation interaction is unlikely to be
QKarl Deutsch et. al., "Political Community in the North 
Atlantic Area," in International Political Communities: An. Anthology
(Garden City, N. Y. Doubleday, 1966), pp. 1-2.
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accompanied by high tension and conflict. In such cases, behavior tends 
to be institutionalized, and patterns of interaction develop. These 
patterns soon develop into standard procedures which in turn develop 
into formal (international) organizations.^^ The process suggests that 
as communication between the units increases, the complexities inherent 
in such activities increase, causing the groups in the potential com­
munity to formalize their interaction to handle these complexities, 
which results in greater collaboration. This mutual cooperation facili­
tates the formation of formal institutions to further simplify the 
relationships or to make decisions jointly for the states now involved 
as one unit. Once that stage has been reached, it is argued, further 
integration becomes more likely. Michael Sullivan suggests that the 
most insightful proposition of the pluraliste is that truly integrated 
communities may not necessarily be those declared integrated by formal 
agreement, that "...using concepts from communication theory, Deutsch 
contended that those nations that contain high and consistent levels of 
communication, and transactions with each other may be more integrated 
than those that have signed agre e m e n t s . S u r e l y ,  the relationship 
that has evolved between Canada and the United States is the best example.
In many ways, these two nations have more common economic, communications 
(mass media), cultural, ecological, and legal (e.g. relaxed restrictions 
at border crossings) policies than do the signatories of the Treaties of Rome.
Roger W. Cobb and Charles Elder, International Community; A 
Regional and Global Study (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1970), 
pp. 8-9.
^"Slichael P. Sullivan, International Relations: Theories and
Evidence (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976), p. 210.
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The Functionalists and Neo-Functionalists 
Those belonging to the functionalist school of political inte­
gration theory have drawn from the social theories of Spencer, the 
methaphorical organicism of Radcliff-Brown and Durkheim, and the "requi­
site analysis" or "structural-functionalism" of Parsons, Levy, Almond 
12and Apter. The notions that "form follows function" and that "struc­
tures exists to satisfy functional needs" were expressed very early by 
13David Mitrany, and later by other international integration functional­
ists, i.e.. Inis L. Claude, James P. Sewell, and P. G. T a y l o r . T h e s e  
theorists focus on the world international system. As for those who 
concerned themselves with regional integration and Europe in particular.
12See, H. Spencer, The Principles of Sociology, Vol. 1, (New 
York: Appleton, 1897), E. Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method
(Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1938); A. R. Radcliff-Brown, Structure
and Function in Primitive Society (Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1956);
T. Parsons, The Social System (Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1951);
M. J. Levy, Jr., The Structure of Society (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1952); G. A. Almond, "Introduction" in G. A. Almond 
and J. S. Coleman (eds.). The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1960); and D. E. Apter, The Politics of 
Modernization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965).
13David Mitrany, The Progress of International Government (New 
Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1933).
^^See, Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords Into Plow Shares (4th edition) 
(New York: Random House, 1971) ; James Patrick Sewell, Functionalism and
World Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966); P. G.
Taylor, "The Concept of Community and the European Integration Process," 
Journal of Common Market Studies 7 (1968), pp. 83-101; and P. G. Taylor, 
"The Functionalist Approach to the Problem of International Order: A
Defense," Political Studies 16 (1968), pp. 393-410.
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Altiero Spinelli describes them as follows:
There were the Functionalists who believed that first of all it 
is important to confide the administration of certain concrete 
public activities to a suitable European administration. This 
administration would receive its common directives from the 
national states which would have formulated them in appropriate 
treaties and in subsequent inter-governmental decisions. Within 
the framework of these directives the European administration 
would be separated from and independent of the various administra­
tions. ̂ ̂
It is perhaps a bit simplistic but not inaccurate to say that the 
functionalists argue a sort of economic determinism. They do this by 
tying economics to the process of integration in such a way that politi­
cal integration was an automatic result of economic integration. In 
theory, economic cooperation between states results in working rela­
tionships rather than political relationships, and these relationships 
can only be established through international organizations. The 
resultant transfer of functions to the international organizations leads 
to a transference of loyalty and support from the national to the supra­
national entity which in time leads to the creation of a political 
community.
The "neo-functionalists" agree that the process of political 
integration results from economic integration (or its "functional 
equivalent"), but they do not see the process as automatic. Those of 
the neo-functionalist school (notably Ernst Haas, Philippe Schmitter,
Altiero Spinelli, The Eurocrats: Conflict and Crisis in the
European Community (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1966), p. 13.
"European Functionalists" appear to have lost interest in the European 
Community and now direct their attention to the EGE. See, for example, 
A. J. R. Groom, "Functionalist Approach and East-West Cooperation in 
Europe," Journal of Common Market Studies 1 and 2 (1975), pp. 21-60.
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and J. S. Nye^^) assert that political variables cannot be extracted 
from the process and that, indeed, political actors, "technocrats", 
and bureaucrats often manipulate the process and give it a "political 
push" (or what Haas refers to as "cultivated spillover"). The central 
analytical concept for the neo-functionalists is spillover, a force 
caused by functional interdependence or inherent linkages of tasks 
that press political actors to define their common tasks and then to go 
on to other activities. Spillover is commonly thought of as a process 
in which integrative activity in one sector leads to integrative 
activity in other sectors or, as M. P. Sullivan notes, it occurs when 
"certain procedures and behaviors occurring in the communication process 
spill over into others: cooperative processes in the matter of trade,
for example, may effect relations between the parties in the matter of 
extradition.
Put simply, spillover is said to occur when integrative success 
in one policy sector spills over into other, related policy sectors, 
causing the member states to integrate their once separate activities 
in the new policy sectors. At the macro level, the best example of 
spillover was the creation of the EEC and Euratom out of the successes 
of the ECSC in the 1950s. Subsequent micro-examples are numerous.
See Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social,
and Economic Forces 1950-1957 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958)
E. Haas and P. C. Schmitter, "Economics and Differential Patterns 
of Political Integration: Projections about Unity in Latin America"
in International Political Communities : An Anthology (Garden City,
N. J.: Doubleday, 1966), pp. 259-300, J. S. Nye, Peace in Parts: 
Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization (Boston: Little,
Brown and Co., 1971).
^^Sullivan, p. 212.
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When tariff barriers were first reduced in the EEC, the profit margins 
and competitive positions of many European firms became more strongly 
affected by the different systems of taxation in the member states.
This led to the adoption of a common system of calculating the value 
added tax. Similarly, the agricultural surpluses generated by the 
initial common pricing system pressed the member states toward a com­
mon structural policy in agriculture. An example of deliberative 
("cultivated") spillover is the 1960 package deal which hastened inter­
nal tariff cuts in the EEC to satisfy those eager to advance the common
market and, at the same time, lowered the external tariff to satisfy
18those concerned about a loss of foreign trade. The examples illustrate 
an important observation: spillover involves an increase in both the
scope of authority and the level of authority for central institution 
decision-makers.
The neo-functionalists view European integration as an ad hoc, 
step-by-step process characterized by gradual, continuous movement 
toward regional integration. Ernst Haas sees political integration as 
the process whereby certain crucial elites, those in government, interest 
groups, and political parties, "are persuaded to shift their loyalties, 
expectations and political activities toward a new center, whose insti­
tutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national 
states." His central theoretical conclusion is that integration is 
favored by societal circumstances (e.g., an industralized economy,
18J. s. Nye, "Comparing Common Markets: A Revised Neo-
Functionalist Model," in Leon Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold (eds.). 
Regional Integration: Theory and Research (Cambridge: Harvard Univer­
sity Press, 1971), pp. 200-202.
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politically mobilized masses, and pluralist democracy) that favor or
permit leaders of central institutions to propose or pursue collective
19policies that increase elite expectations and demands. Haas provides 
several criteria for judging whether community sentiment, which is the 
basis for political union, can be considered to flourish;
1. Interest groups and political parties at the national level 
endorse supranational action in preference to action by their 
national government, or if they are divided among themselves 
on this issue, only the case of national opposition to supra­
national action could be considered incompatible with community 
sentiment.
2. Interest groups and political parties organize beyond the 
national level in order to function more effectively as decision 
makers vis a vis the separate national governments or the 
central authority, and if they define their interests in terms 
larger than those of the separate national state from which they 
originate.
3. Interest groups and political parties in confronting each other 
at the supranational level succeed in evolving a body of doctrine 
common to all or a new nationalism i.e. supranationalism.
4. Interest groups and political parties in their efforts at 
supranational organization coalesce on the basis of a common 
ideology surpassing those prominent at the national level.
5. Interest groups, political parties and governments show evidence 
of accepting the rule of law and faithfully carrying out supra­
national court decisions, administrative directives and rules 
even when they oppose these, instead of obstructing or ignoring 
such decisions; further, when opposing federal policy they 
channel their objections through the legal avenues provided 
instead of threatening or practicing succession.
6. Governments negotiate with one another in good faith and generally 
reach agreement while not making themselves consistently and 
invariably the spokesmen of national interest groups; further­
more, community sentiment would seem to prevail if governments 
give way in negotiations when they find themselves in a minority 
instead of insisting on a formal or informal right of veto.^°
19Haas, p. 16. 
^°Ibid., pp. 9-10.
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Another prominent neo-functionalist, J. S. Nye, defines the 
significant aspects of political integration as institutional, policy, 
and attitudinal integration, and adds Deutsch’s "security-community" as 
a fourth aspect. Nye's neo-functionalist model concentrates on seven 
process mechanisms: the functional linkage of tasks, rising trans­
actions, deliberative linkages and coalition formation, regional group 
formation, elite socialization, the ideological identitive appeal, and 
the involvement of external actors. His basic hypothesis is that "most 
political decision-makers will opt for the status quo at any level so
long as the process forces or popular pressures are not so strong as to
21make the choice unbearable for them." Nye's seven process mechanisms 
are meant to be indicators of continued, arrested, or reversed insti­
tutional, policy, attitudinal, and "security-community" regional inte­
gration. According to the model, the response of political decision­
makers to these process mechanisms depends on the strength of the 
mechanisms and on certain integrative conditions: structural conditions
(economic equality of units, elite value complimentarity, pluralism, 
capacity of the member states to adapt and respond) and perceptual con­
ditions (perceived equity of distribution of benefits, perceived external
22cogency, low or exportable visible costs).
The Federalists
While the pluraliste' emphasis on pre-integration forces and the 
beginnings of the process of integration makes the pluralist school of
^^Nye, p. 97. 
Z^lbid., pp. 55-107.
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greater value in understanding that stage of the integration process and 
the functionalists'and neo-functionalists' views are helpful for under­
standing the dynamic maintenance of the process (how it keeps going), 
the federalists offer the most with regard to measurement of objectives 
and the end-product orientation of the process. Generally, the federal­
ists stress political solutions, political institutions, and an 
acceptance of the nation-state as a political given that needs to be 
accommodated rather than abolished or circumvented in any scheme to 
reorganize world politics. As Charles Pentland notes, the federalists 
argue that "...since the classic mechanisms of international adjustment 
have proved inpermanent or unreliable for maintaining peace and security, 
real institutional limitations must be placed on the autonomy of states —  
however difficult this may be. While autonomous states can be influenced 
by diplomacy and communications, they can only be controlled if they
give up some of their autonomous powers. Hence, in the federalist view,
23the need for a supranational state."
Those in the "federalist school", notably C. J. Friedrich,
^^Pentland, pp. 149-150.
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W. H. Riker, Peter Hay, George Liska, and Amatai Etzioni,^^ take an
approach to European integration most aptly described by Spinelli:
...there are the Federalists who asked that the political insti­
tutions of a democratic Europe be constructed first by taking 
certain powers of initiative, deliberation, decision and execution 
from the national executives, parliaments and judiciaries and con­
fiding them to a European executive, parliament and judiciary. The 
institutions would derive their legitimacy from the consent of 
European citizens directly expressed through European elections and 
would exercise their powers directly on European citizens without 25 
interference from the member states in matters of federal competence.
(Table 2.1 contains a comparative summary of the above four schools.)
The Eclectics
There is no popular acceptance of an added typology, "the
24See C. J. Friedrich’s Trends of Federalism in Theory and 
Practice (London: Allen and Unwin, 1968); W. H. Riker’s Federalism:
Origin, Operation, Significance (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1964),
and Peter Hay, Federalism and Supranational Organizations: Patterns
for New Legal Structures (Urbana, 111.: University of Illinois Press,
1966). Although not explicitly federalist, George Liska’s Europe 
Ascendant: The International Politics of Unification (Baltimore: John
Hopkins Press, 1964) and Amatai Etzioni, Political Unification: A
Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces (New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, 1965) employ a body of federalist assumptions. Liska sets out 
to analyze the means and forces forging Europe’s unity by focusing on 
the concept of "Statecraft". His analysis of the shortcomings of 
functional strategies and his prescriptions for moving from functional 
to political phases makes the work federalist in character. In 
Political Unification, Etzioni attempts to construct a general theo­
retical framework based on Parson’s structural-functional systems 
theory. He posits twenty-two propositions which he attempts to test 
(rather, illustrate) in case studies of the European Community and three 
other regional organizations. Although intended to be a functional 
analysis, Etzioni’s use of the single-state analogy, his emphasis on 
the continuing role of the component units, and his insistence on the 
role of supranationality make his work equally federalist in character.
^^Spinelli, p. 11.
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Table 2.1 - Comparative Summary of the Four Schools of International Integration.
PLURALISM FUNCTIONALISM NEOFUNCTIONAI.ISM FEDERALISM
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SOURCE: Charles Pentland, Integration Theory and European Integration (New York: The Free
Press, 1973), p. 190; and Gerhard Mally, The European Community in Perspective 
(Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1973), pp. 25-39.
52
eclectic school." However, many international integration theorists
agree that some utility exists in all the schools discussed previously.
Indeed, as was mentioned above, J. S. Nye borrowed the "security-
community" concept from Deutsch and the concern with elite socialization
from the pluralist school, and the works of George Liska and Amatai
Etzioni on international integration appear to combine functionalist
and federalist perspectives.
Perhaps the best example of eclectic international integration
26theory is the work of Leon Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold. Like
Nye, Lindberg and Scheingold attempted to refine the concepts advanced
by Haas in light of the historical experience of the Community's first
ten to fifteen years. Lindberg and Scheingold describe the Community
as "an ambiguous pluralistic system" and, in an assessment of two decades
of polity-building in the three European Communities that focuses on the
development of the varieties of mass public and elite attitudinal and
behavior supports, they discuss the role in integration of four different
coalition-formation mechanisms: functional spillover, side-payments
and logrolling, actor socialization, and feedback. The authors also
suggest some specific models of change, e.g., forward linkage, output
2 7failure, equilibrium, and "spillback". While strongly neo-functionalist 
in character, their eclecticism comes primarily from the liberal bor­
rowing from Karl Deutsch.
26See, especially, Lindberg and Scheingold, Europe's Would-be 
Polity and Leon Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold (eds.). Regional Integra­
tion: Theory and Research (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971).
27Lindberg and Scheingold, Europe's Would-be Polity, pp. 34-139.
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Another neo-functionalist who has demonstrated in his more 
recent work some borrowing from the pluraliste and significant modi­
fication to the neo-functionalist model is Philippe Schmitter.
Schmitter concluded in the late 1960s, from the experience in Europe 
and elsewhere, that "spillover" was much less automatic than he or other 
neo-functionalists had once supposed. Consequently, he extended the 
concept of spillover to include several "strategic options" available 








i.e., to increase both the scope and level 
of his commitment concomitantly
i.e., to increase only the scope while 
holding the level of authority constant
i.e., to increase the decisional autonomy 
of capacity of joint institutions but deny 
them entrance into new issue areas
i.e., to increase the level of joint delibera­
tion but withdraw the institution(s) from 
certain areas
i.e., to let the regional bureaucrats debate, 
suggest, and expostulate on a wider variety 
of issues but decrease their actual capacity 
to allocate values
i.e., to retreat on both dimensions, possibly 
returning to the status quo ante
i.e., to respond to crisis by marginal modi-
2 8ficatdon within the zone of indifference 
Schmitter’s concept of spillover does not differ from the expla­
nation of spillover given previously. By spillaround, Schmitter means 
that regional decision-makers would be given authority by national leaders
28Philippe C. Schmitter, "A Revised Theory of Regional Integration" 















Schmitter’s Alternative "Actor Strategies"
SOURCE: Philippe C. Schmitter, "A Revised Theory of Regional Integra­
tion" in Lindberg and Scheingold (eds.), Regional Integration: Theory
and Research (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 241.
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to regulate additional aspects of a particular policy sector or an 
entirely new policy sector without an accompanying increase in autonomy 
or rule-making or rule-enforcement power. For example, the scope of 
Commission authority in external relations has increased due to the 
expansion of the Community and the increase from nineteen Yaounde 
associate states to fifty-two ACP states. However, the level of authority 
granted the Commission did not significantly increase for the Lome 
Convention relative to the Yaounde agreements. (This is discussed in 
more detail in Chapter VII.)
The buildup concept is similar to spillaround except that cen­
tral instituion decision-makers are given more autonomy or rule-making 
authority, but only in those areas over which they previously had any 
control. They are not given any additional competences. The European 
Parliament was given more control over the operating budget (of the 
Community's institutions) in 1970. Although Parliamentary control was 
increased, it was only over that small portion of the Community budget 
for which they previously had some input. The increase in the level of 
authority without the Council's permitting the Parliament any decision­
making authority over the major portion of the EC budget is an example 
of buildup.
Schmitter's terms, "retrench", muddle-about", and "spill-back", 
are all negative in character. Retrenchment brings an increase in 
decisional authority, but a decrease in the number or scope of policy 
areas. The increase in decisional authority may mean only an increase 
in the level of joint deliberation (e.g., from the Council of Ministers 
to the European Council); but this is accompanied by a withdrawal from
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certain common areas (e.g., the British, French, and Italian withdrawal of 
their currencies from the Community's common currenty float). "Muddle- 
about" refers to an increase in the scope of authority with a concomitant 
decrease in the level of authority given regional decision-makers. The 
Council of Ministers, for example, may permit an increase in competences 
for the Commission (allow the bureaucrats to debate, suggest, and 
expostulate on a wider variety of issues), but give them no power to act 
on those issues. Such is the present situation for industrial and 
energy policies in the Community. Directorate General III (Industrial 
and Technological Affairs) and Directorate General XVII (Energy) have 
been permitted to research and recommend new policy areas, but not a 
single mandate for action has come from the Council of Ministers since 
1970. "Spill-back" is a term that denotes disintegration, a decrease 
both in the level and scope of decision-making authority given regional 
institutions. Historical examples of spill-back in the European Community 
include the national solutions to the 1958 coal crisis in the ECSC, the 
isolation of the French and West German agricultural market after the 
changes in currency values in 1969, and the immediate reaction of the 
Community member states to the Arab oil embargo.
Schmitter's final actor strategy, "encapsulation", centers on 
another of his terms, the "zone of indifference". Schmitter suggests that 
regional actors operate inside certain loosely defined limits within 
which their activities (or absence thereof) go uncontested. As long 
as regional bureaucrats operate within the zone of indifference and 
incur no new costs, they are tolerated. Encapsulation, then, is the 
response of regional actors to crises by marginally modifying their
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actions without exceeding the zone of indifference. Encapsulation 
occurs when regional actors respond to crises by reasserting previous 
strategies. Perhaps the best examples are the decisions to negotiate 
the Lome Convention and to begin the Eur-Arab Dialogue in response to 
the 1973 oil crisis. (The Eur-Arab Dialogue is discussed in detail in 
Chapter V.)
Schmitter also offered three interesting hypotheses concerning
the process of integration. His "spill-over hypothesis" suggests that
"the greater the policy scope and the higher the level of initial comr-
mitment to collective decision-making, the greater the propensity for
task expansion." Second, the "politicization hypothesis" postulates
that "faced with this culmination of commitments, national actors find
themselves gradually embroiled in even more salient or controversial
areas of policy-making (leading to) a shift in actor expectations and
loyalty toward the new regional center." Third, his "extemalization
hypothesis" states that once agreement is reached...members will be forced
29to hammer out a collective external position." Schmitter's expanded 
neo-functionalist model, particularly his "extemalization hypothesis", 
"spillaround", and "encapsulation", provide the basis of this disserta­
tion's theoretical framework. The theoretical model also includes a 
different use of the term, spillaround, the "path of least resistance" 
hypothesis. This hypothesis predicts that given sufficient political 
support, some progress in integration will occur even when strong
29Philippe C. Schmitter, "Three Neo-Functional Hypotheses About 
International Integration"International Organization 23 (Winter, 1969),
pp. 161-166.
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political and economic barriers to integration exist. Further, that 
progress will occur in policy sectors where those barriers are weakest.
The political resolve to demonstrate progress of some sort will, then, 
follow the path of least resistance.
The Theoretical Model 
As was noted in the latter part of Chapter I, progress toward 
European union in the context of the European Community appears to be 
nearing a standstill. The stagnation is most evident in the Community's 
internal affairs (e.g., the attempts to reach an economic and monetary 
union, a passport union, and improved cooperation in industry and agri­
culture). National government leaders. Community officials, and press 
and academic observers are united in that assessment.
Yet, significant progress toward integration has been made in 
the external relations of the Community during the past seven years, in 
moving the member states toward common policies in foreign relations 
(toward non-EEC nations) and in development aid programs for the less 
developed countries of Africa and Asia. The ensuing chapters of this 
dissertation will focus on the following:
Proposition I: Generally, the Community's internal policy sectors
(economic, monetary, industrial, agricultural, transport, social, etc.) 
have been in a state of stagnation since 1970.
Proposition II: Support for continued integration in the European
Community is strong and widespread. It exists beyond the several 
reports on European Union and statements by national and Community 
leaders.
Sub-proposition Ila: Support for further European integration
will be stronger among citizens of the original six member states 
than among the Danes, Irish, and British.
Sub-proposition Ilb: The relative amount of member-states'
support for further integration is strongly associated with the
59
relative size of the member states: the smaller states will
be seen as favoring further integration more than the larger 
states.
Sub-proposition lie: Those working in or closely with
Community institutions strongly support continued European 
integration. They favor further policy centralization, i.e., 
the goal of a federal state in which foreign political and 
economic decisions are made by Community central institutions.
Sub-proposition Ild: The general publics of the Community's
member states and Community officials prefer certain strategies 
to reach the goal of European Union. They agree that further 
integration will not come automatically, but requires an 
occasional push from political leaders or a shock from the 
external world. They favor:
(1) accelerating the process, pursuing economic and 
political union simultaneously,
(2) combining foreign affairs ("high politics") and economic 
matters ("low politics") into the competence of the 
Community's institutions,
(3) establishing a European Community defense function,
(4) a mondialist, multilateralist approach to developing 
countries.
Proposition III: Since 1970, the external relations efforts of the
European Community have been relatively more successful than have 
other policy sectors in the Community.
Proposition IV: Since 1970, the successes in the Community's external
relations have had an integrative effect on the Community. This 
development can be explained, at least in part, by Schmitter's 
"Extemalization Hypothesis" (that intergovernmental regional actors 
would find themselves compelled to adopt common policies toward non­
participant third parties once intermember policies are decided and 
operationalized).
Proposition V : The continued successful integration in the Community's
external affairs can be explained by "encapsulation" (responding to 
a crisis by marginal modifications within the zone of indifference) 
or "spillaround" (increasing the scope of authority (more coverage 
of issue areas) while holding the level of authority constant or 
within the zone of indifference).
Sub-proposition Va: Progress in integration in the Community's
external relations (relative to Community-wide stagnation) may 
be explained by "encapsulation".
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Sub-proposition Vb; Progress in integration in the Community's 
external relations (relative to Community-wide stagnation) may 
be explained by "spillaround".
Sub-proposition Vc: Progress in integration in the Community's
external relations (relative to Community-wide stagnation) may 
be explained by a different application of "spillaround": the
"path of least resistance" hypothesis. (This will be presented 
in Chapter IX.)
In summary, this dissertation will attempt to demonstrate that, 
given the self-assessed state of stagnation in the European Community, 
there still exists in the European Community strong ideological commit­
ment to move toward European Union; that progress toward this goal has 
been encapsulated, or has spilled around the internal Community sectors 
and is strong in the external sector; that the Community's decision­
makers have opted for increased cooperation and formulation of joint 
policies vis-a-vis nonparticipant third parties; and, finally, that the 
collective assessment of a group of those most familiar with the Community's 
external relations substantiates the above.
Methodology
The data presented in this dissertation were collected from the 
following sources: primary source documents read or collected in
Brussels; news sources (Agence Europe, Europolitique, The New York Times,
The International Herald Tribune, and press and news releases of the 
Commission of the European Community); and from personal interviews in 
Brussels and The Hague during the period May-July, 1976. Averaging one 
hour and twenty minutes each, the interviews were conducted with more than 
seventy officials of the Commission, Economic and Social Committee,
European Parliament, Council of Permanent Representatives, national
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foreign offices, the U.S. Mission to the Community, UNICE, COPA, and 
the ETUC. Most of the personal elite interviews afforded me the 
opportunity to ask unstructured questions that were geared to the 
expertise of each respondent and designed to broaden or refine that which 
was suggested by non-interview data sources. For the most part, findings 
from the above sources are presented in Chapters III, V, and VII. In 
fifty of the elite interviews (discounting interviews with non-EC mem­
ber citizens or those with whom I had insufficient time or access), I 
employed a structured questionnaire, the results of which provide the 
bases for Chapters IV, VI, and VIII.
The Interview Sample 
Neither the interview sample size nor the selection technique 
were determined in advance. I set out to talk to as many elites know­
ledgeable of the Community's external affairs as was possible. Due to 
problems of time and access, I made no effort to achieve a scientifically 
random sample. As my research focus was the external relations of the 
Community, I sought out only those who were likely to have relatively more 
knowledge and expertise in that area. Consequently, no attempt is made 
to imply that my sample is representative of any larger population. The 
combined responses of the fifty respondents will be presented only as a 
substantial collection of expert opinion of bureaucrats of the nine mem­
ber nations working for or directly connected to institutions of the 
European Community. As a matter of convention, I shall hereafter refer 
to the fifty respondents to my structured questionnaire as the "Eurocrats." 
I do not mean to suggest that they are all dedicated "Europeanists" com­
mitted to furthering European integration and employed by the Community's
62
central institutions (as suggested by Spinelli in his previously cited 
book). Indeed, many are national foreign ministry officials or employ­
ees of private interest groups. (See Table 2.2 for a profile of the 
respondents.) I define the term "Eurocrat" somewhat more broadly than
do Lemer and Gorden who use "Eurocrats" to mean "the corps of top
30civil servants responsible for the functioning of the EC."
The initial interviews were arranged for me by the Commission's 
Office for University Information, Directorate General for Information 
(DG-X). The majority of my interviews were arranged through contacts 
and referrals from my initial respondents, through the Administrative 
Assistants to the Directors-General in the Commission's Directorate for 
External Relations (DG-I) and Directorate for Development (DG-VIII), and 
by direct contact. Although some of the interviews were conducted in 
both English and French, all of the structured questionnaires were con­
ducted in English only. This was done in an attempt to avoid interviewer 
error. Due to the fact that the first part of the questionnaire allowed 
open-ended responses, the interviews ranged in length from 30 minutes 
to 3 hours and 15 minutes. Most of the interviews occurred in the res­
pondent's office. However, I conducted some, at the urging of some of 
the respondents, in such places as the Commission's "commons room" (a 
sort of combination bar and coffee house), while seated on the planters 
in the patios below the Berlaymont, in a local pub or coffee house, and, 
on one occasion, seated on a store-front ledge on the Rond-Point Schuman.
30Daniel Lemer and Morton Gorden, Euratlantica: Changing
Perspectives of European Elites (Cambridge, Mass.; MIT Press, 1969), 
p. 263.
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Table 2.2 Profile of the Respondents to the Structured Questionnaire, 









GroupsDGI^ DGVIII^ DGX^ TOTAL
Belgium 2 1 1 1 1 6
Netherlands 2 1 1 1 5
Luxembourg 1 1 2
Ireland 1 1 1 3
Denmark 1 1 1 3
Britain 2 3 4 1 1 11
Italy 1 2 1 1 1 6
Germany 1 4 2 1 8
France 2 2 1 1 6
TOTAL 10 14 9 3 2 9 3 50
^Directorate General I (External Relations)
b_.Directorate General VIII (Development)
Directorate General X (Information) and the Secretariat-General
Council of Permanent Representatives
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The Questionnaire 
The structured questionnaire was in three parts. The first 
part included three general areas of questions, one dealing with develop­
ment assistance, one with foreign policy, and the third with European 
Union in general. The technique employed in the first part was self­
anchoring scaling. In each of the three major areas I asked the res­
pondent to tell me what he or she saw as the best and worst possible
states of European Union, foreign and development policy-making, and I
took detailed notes of their responses. I then showed each a nine inch 
by twenty-four inch card on which I had drawn a ladder. The rungs of 
the ladder were numbered from "0" on the bottom to "10" at the top. I 
asked the respondent to assume that the bottom rung of the ladder ("0") 
represented the worst possible state as they had described it, and the 
top rung ("10") the best possible state, again as he or she had des­
cribed it. I then asked each where on the ladder he or she would place
the Community today, five years ago, and five years in the future. I
31recorded the ladder responses for each of the three question groups.
31For seminal and exemplary uses of self-anchoring scaling, 
see F. P. Kilpatrick and Hadley Cantril, "Self-Anchoring Scaling; A 
Measure of Individuals’ Unique Reality Worlds," Journal of Individual 
Psychology XVI (Nov., 1960), pp. 158-173; and Albert H. Cantril and 
Charles W. Roll, Jr., Hopes and Fears of the American People (New York: 
Universe Books, 1971). I used as a guide to constructing the question­
naire and wording the questions the following: John C. Wahlke, Heinz
Eulau, Wilham Buchanan, and Roy C. Ferguson, The Legislative System: 
Explorations in Legislative Behavior (New York: John Wiley and Sons,
Inc. 1962); and F. P. Kilpatrick, Milton C. Cummings, Jr., and M. Kent 
Jennings,Source Book of a Study of Occupational Values and the Image of 
the Federal Service (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1964).
The latter also contains an excellent section on the self-anchoring 
scaling technique on pp. 20-24.
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(The entire questionnaire appears in Appendix A.)
Part II consisted of handing each respondent three sheets of 
paper, each of which contained an alphabetical list of the Community’s 
member states. The first sheet asked the respondent to rank the states 
from one to nine as to the support each gives to a common development 
policy in the Community; the second asked for rankings on a common 
Community foreign policy; and the third asked for rankings on general 
efforts toward European Union. For part 111 of the structured question­
naire, 1 handed the respondent a twelve inch by twenty-four inch poster 
board on which 1 had drawn six large squares and an accompaning arrow 
indicating that the top square was for strong agreement, the bottom for 
strong disagreement, and the middle four for lesser degrees of agree­
ment or disagreement. 1 then handed the respondent twenty cards which 
1 had shuffled prior to each interview to insure random order. 1 asked 
the respondent to read each card and place it on the square where it 
belonged according to how much he or she agreed or disagreed with the 
statement on each card. IVhen the respondent finished, 1 put the six 
piles of cards into separately numbered envelopes and recorded the res­
ponses after the interview. (The statements on the cards are shown in 
Appendix A.) 1 completed the interview by asking several demographic
questions, such as age, nationality, education, prior experience, and 
reasons for coming to work in Brussels.
Data Analysis
The fifty interviews were coded and data analysis accomplished 
by constructing numerous bi-variate tables. Correlational analysis
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employed simple statistical tools: the two-sample mean t-test for the
self-anchoring scaling and Likert-scaling questions, and Spearman's Rho 
and Kendall's W for rank correlations on the nation states of part II 
of the structured questionnaire. Tests of significance were calculated. 
Independent variables will be reported in succeeding chapters only when 
significant differences (P < .05) are found.
Data Presentation 
The next six chapters present the findings of this dissertation. 
Chapters III and IV examine the general questions of European Union, 
particularly questions of perceived goals, attitudes concerning several 
means to those goals, and assessments by the "Eurocrats" of existant 
support for and progress achieved toward European Union in the European 
Community. Chapters V and VII are meant to provide some background on 
two major aspects of the Community's external relations, foreign (political) 
policy and development assistance to developing countries. Like Chapter IV, 
Chapters VI and VIII contain the collective attitudes about and assess­
ments by the Eurocrats of foreign policy and development policy respect­
ively, again with attention to perceived goals, means to these goals, 
and the state of progress toward integration in those sectors. In 
Chapter IX, I return to the subject of integration theory in general, and 
the hypotheses suggested above.
CHAPTER III
THE REPORTS ON EUROPEAN UNION
At the Paris Summit Conference in October 1972, the European 
Council (Heads of State or Government of the Member States of the 
European Community), "having set themselves the major objective of 
transforming, before the end of the present decade and with the fullest 
respect for the Treaties already signed, the whole complex of the rela­
tions of the Member States into a 'European Union,"' requested the 
Community institutions to draw up a report on this subject by the end 
of 1975 for presentation at a later summit conference.^ The aim of 
achieving European union by 1980 was later reaffirmed at the European
Council Summit Conferences held in Copenhagen on December 14 and 15,
2 31973, and in Paris on December 9 and 10, 1974. At the Paris meeting
the European Council decided that an overall plan to achieve European
^oint 16 of the Final Communique, Bulletin of the European 
Communities 10-1972, Part I, Chapter 1.
2Point 2 of the declaration released after the Summit, Bulletin 
of the European Communities 12-1973, point 1106.
3Point 13 of the Final Communique, Bulletin of the European 
Communities 12-1974, point 1104.
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Union should be developed and charged the European Parliament, the 
Commission of the European Community, and the European Court of Justice 
to submit reports to them by the middle of 1975. Subsequently, the 
Economic and Social Committee of the Community and the government of 
the Kingdom of the Netherlands prepared similar reports on their own 
initiatives. Mr. Leo Tindemans, the Belgian Prime Minister, was asked 
to prepare a summary report for the European Council (of which he is a 
member), and to submit his report by the end of 1975. His report was 
to have been based on the reports submitted by the Community's insti­
tutions, and his consultations with the member states governments and
4representative sectors of public opinion in the Community.
The Tindemans Report 
The Tindemans report is generally believed to be the most 
pragmatic of all the reports on European union. Tindemans prepared the 
report for and on behalf of the European Council and appears in the 
report to have been very conscious of the impact on and reaction of 
his primary audience. He states in the letter of transmittal of his 
report to the European Council: "...I deliberately refused to draw up
a report claiming to be, at least in part, the Constitution for the 
future of European Union. Nor did I wish to describe what Europe 
ideally should be, while remaining personally convinced that Europe 
will only fulfill its destiny if it espouses federalism."^ Tindemans'
4Supplement 9/75, Bulletin of the European Communities, p. 5.
^His letter, dated December 29, 1975, is reprinted in Supple­
ment 1/76, Bulletin of the European Communities, pp. 5-7.
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report, then, is not a blueprint for some future government of Europe, 
but a series of proposals to gradually transform relations between the 
member states to broaden their present collective action. By taking a 
moderate approach to future European integration, Tindemans has been 
criticized both by those who see his proposals as too modest and by 
those who see them as too ambitious.^
Tindemans sees the "European idea" in the context of the 
European Community as having been weakened by an imbalance in the devel­
opment of certain sectors of the Community, some in which the Community 
has far reaching powers and others where Community institutions are 
powerless. European union, according to Tindemans, means that 
Europeans ought to present a united front to the outside world. This, 
he says, requires a common economic and monetary policy, and common 
policies in agriculture, industry, energy and research. It requires 
institutions that respect the equality of the member states and that 
work for individual rights and equality and the solidarity of Europe's 
people. He argues that European union must be built gradually but that 
it must be done. Inaction would mean a divided and increasingly 
impotent Europe.
Tindemans' report includes substantial recommendations con­
cerning Europe's role in the world. Tindemans argues that the
At the time of this writing, both the European Council and the 
Council of Ministers are still in the process of studying and discussing 
Tindemans' report. The only concrete action that has been taken is the 
decision of the November, 1976, Summit of Heads of State and Government 
in The Hague to charge the foreign ministers and the Commission to pro­
duce annual reports of progress in achieving European union. See, 
European Community 199 (January-February, 1977), pp. 45-46.
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Community's activities in its external relations must be, at once, 
economic, industrial, financial, commercial, and political. He further 
urges the Council of Ministers to end the "schizophrenic" distinction 
between "economic" and "political" matters, and that the European 
Council should become the locus of common foreign policy decision­
making, taking over the present efforts to coordinate foreign policies. 
Tindemans proposes that the member states join in the search for a new 
world economic order by presenting united positions at multi-lateral 
international negotiations in which the member states are represented 
by Community delegates. Further, they should gradually transfer a sub­
stantial part of their development aid programs to the Community, and 
take common stands on all political problems arising in the Third 
World. In the area of relations with the United States, Tindemans sug­
gests a more constructive dialogue, particularly concerning security and 
defense matters. In addition, he argues the need for a Community com­
mon defense policy, specifically the establishment of a European 
armaments agency for cooperation in manufacture and procurement of 
military hardware. Concerning the nations of the Warsaw Treaty Organi­
zation, Tindemans recommends that the Community member states have a 
common position on "detente". As all of these qualitative changes occur, 
they will require formalized legal obligations in amended or new 
Community treaties.
Concerning economic and monetary policies, Tindemans urges
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that all member states should be helped to join the "snake"^ and that 
all capital barriers between those in the snake should be gradually 
abolished. As a more immediate step, those now outside the "snake" 
should be included in discussions of joint action on monetary, budgetary, 
and short-term economic policy. He argues that the European Monetary 
Cooperative Fund should be made stronger and automatic, and that moves 
toward developing a European currency should be encouraged. All economic 
and monetary problems must be handled from a total perspective and irre­
versibly. Tindemans makes a further suggestion in this area which he 
refers to as a "new approach": "...(1) those states which are able to
progress have a duty to forge ahead, (2) those states which have reasons 
for not progressing which the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, 
acknowledges as valid do not do so, —  but will at the same time receive 
from the other states any aid and assistance that can be given them to
g
enable them to catch the others up..."
Social policy in the context of European union means, for 
Tindemans, a "citizens' Europe." Tindemans believes that individuals 
ought to have the right to appeal directly to the European Court of 
Justice. He argues that border controls should be abolished and a passport
The "snake" is a currency fluctuation devise in which those par­
ticipating member states agree to link the floating value of their currencies 
in a chain fashion to one another, while maintaining fixed ceiling and 
floor rates (hence, the analogy of a snake in a tunnel). See, Paul Kemezis, 
"Europe Slims the Money 'Snake'," European Community 165 (April, 1972), pp. 
11-12, and Supplement 12/73, Bulletin of the European Communities, pp. 1-17.
g
Supplement 1/76, Bulletin of the European Communities,
p. 21.
72
union established between Community states. He generally favors 
improved transportation and communication, more student transfers, and 
the establishment of a "European Foundation" to promote human contact.
The Tindemans Report’s last section contains his recommendations 
as to how his proposals should be put into effect. It is, in its 
entirety, a plea for strengthening five of the Community’s institutions, 
the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council of Ministers, 
the Commission, and the Court of Justice. For the Parliament, Tindemans
9lists as first the necessity for direct elections. He adds that the 
Parliament should be empowered to consider all matters, not only those 
within the scope of the Treaties, and recommends that the Parliament’s 
resolutions should receive immediate consideration by the European 
Council. He also recommends an amendment to the Treaties to give the 
Parliament the legal right of initiative, and that it conduct an annual 
State of the Union debate. Concerning the European Council, Tindemans 
recommends its members make coherent general policy guidelines. In 
matters of Community competence, the European Council should do so with 
the Commission present; on other matters, it should appoint a subsidiary 
institution to execute its decisions and, when necessary, apply deadlines. 
The Council of Ministers ought to prepare the meetings of the European 
Council and itself be given more competence outside the Treaties by 
authority of the European Council. Tindemans recommends that basic reforms 
take place in the Council of Ministers: majority voting should be
instituted as normal practice and the presidency of the Council should be 
extended from six months to one year. Tindemans says the Commission
9Direct elections are now anticipated in 1978.
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should be given more mandates and should reassert its freedom. Its 
President should be appointed by the European Council (subject to 
Parliamentary confirmation), and he, in turn, should appoint the other 
Commissioners. Finally, the Court of Justice must be given the same 
powers it now has (interpretation of the law and ability to annul acts 
not in accordance with the Treaties) in any new sectors created as the 
Community moves closer to European Union. (See Table 3.1)
The Commission's Report 
The Commission was the first to transmit a report on European 
Union to the European Council in accordance with point 16 of the final 
Communique of the Paris Summit. In their report, published in June 26, 
1975, the Commissioners are less guarded in suggesting a structural goal 
for European Union than was Tindemans in his report. While strongly 
denying any desire to see the Union give birth to a centralized super­
state, the Commission recommends a strengthening of the present institu­
tions and the relationship between the member states and Community bodies. 
Essentially, their appeal is for constitutionalization, for clearly (and 
legally) defining exclusive and concurrent competences. The Commissioners 
argue that the means of transferring power from the member states to 
Community institutions should be determined by those institutions, leaving 
the timetable solely in the hands of the states. During the transition, 
the Community bodies would serve to promote harmonization of national 
legislation and coordination of nation policies as a means of bringing 
about convergence. This, the Commission states, is preferable to any 
purely intergovernmental approach which suffers from a lack of continuity
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Table 3.1 - Summary of the Tindemans Report
View of Europe - A "Citizen’s Europe" (emphasis on individual social
and legal rights).
General Strategy - Build constantly, step-by-step integration made irre­
versible. A "two-speed" Europe. End distinction 
between "Politics" and "Economics" in decision-making.
Common Internal - Economic and Monetary Union, Agriculture, Industry,
Policy Areas Energy and Research, Passport Union.
Advocated (or
mentioned)
Role in the - Common position on detente; Coordinate common foreign
World policy in Council of Ministers; increase multilat­
eralism in aid; establish European Arms Agency.
Institutional - European Council; make general policy guidelines.
and Decision- _ ,. ,. _ .,Parliament: direct elections, widen scope, own
Making Structure legal Initiative.
Council: widen scope, integrate Commission, majority
vote. President for 1 year.
Commission: wider mandates, more accountability to
Parliament.
Court: same competences in each new added Community 
area.
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and tends to be short-lived.
The Commission's report is quite explicit as to what ought to be 
the proper fields of competence of Community institutions. The report 
lists those competences mentioned in the Treaty in the fields of com­
mercial policy, competition, agriculture, social, and regional policy 
where significant progress has been made, and those needing significant 
improvement: economic, industrial, energy, environment, and research
policies. The authors of the report conclude that the immediate objec­
tive of European union should center on economic and monetary union.
They argue that competence, powers, and means of action should be increased 
in: "(i) monetary policy; (ii) budgetary expenditure; (iii) budgetary
revenue; (iv) improving economic structures so as to help reduce imbal­
ances ; (v) social a f f a i r s . T h e  report provides various approaches to 
these areas, but, in general, the recommendations are to enable the 
authority already granted in the EEC Treaty rather than creating a new 
legal arrangement or amending the Treaties under Article 236. It does, 
however, contain a recommendation for a European tax to finance a larger, 
more independent "Union budget".
The authors of the Commission report do argue for the inclusion 
of foreign policy and defense in the competence of the European Union.
The reasons cited for including foreign policy include increased weight
and efficacy to be gained by collective action in international policy
(the Lome Convention^^ is cited as an example), the using of "multilateralism"
^^Supplament 5/75, Bulletin of the European Communities, p. 15. 
^^The Lome Convention is discussed in Chapter VII of this
dissertation.
76
in international negotiations, and the geographic position and commercial 
and economic power of Europe. Decrying the fact that political cooper­
ation in the Community has been no more than a collective reaction to 
events, the Commissioners propose, as a final objective, common policies 
to be made in a single institutional framework "... in all areas where the 
Member States acting alone cannot have as effective a voice as would the 
Union acting as one, or where the absence of a common policy would make 
it impossible for the Union to pursue the objectives of its internal 
development or to contribute to international actions of interest to the 
Union.
The Commissioners make three important proposals concerning the 
external relations of the Community. They suggest that the Community’s 
institutions should prepare and implement joint positions and actions.
Second, they argue that external Community competences must cover the same
13areas and be of the same nature as those the Community exercises internally. 
Finally, they recommend the development of a common defense policy as an 
adjunct to a common foreign policy. The basic argument in the report is 
that once European Union is established, common security (defense) will 
have to be an integral part of the Union. The Commissioners recommend interim 
actions such as joint strategic planning and the establishment of a
12Supplement 5/75, Bulletin of the European Communities, p. 23.
13The European Court of Justice set the precedent in this matter 
in its "AETR judgment" (Case 22/70: Recueil, p. 263). The Court ruled
that each time the Community, with a view to implementing a common policy 
envisioned by the Treaty, lays down common rules, the member states no 
longer have the right to contract obligations with third countries which 
may be contrary to these rules. See Common Market Law Review 8 (July, 
1971), pp. 392-401.
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"European Arms Agency". They add that the alignment of defense policies 
would be desirable even if done outside the present Community structure.
The Commission report contains extensive discussions of several 
future institutional systems for the European Union. The Commissioners 
discuss in detail two possible models, a single institutional system to 
cover all functions, and totally separate structures, each functionally 
specific, connected to others only by a central coordinating body. The 
authors clearly show a preference for the former. They argue that any 
institutional system must include legislative, governmental, judicial, 
and constitutional amendment functions and that a separation of powers 
must be defined for these functional groups. As for setting up the insti­
tutional system, the Commissioners appear to prefer a qualitative leap 
(reform) forward (as happened, they argue, when the Treaties were adopted) 
to a step-by-step approach to enlarging institutional competences. 
Specifically, they call for direct suffrage to the European Parliament 
and a major reorganization of the executive organ of government. Again, 
demonstrating a propensity for proposing alternatives before hinting at 
a preference, the Commission report offers three structural models. The 
first posits a governmental organ consisting of ministers from the national 
governments devoted solely to European affairs, completely independent of 
a bicameral Parliament. The second model has, as a governmental organ, 
a collegiate body independent of the national governments, which would 
absorb the present Council of Ministers and Commission. It too would have 
a bicameral legislature, but the governmental organ would be in some way 
responsible to the Parliament, the primary decision-making body. The 
third model would be the same as the second with the addition of a third
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body, the "Committee of Ministers" (representatives of the member 
governments). The Commissioners clearly prefer the second model. The 
first, they say, is no real improvement on the present situation, and 
the third involves a more ponderous institutional structure and the pos­
sibility that the "Committee of Ministers" might intervene too often, 
thus undermining any government action.
The report contains several other recommendations concerning 
the institutional system, particularly the need for legislative initia­
tive, strengthening judicial review, and the rights of individuals before 
the European Court of Justice. In general, the Commission’s Report 
differs from the Tindemans Report in that its view of a future Europe is 
more ambitious, particularly concerning the means to that end. The 
Commissioners argue for moving toward union by "reactivating the building 
of Europe." This, for them, means an immediate institutional reform 
rather than the step-by-step pragmatism of Tindemans. (See Table 3.2)
The European Parliament’s Report
The Report on European Union by the European Parliament is in the 
form of two resolutions, one adopted October 17, 1974, and the other 
July 10, 1975. In both, the Parliament argues that efforts to transform 
the present Community into a European Union should involve the strengthen­
ing and extending of Community powers (to include foreign policy and 
security). The Parliamentarians specifically call for a democratization 
of the Community's institutions. These institutions should include a 
Parliament having budgetary powers and powers of control, a single decision­
making center independent of the national governments and responsible to
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Table 3.2 - Summary of the Commission's Report
View of Europe - 
General Strategy -




Role in the -
World
"Reactivate the Building of Europe"(a qualitative 
leap forward).
"Constitutionalization" (EC to States). Transfer 
power (states to EC): EC defines means, states set
timetable.
Now under Treaty: Commercial, competition, agri­
culture, social, regional; need to add: economic,
industrial, energy, environment, research, monetary, 
budgetary.
Integrate foreign policy into EC institutions (single 
decision-making body for areas deemed necessary); 
Competences same in external as for internal areas; 
Establish European defense policy.
Institutional - Single system to cover all functions.
and Decision- 
Making Structure Parliament: direct elections, bicameral body, act as primary decision-maker.
Council; to be eventually replaced by Commission 
and Parliament.
Commission: collegiate body independent of member-
states * governments.
Court: strengthen judicial review and individual
access to the ECJ.
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the Parliament, a European Court of Justice, a European Court of Auditors, 
and, as a consultative body, an Economic and Social Committee.
The two resolutions by Parliament are also explicit as to what 
policy sectors should be included in the Union. The first mentioned and 
most emphasized is foreign policy followed by security policy, social and 
regional policy, educational policy, economic and monetary policy, 
budgetary policy, energy and raw materials policy, and scientific and 
technical research policies. The Parliament specifically recommends 
direct universal suffrage to the European Parliament, the submission by 
the Commission of an action program of positive steps toward union over 
the next ten years, and the substantial reinforcement of the Parliament’s 
power by 1980. Further, they call for an end to allowing a lack of pro­
gress in one aspect of economic and monetary union to serve as a pretext 
to inaction in the other, an end to unanimity voting and closed meetings 
in the Council of Ministers, and an end to the distinction between Com­
munity procedures and intergovernmental procedures. Finally, the 
Parliament calls for incorporating in the Union a "Charter of the rights 
of the peoples of the European Community.
The Report of the Court of Justice
In making its report on European Union, the European Court of 
Justice confined its suggestions solely to areas of its competence. Hence, 
its concerns are the requirements for a genuine rule of law, the require­
ments for effective legislation, and judicial requirements. As for the 
first, the court warns that European Union would lack any force if it is
^^Supplement 9/75, Bulletin of the European Communities, pp. 9-13.
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based on rules that impose neither obligations nor sanctions on the 
member states' relations with each other or with respect to individuals. 
Further, all such rules must apply with the same force to all parties 
to the Union. Protections of the rights of individuals must be considered, 
and individuals must have direct recourse both to their national courts 
and to the European Court of Justice.
Effective Community law depends on establishing an effective
decision-making body. The Court further argues that the present slow pro­
cess of lawmaking must be replaced by a system which provides clear and 
positive rules of law in a timely fashion that can be easily absorbed in 
the judicial system. Once effective decision-making machinery is designed, 
the next important area is legal cooperation, particularly the harmon­
ization of national laws (as provided in Art. 100 et. seq. of the EEC 
Treaty).
Finally, the Court argues that the judicial system should be 
subject to a single Supreme Court, that a system of separate and com­
peting courts should be avoided. Also, judicial procedures should be 
simplified even as new institutional arrangements having new competences 
become more complex. Finally, the Court recommends that the present 
relationship between the Community and national courts should apply to 
any new fields added to or modified for Community competences.^^
The Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee
The contribution of the Economic and Social Committee, expressed
in the form of an opinion to the Commission and Council of Ministers,
l^Ibid..pp. 17-21.
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states several broad objectives to be achieved by European Union. These 
objectives, which the Committee considers basic aims, are the establish­
ment of a lasting peace between European states, the preservation of 
democratic freedoms, Europe's international mission, and economic recovery. 
The Committee insists, however, that these aims are subject to a pre­
requisite, that Europe become economically and politically independent 
relative to the rest of the world.
The Economic and Social Committee's view of Europe is one which 
goes far beyond the economic sphere. European Union must move toward a 
society which reflects "...the lofty ideals of the people of Europe, who 
want peace, freedom and security and who aspire to the abolition of 
frontiers, the achievement of a more natural human environment and way of 
life, enhanced human dignity, and greater fairness through the reduction 
of inequalities."^^ The Committee concretely recommends the adoption of 
a charter setting out these objectives enumerating the rights of European 
citizens, and setting economic and social targets as steps to the achieve­
ment of European Union.
The opinion also contains specific recommendations concerning the 
institutional structure of the proposed Union. The Economic and Social 
Committee sees the need for significant changes spread out over a long 
period of time, during a transition period in which Community and member 
states powers exist side by side. Ultimately, however, the legislative 
function for the Union must be assigned to a European Parliament elected 
by direct universal suffrage. The executive function should be assigned
^^Ibid., p. 26.
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during the transition period to both the Council of Ministers and the 
Commission. The Council would have decision-making powers and would 
immediately adopt the principle of majority rule; the Commission would con­
tinue to have implementing powers. Eventually, the Commission would pro­
pose legislation to the Parliament and be responsible to it for the 
execution of Community laws and programs. The Economic and Social Com­
mittee would continue its consultative and advisory role, but consulta­
tion would be obligatory on all economic and social matters. The 
European Court of Justice would continue to function as it does now, but 
would be joined by the Court of Auditors.
The Committee recommends several action programs in its opinion.
It lists steps which it feels must be taken to speed up the achievement 
of Economic and Monetary U n i o n . T h e  Committee also calls for the imple­
mentation of a Community employment policy directly financed by a Com­
munity budget, the setting up of a European Employment Office, the intro­
duction of a European regional policy, the definition of a common energy 
policy, the establishment of an industrial policy, strengthening the 
Common Agricultural Policy, the development of a common policy on immi­
gration, and the harmonization of working conditions and degrees, diplomas, 
and certificates.
Finally, the Economic and Social Committee addresses specific 
areas of the Community's external relations. Having mentioned the success 
of the Lome Convention and the fact that the Commission has substantially
17See "Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee" (December 13, 
1973) in Bulletin of the European Communities 12-1973, point 2463.
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18increased its own power through increasing its international contacts,
the Committee recommends the "concertation" of member states’ foreign
policies, and institutional arrangements to coordinate trade, energy,
19and industrial policies both internal and external to the Community.
(See Table 3.3)
The Spierenburg Report
Unlike the other reports, the Report by the Advisory Committee
on European Union (called the Spierenburg Report after the President of 
20that group) is a result of a unilateral initiative of only one of the 
member states, the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The advisory Committee 
(consisting of prominent Dutch citizens) was commissioned to do the 
report by the Minister of Foreign Affairs pursuant to a Cabinet resolution 
(March 22, 1974). The mandate given the Spierenburg Committee specifi­
cally charged them to address what process (stages) should be followed, 
what should the end-product be, what organs should it have with what 
accompanying powers, what should be the role of the member states in the 
process and the final stage, and what external position should the union 
have?
The Report is in two parts. Part one contains general references 
to questions of the "desirable vs. the attainable" and policy content vs. 
policy procedures. It contains also a brief assessment of the move
18See Chapter VII of this dissertation for further elaboration 
of this point.
19Supplement 9/75, Bulletin of the European Communities, pp. 25-34.
20The Spierenburg Report is distributed in mimeograph form by 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.
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Table 3.3 - Summaries of the Reports of the European Parliament,
European Court of Justice, and Economic and Social Committee
View of Europe - The Democratization of EC Institutions. Europe 
under the General Rule of Law.^ A "Citizen's 
Europe".c
a&bGeneral Strategy - More power to Parliament.""" End distinction:
politics/economics.b Adopt Economic and Social 
Rights Charter.^ Long-term gradual change;*^ 10-yr. 










- Social and regional, educational, economic and 
monetary, budgetary, energy and raw materials; 
European Employment Office, industrial, agricultural, 
immigration;^ judicial.
- Common foreign and security policies;^ concertation 
of foreign policies;^ coordinate internal policies 
with external policies (trade, energy, industrial 
cooperation).^
- Parliament: direct elections budgetary control,^
sole decision-making powers.^
Council and Commission: megge as single executive
a&c
accountable to Parliament.
ESC:^ obligatory consultative body.'
Court : as is, but add Court of Auditors; 
courts should be est a b l i s h e d . ^
a&c no other
European Parliament only
European Court of Justice only
"Economic and Social Committee only
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toward European unification during the past twenty-five years, including
21an itemization of the causes of stagnation, and a general discourse 
concerning unification in the future. Part two provides specific obser­
vations and recommendations organized as to policy areas (monetary union, 
social policy, environmental and national resources policy, energy 
policy, foreign policy, development cooperation, and defense policy) and 
the institutional structure and decision-making procedures.
Of the reports mentioned thus far, the Spierenburg Report is 
generally regarded as the most far-reaching, ambitious, and, by some, as 
the least practical or realistic. The Committee freely admits that it has 
"...sought a close link with current realities without, however, entirely
basing the form and content to be assigned to the Union on what would be
22practical in the present circumstances." Moreover, the Committee argues
that the European Union should be regarded as a future step in the pro­
cess of European unification and that it need not represent a final 
state. Progress toward Union should be in a stable environment in which 
each exercise of new powers must be irreversible. It may continue along 
the existing patterns of integration, but revision of the existing trea­
ties will prove unavoidable in the long term. As to policy areas, the 
Committee believes that the sine qua non of success for European Union
21The Spierenburg Report, points 2.2.1-2.2.5. Specifically men­
tioned are changes which have taken place in the structure of economic 
policy and social structure of the member states, the lack of political 
will (and the dependence on it) in the member states, the serious defects 
in the Community decision-making process, and the failure of the member 
states to lay the foundations for a common economic and monetary policy 
when, in the first ten years of the Community's existence, the economic 
situation was still "exceptionally favorable."
22The Spierenburg Report, point 1.2.2.
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is the formation of a monetary union. This might be followed by common 
positions in "complementary policy areas": social matters, environment,
national resources, energy, and development aid and cooperation. With 
further unification, the Committee believes it "inconceivable" to have 
any Union without a common external policy, especially a foreign policy 
and an associated common defense policy. The Committee does not suggest 
a timetable to accomplish European Union. The Spierenburg Committee is 
careful to point out that all future developments depend on the creation 
of political consensus, for which no time limits can be set.
The Committee does make certain recommendations concerning the 
institutional and decision-making structures. They recommend that the 
present institutions remain, but that their powers and "democratic con­
tent" be strengthened. The Council should have competences in all areas, 
and should appoint special subgroups of government ministers to handle 
less politically controversial matters. Further, it should in all mat­
ters make decisions by majority rule (unanimity might be retained for the 
short-term only for admission of new members, amendment of the Treaties 
and foreign and defense policy matters). The Commission, in sharing 
executive responsibilities with the Council, should have a political role. 
Its exclusive right of initiative should be restored, it should have more 
power and competences in all functional areas, and the Commissioners 
should be made individually accountable to the European Parliament and 
tiie President of Commission appointed by that body. Finally, the European 
Parliament should be given a share in decision-making, i.e., the right to 
share with the Council of Ministers in legislation. The Parliament 
must also be further "democratized" through the institution of direct
88
Table 3.4 - Summary of the "Spierenburg Report"
View of Europe 
General Strategy -









European Union as a stage toward still further 
European unification.
Create stable environment in which integration pro­
gress is irreversible. Revise existing treaties. 
Begin with Monetary Union.
Monetary union (first), social, environmental, 
natural resources, energy.
- Common foreign policy made by EC central institu­
tions after common defense policy established 
(common budget, etc). World-wide development pro­
gram - harmonize national aid programs.
- Parliament; direct elections; share in decision­
making with Council; have commission accountable 
to it.
Council: expand its scope, majority voting, appoint
subgroups of Ministers (to handle details).
Commission: have political role, expand scope,
have exclusive right of initiative.
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elections to that body by universal suffrage. (See Table 3.4)
Summary of the Reports
The reports on European Union discussed in this chapter are all 
similar in that all are arguments for increased integration to reach 
European Union. As such, an implicit assumption of each report is that 
European Union is both right and proper, and that continued European 
integration is, perhaps, a necessity. Although the contents of the 
reports differ in the recommended extent and speed of such integration, 
general positions regarding matters such as the policy areas that should 
be included in the Union, the appropriate decision-making and institutional 
structure, general strategy, the Community's role in the world, and the 
general view of what European Union should be are essentially similar 
(Table 3.5 provides a comparative summary of the reports).
In general, the reports contain recommendations for increasing 
the scope (legal competences) of the Community's institutions in many 
policy areas not included in the Treaty of Rome. Specific recommenda­
tions include the democratization of the Community's decision-making pro­
cess (e.g., direct elections to the European Parliament and voting by 
majority rule in the Council of Ministers) and the cessation of the 
articificial distinction between "low politics" (matters given to Community 
competence by the Treaties) and "high politics" (the sole jurisdiction of 
the member states). As such, all the reports (except the one submitted 
by the European Court of Justice) include recommendations for some form 
of a Community foreign policy and a Community defense policy. The recom­
mended means to achieve European Union range from the pragmatic, step-by- 
step gradualism of the Tindemans Report to the "qualitative leap forward"
Tlndeman^s Report






Role in the World )
A "Citizen's Europe" (emphasis on 
individual social and legal rights)
Build constantly, step-by- 
step integration made irre­
versible. A "two-speed" Europe. 
End distinction between "Politics" 
and "Economics" in decision-making
Economic and Monetary Union, 
Agriculture, Industry, Energy 
and Research, Passport Union.
Common position on detente; 
Coordinate common foreign policy 
in Council of Ministers; Increase 
multilateralism in aid; estab­




European Council; make general 
policy guidelines.
Parliament ; direct elections, 
widen scope, own legal initia­
tive.
Council: widen scope, integrate
Commission, majority vote,
Pres, for 1 year.
Commission ; wider mandates, 
more accountability to Parlia­
ment .
Court: same competences in
each new added Community area.
The Commission's Report
"Reactivate tho Building of 
Europe" (a qualitative leap 
forward)
"Const 1cutlonalization" 
(EC to States). Transfer 
power (states to EG):
EC defines means, states 
set timetable.
Mow under Treaty: Commer­
cial, competition, agri­
culture , social, regional; 
need to add: economic,
industrial, energy, environ­
ment, research, monetary, 
budgetary.
reports of the Parliament, 
ECJ, and Economic and 
Social Committee The "Spierenburg Report"
The Dciiiocratizatton of EC 
Institutions.*^ Europe under 
the General Rule of Law^
A "Citizen's Europe"*^
IEuropean Union as a stage toward 
jStlll further European unlfica- 
Ition.
More power to Parlianent^^^ 
End dlsrincilon: politics/
economics^. Adopt Economic 
and Social Rights Charter^ 
Long-term cradual change 
10-yr. time tablc*^ Han.wn- 
Izo national laws
(Create stable environment in 
jwhich integration progress is 
llrreverslble. Revise existing 
[treaties. Begin with Monetary 
(Union.
Social and regional, edu­
cational, economic and 
monetary, budgetary, energy 
and raw materials 
European Er^loyment Office, 
industrial, agricultural, 
immigration;^ judicial.
(Monetary union (first), social, 
jenvironmcntal, natural resources, 
energy.
Integrate foreign policy into 
EC institutions (single 
deci s ion-makii.. i)C'dy for 
areas deemed necessary); 
Cori|)etences same in exter­
nal as for internal arena; 
Establish European defense 
policy.
VOO
Single system to cover all 
functions.
Parliament : direct elec­
tions, bi-cameral body, 
act as primary decision­
maker.
Council; to be eventually 
replaced by Commission and 
Parliament.
Commlss ion ; collegiate 
body independent of mcmbcr- 
atates' govcnunents.
Court: strengthen Judicial
review and individual access 
CO the r.CJ.
Com.on foi'lgn and security 
policies;** concertation of 
fovaign policies;^ coordin­
ate internal policies with 
external policies (trade, 
energy. Industrial coop.)*^
jCotrmon foreign policy made by EC 
central institutions after common 
I defense policy established 
i(common budget, etc). World-wide 
I development program - harmonize 
Inntionnl aid programs.
Pari lament : direct elec­
tions budgetary control,*^ 
solo doclsion-r-..iUing powers.^ i 
Council and Corrmiission; mergp : 
as single exec, accountable ! 
to Pari i ament |
ESCi5 obligatory consulta- ! 
tivo b o d y i 
Court : as is. but add Court |
of Auditors;****^ no other i 
courts should be established.^
‘'^European Parliament only 
'^European Court of Justice 
only
^Economic and Social Commit­
tee only
Parliament : direct elections
share in decision-making with 
Council; have commission account­
able to it.
Counci 1: expand Its scope,
majority voting, appoint sub­
groups of Ministers (to handle 
details).
Commission: have political role,
ex;)and scope, have exclusive right 
to Initiative.
TABLE 3.5
Comparative Summary of the Reports on European Union
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recommended by the Commission.
Taken with the Paris Communique, which first officially sug­
gested the goal of European Union by 1980, the reports do represent a 
significant amount of ideological support for increased political and 
economic integration in Europe, at least on the part of the Community's 
institutions (the Tindemans' report was done for the European Council 
and the Council of Ministers). But the reports in themselves are not 
sufficient evidence that a widespread commitment exists in the Community 
to achieve European Union. Before one can argue strongly for the pro­
positions suggested in Chapter II, that the move toward European inte­
gration has been externalized, concentrated in, encapsulated in, or has 
spilled-around to the Community’s external relations sectors, it is 
necessary to examine the support rendered the European Union concept by 
the national governments. Community officials, and the general publics in 
the member states. This probes deeper than does consideration of the 
formal reports examined in this chapter and may assist in supporting the 
observation that the present state of stagnation in the Community's 
internal affairs (as was argued in Chapter I) is not merely the result of 
a lack of ideological commitment in the Community to demonstrate pro­
gress toward European Union.
Some Unanswered Questions
Such an examination will serve another important purpose. The 
reports on European Union leave several questions unanswered. What 
governmental form should the Union take: a unitary state, a federal or
confederal arrangement, or a more loose association of the states? Is the 
underlying assumption in the reports that European integration is a right
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and proper enterprise shared by the majority of elites and by the general 
publics in the Community? Of the strategies recommended in the reports, 
which are the ones preferred by those who will be called upon to imple­
ment them? Do these implementers see integration as an automatic pheno­
menon (as the functionalists have argued) or must it be contrived by 
political leaders (as per the neo-functionalists)? Is economic union a 
requisite for political union, political union for economic union, or is 
neither dependent on the other’s having been established first? What is 
the general reaction to specific recommendations in the reports on 
European Union, such as Tindemans’ suggestion for a two-tiered (or two- 
speed) Europe and the role the European Council should have in the Union 
(most of the reports make no mention of the European Council)? Further 
questions concern the assessments that can be made of the present state 
of progress toward European Union (as only the Spierenburg and Economic 
and Social Committee's reports attempted), as to perceived levels insti­
tutional support, national government support, and public opinion support. 
Finally, can one measure recent progress toward European Union relative 
to prospects for the immediate future? These questions and the general 
question as to commitment to progressing toward European Union will be 
addressed in the next chapter.
CHAPTER IV 
THE ’EUROCRATS’: TOWARD EUROPEAN UNION
In order to answer the questions raised in the previous chapter, 
particularly those that attempt to get at more specific information 
concerning desired goals, means to those goals, and assessments of the 
present state of integration, I turn to my fifty informants, whom I call 
the "Eurocrats."^ The collective insight of the Eurocrats is not intended 
to be a representative sample of elite attitudes in Brussels. It does 
constitute, however, a survey of a substantial number of people who are 
among the most knowledgeable concerning the Community. Moreover, many 
of them are in a position to directly influence decisions made in the 
Community, and one day some of the respondents will likely be at the
By Eurocrats, I mean the corps of high level bureaucrats in 
Brussels responsible for the functioning of the European Community.
For further explanation, a profile of the fifty respondents, and details 
as to methodology, see Chapter II.
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2highest levels of Community policy-making.
Personal Commitment to European Union 
Taken by themselves, the reports on European Union indicate a 
very strong commitment to continued European integration. Before pre­
senting the collective thinking of the Eurocrats, it should be helpful 
to measure in the most general way their attitudes as to whether efforts 
to achieve European Union are necessary and proper. It would also be 
instructive to point out any attitudinal differences which may exist
3between various categories of Eurocrats. Table 4.1 contains the res­
ponses of the Eurocrats to the general question of the correctness and 
necessity of European Union. A total of 80 percent agreed that European 
Union was a necessary and proper enterprise, and over half agreed 
strongly.
2There is sufficient justification for the study of bureaucratic 
attitudes. As Robert D. Putnam states: "Can there be any doubt who
governs our complex modern societies? ... Bureaucrats, monopolizing as 
they do much of the available information about the shortcomings of 
existing policies, as well as much of the technical expertise necessary 
to design practical alternatives, have gained a prominent influence over 
the evolution of the agenda for decision." Robert D. Putnam, "The 
Political Attitudes of Senior Civil Servants in Western Europe: A Pre­
liminary Report," University of Michigan Institute of Public Policy 
Studies Discussion Paper No. 36« p. 1*
3As a convention, only those independent variables that showed 
a significant relationship (at .05 by t) will be reported throughout this 
chapter for all questions asked the Eurocrats.
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Table 4.1 - "Working steadily and very hard toward the goal of European
Union is the right thing to do. It is also something that
must be done."
Strongly Mildly Mildly Strongly
Agree Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Disagree
27 (54%) 12 (24%) 1 (2%) 2 (4%) 4 (8%) 4 (8%)
Mean Response = 2.12 (where 1 = strongly agree; 6 = strongly disagree)
When the Eurocrats' responses were analyzed by nationality, some signi­
ficant differences appeared (Table 4.2). The Danish respondents uniformly 
disagreed with the statement^ and the French were the most in favor of 
it. Similarly, those respondents who were from the three new member 
states (Ireland, Denmark, and the United Kingdom) demonstrated (as a 
group) far less commitment to European Union than did those from the
4The Danish respondents were unanimous in their belief that 
any preoccupation with future integration, particularly if it involved 
any structural changes in the Community or attempts to increase the 
power of Community institutions relative to the member states, were ill- 
advised for the present. Rather, they argued, there is a more pressing 
need to fully apply the Treaties and solve present problems. One of 
them told me, "If it can be proven that increasing the power of the 
Commission will in any way reduce unemployment in my home country, I 
will then become a devout Europeanist." It should be further noted here 
that in almost all the statements put to the Eurocrats (included in this 
chapter), the Danes are the most negative. Rather than being a result 
of having chosen Danish respondents who were by nature negative indivi­
duals, the Danish respondents accurately reflect Danish attitudes in 
the Community. The "pro-marketeer" forces in Denmark barely won the 
referendum for Danish entry into the Community, and "anti-marketeer" 
political forces are still extremely strong in Denmark. Many "pro­
marketeer" Danes feel they would have been much happier in some sort of 
Scandanavian Common Market, but the United Kingdom's entry into the 
Community combined with the fact that two-thirds of Denmark's trade is 
with the United Kingdom and West Germany, made Community membership an 
economic necessity if not something otherwise "devoutly to be wished." 
(From interviews in Brussels, June-July, 1976).
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Table 4.2 - "Working steadily and very hard toward the goal of European
Union is the right thing to do. It is also something that
must be done."






United Kingdom 11 2.55
Italy 6 1.67
West Germany 8 1.63
France 6 1.17^
Benelux Countries 13 2.08
France/Germany/Italy 20 1.50
New Three Countries 17 2.88*
TOTAL 50 2.12
differs significantly with all other nations (at .05 by t).
^Differs significantly from the mean responses of the Dutch 
and British.
^Differs significantly from the mean responses of the French/ 
German/Italian respondents.
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original six member states. The difference suggests a correlation 
between length of membership in the Community (old members vs. new 
members) and commitment to European Union.
However, the respondents' ages, time in the Community, insti­
tution, or previous experience before working in the Community seemed 
to make no difference in their level of commitment to European Union.
What does appear to have a definite association is the relationship of 
the respondent's answers as to the best possible states for European 
Union (See Table 4.4) and for foreign policy (see Table 6.1 in Chapter VI) 
As is indicated in Table 4.3, those who opted for a federal arrangement 
to a unitary state (designated here as the "federalists") and those who 
preferred foreign policy decision-making to be made totally by the 
Community's central institutions (the "centralists") were significantly 
more committed to European Union than were those who opted for less 
ambitious goals (the "non-federalists and "non-centralists") for 
European Union and Community foreign policy-making.
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Table 4.3 - "Working steadily and very hard toward the goal of European
Union is the right thing to do. It is also something that
must be done."
Preferences Indicated in Self-Anchoring 
Scaling Responses:
Number Mean Response
As to Government Structure:^
"Federalists" 31 1.61
"Non-Federalists" 19 2.95
As to Foreign Policy Making:^
"Centralists" 28^ 1.57
"Non-Centralists" 20^ 2.55
The "Federalists" saw the federal (or unitary) model as the 
ideal state for European Union.
^The "Centralists" saw foreign policy making by the Community’s 
central institutions as a goal for European Union.
^Two respondents indicated no preference in this area.
End Products
One important question about which the reports on European 
Union are usually very vague or totally silent concerns what the 
structural form of the European Union should be, especially the nature 
of the relationship of the central government to the member states. In 
their answers to the question designed to anchor the top of their self­
anchoring scales on European Union, the Eurocrats provided the responses 
indicated in Table 4.4. It is worth mentioning that, although the
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question was totally open-ended and the responses listed in the table 
are compacted categories of the fifty responses, all fifty respondents 
answered this question either wholly or in part as to government structure 
expressing what appeared to be definite preferences as to which govern­
mental organization the European Union ought to have. It is also worth
Table 4.4 - The Best Possible State for European Union
Ideal State Number
Unitary State of Europe 4
Between Unitary and Federal 1
Federal on a regional basis^ 3
Federal^ 23
Between Federal and Confederal^ 6
Confederal 5
Supranational 5
Loose Union (as now exists) 3
Total 50
Those who mentioned this spoke of replacing the present member 
states with 50 regions in which, for example, Luxembourg would not change, 
but Great Britain would be divided into 11 regions, France into 12, Germany 
into 7, etc., and the Scandanavian countries, Switzerland, and other non­
member states included. See, for example, the partially tongue-in-cheek 
article, C. J. Parkinson, "The Little (United) States of Europe," Profile 
(Autumn, 1974) (published by ITT, Brussels), pp. 49-51.
^These and the three categories above (total: 31 respondents)
are referred to in this and later chapters as the "federalists".
^These and the three categories below (total: 19 respondents)
are referred to in this and subsequent chapters as the "non-federalists".
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noting that over half (31) of the respondents opted for a federal or 
unitary system for the Community, and that none thought the ideal state 
would be any state of integration less than what now exists.^
Table 4.5 contains the responses of the Eurocrats as to the 
worst possible state of European Union, compacted into the eight most 
often mentioned response categories. Although no general correlation
Table 4.5 - The Worst Possible State for European Union.
Worst Anticipated Development
Too much federalism or centralization
"OECDization" (to become only an exclusive "club of 




Re-nationalization (nine separate policies)
Split North/South or East/West










This compared favorably with a much earlier study (1965) by 
Lemer and Gorden. They found that 93 percent of the Community's bureau­
crats they interviews opted for "Etats-unis d'Europe" (after Jean 
Monnet's "United States of Europe") of which better than two out of 
three considered that to mean a federation. Only 5 percent chose 
"Europe des patries" (De Gaulle's vision of a Europe of many nations) 
as an option. See Daniel Lemer and Morton Gorden, Euratlantica; Changing 
Perspectives of European Elites (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1969),
pp. 264-265.
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appears to exist between the responses in this and the previous table 
(Table 4.4), the three whopreferred a loose association and three of the 
five who opted for a confederation as the best possible state for 
European Union saw as the worst possible outcome too much federalism or 
centralization (integration). (Those six are also those who disagreed 
or strongly disagreed with the statement cited in Table 4.1.) The 
Eurocrats do not then represent a group unanimously committed to increased 
integration in Europe. The majority are, however, so committed (over 
half are federalists), and all have specific ideas as to what the future 
form of the Community ought to be.
In way of further proof. Table 4.6 lends evidence to support the 
observation that the majority of the Eurocrats favor something more than 
a loose confederation of the member states as the goal for European Union.
Table 4.6 - "The goal of European Union should be a loose association of 
the states in which the central institutions of the Community 
are slightly strengthened, but the national identity of each 
state and its right to act independently of the others are 
preserved."
Strongly Mildly Mildly Strongly
Agree Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Disagree
3 (6%) 6 (12%) 4 (8%) 3 (6%) 12 (24%) 22 (44%)
Mean Response = 4.62 (1 = strongly agree; 6 = strongly disagree)
Only 26 percent of the respondents agreed with the statement quoted in 
Table 4.6, and the mean response for all respondents indicates clear 
disagreement. Table 4.7 illustrates that it is again the three new
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Table 4.7 - "The goal of European Union should be a loose association of
the states in which the central institutions of the Community 
are slightly strengthened, but the national identity of each 
state and its right to act independently of the others are 
preserved."






United Kingdom 11 3.91^
Italy 6 5.33
West Germany 8 5.25
France 6 5.00
Benelux Countries 13 5.00
France/Germany/Italy 20 5.20
New Three Countries 17 3.65^
Original Six Countries 33 5.12
TOTAL 50 4.62
differs significantly from all other nations (at .05 by t). 
b.Differs significantly from responses of Italians and Germans.
"Differs sign 
Original Six responses
^ ificantly from Benelux, France/Germany/Italy, and
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member states, the British and much more so the Danes, who differ with 
the others as to support for a loose coalition only (in this case, the 
Irish did not concur with their fellow newer members). As one might 
expect, the "federalists" and "centralists" differed significantly from 
the "non-federalists" and "non-centralists" respectively in their 
greater disagreement with this proposition (see Table 4.8).
Table 4.8 - "The goal of European Union should be a loose association of 
the states in which the central institutions of the Community 
are slightly strengthened, but the national identity of each 
state and its right to act independently of the others are 
preserved."
Preferences Indicated in Self-Anchoring 
Scaling Responses:
Number Mean Responses
As to Governmental Structure:^
"Federalists" 31 5.29
"Non-Federalists" 19 3.53
As to Foreign Policy-Making:^
"Centralists" 28^ 5.38
"Non-Centralists" 20^ 3.90
^The "federalists" saw the federal (or unitary) model as the 
ideal state for European Union.
^The "Centralists" saw foreign policy making by the Community’s 
central institutions as a goal for European Union.
^Two respondents indicated no preference in this area.
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When the Eurocrats were asked to agree or disagree with the 
proposition that the goal of European Union should be a federal arrange­
ment, the result was nearly the opposite. Table 4.9 indicates that 
nearly three out of the four Eurocrats agreed with the federal goal, 
the mean response falling halfway between "agree" and "mildly agree."
Table 4.9 - "The goal of European Union should be a federal arrangement 
in which the Community’s central institutions have more 
power than do the individual member governments."
Strongly Mildly Mildly Strongly
Agree Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Disagree
19 (38%) 11 (22%) 7 (14%) 5 (10%) 5 (10%) 3 (6%)
Mean Response = 2.50 (where 1 = strongly agree; 6 = strongly disagree)
When one looks at the responses to this statement by nationality (as
in Table 4.10), the Danes are the most negative, but their responses
differ significantly only from those of the Italians and Germans. The 
British as a group appear to be the most opposed to the federal idea, 
differing significantly from all other groups except the Danes. The 
responses of the Danes and British again account for the significant dif­
ference in the responses of the Three New countries’ nationals when com­
pared to those of the Original Six Member States.
As in previous questions, there exists a positive correlation
between the responses to this statement and whether or not the respondents 
could be considered "Federalists" and "Centralists." Indeed, one would
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Table 4.10 - "The goal of European Union should be a federal arrange­
ment in which the Community's central institutions have 
more power than do the individual member governments."






United Kingdom 11 3.91^
Italy 6 1.83
West Germany 8 1.50
France 6 2.33
Benelux Countries 13 2.00
France/Germany/Italy 20 1.85
New Three Countries 17 3.65^
Original Six Countries 33 1.91
TOTAL 50 2.50
differs significantly from responses of Italians and Germans 
(at .05 by t).
^Differs significantly from all others except Danes.
*^Differs significantly from responses of Benelux, France/ 
Germany/Italy, and Original Six respondents.
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expect the association between a statement advocating federalism and 
respondents considered federalists to be very bigb. (See Table 4.11)
Table 4.11 - "The goal of European Union should be a federal arrange­
ment in which the Community's central institutions have 
more power than do the individual member governments."
Preferences Indicated in Self-Anchoring 
Scaling Responses: Number Mean Response
As to Governmental Structure:^
"Federalists" 31 1.77
"Non-Federalists" 19 3.68
As to Foreign Policy-Making:^
"Centralists" 28^ 1.71
"Non-Centralists" 20^ 3.30
^The "federalists" saw the federal (or unitary) model as the 
ideal state for European Union.
^The "Centralists" saw foreign policy-making by the Community's 
central institutions as a goal for European Union.
^Two respondents indicated no preference in this area.
A Two-Speed Community?
Of all the strategies to achieve European Union recommended in 
the reports on European Union, none created as much reaction and con­
troversy as did Tindemans' suggestion that those member states which had 
stronger economies continue progress toward integration while others
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(particularly the British, Irish, and Italians) catch-up when they are 
able. The reaction of the Eurocrats seems to accurately reflect the 
general reaction in Brussels and the Community capitals that followed 
publication of Tindemans' report (see Table 4.12). The Eurocrats' mean 
response indicates disagreement with the suggestion. Indeed, three- 
fifths of the respondents strongly disagreed.
Table 4.12 - "The E.E.C. should be divided into a two-tiered community 
in which the stronger economies march quickly toward inte­
gration while the less strong ones proceed more slowly to 
catch up when they are able."
Strongly Mildly Mildly Strongly
Agree Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Disagree
2 (4%) 1 (2%) 3 (6%) 8 (16%) 5 (10%) 31 (62%)
Mean Response = 5.12 (where 1 = strongly agree; 6 = strongly disagree)
Not surprisingly, those who disagreed the more strongly were nationals 
of those countries which, because of economic difficulties, would pre­
sumably be left behind to catch-up. (The Irish, 6.00; the Italians, 
5.67; and the British, 5.55). (See Table 4.13). Although no nation­
ality group favored the proposal, the Danes and those of the Benelux 
countries were significantly less opposed to the idea.
Differences among the Eurocrats occurred also between age
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Table 4.13 - "The E.E.C. should be divided into a two-tiered community 
in which the stronger economies march quickly toward inte­
gration while the less strong ones proceed more slowly to 
catch up when they are able."






United Kingdom 11 5.55C
Italy 6 5.67
West Germany 8 5.25
France 6 5.33
Benelux Countries 13 4.46^
France/Germany/Italy 20 5.40
New Three Countries 17 5.29
TOTAL 50 5.12
differs significantly from responses of Italians, British, 
and French (at .05 by t).
^Differs significantly from responses of Italians and British.
^Differs significantly from responses of Dutch, Luxembourgers, 
and Danes.
'differs significantly from responses of the French/German/ 
Italian responses.
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groups and groups differentiated by experience (See Table 4.14). Those 
below thirty were unanimously opposed to the suggestion of a two-tiered 
Community while those over thirty also disagreed, but less strongly.
There also appeared to be an association between experience and the 
response to this statement. Those having the least experience in the 
Community and those having had no prior national civil service experience
Table 4.14 - "The E.E.C. should be divided into a two-tiered Community 
in which the stronger economies march quickly toward 
integration while the less strong ones proceed more slowly 
to catch up when they are able."
A m Number Mean Response
Below 30 6 6.0
30-39 24 5.0
40 and over 20 5.0









were more negative in their replies.^
What Role for the European Council?
The European Council (Heads of State and of Government) was 
created to provide summit level meetings held on a regular basis to 
permit the resolution of problems considered "too political," problems 
that had completely tied up the Council of Ministers. To some, this 
represented the recognition of a failure on the part of the Community's 
institutions and a vote for Gaullist-style intergovemmentalism for 
running Community affairs (hence, a sign of institutional disintegra­
tion) . Others see the European Council as a move toward further 
European unification, a sign of the commitment by national leaders to 
solve the more difficult problems and get the Community moving again.
It is interesting that only one of the reports recommends a 
specific role for the European Council in an eventual European Union, 
and surely Tindemans, writing for that body and himself a member of it, 
might have been expected to include a role for the European Council.
The Eurocrats appeared to side with Tindemans and those who see the 
European Council as a positive influence on the Community. That is, 
they disagreed with the proposition that the European Council is a sign 
of disintegration in the Community (see Table 4.15). By nationality.
The differences in experience levels (in the Community) may 
reflect the fact that the British, Danish, and Irish respondents have 
less experience because their countries are relatively new to the 
Community. However, the possibility that nationality "contaminates" 
the experience-in-the-community variable is not supported by the highly 
negative responses of the Italians, Germans, and French, nor by the 
least negative response of the Danes.
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Table 4.15 - "The creation of the European Council (summits of heads of
state and of government) is a sign of the disintegration of
the Community."
Strongly Mildly Mildly Strongly
Agree Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Disagree
6 (12%) 3 (6%) 7 (14%) 9 (18%) 9 (18%) 16 (32%)
Mean Response = 4.20 (where 1 = strongly agree; 6 = strongly disagree)
only the Danes, the Dutch, and the Irish agreed; the Luxembourgers and 
British were the most negative and the only ones to differ at significant 
levels. (See Table 4.16)
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Table 4.16 - "The creation of the European Council (summits of heads of
state and of government) is a sign of the disintegration
of the Community."






United Kingdom 11 5.45C
Italy 6 3.83
West Germany 8 4.50
France 6 4.00
TOTAL 50 4.20
^Differs significantly from the Danish and Italian respondents 
(at .05 by t).
^Differs significantly from the Italian, German and British 
respondents.
^Differs significantly from all others except the Luxembourgers 
and Germans.
Significant differences in responses were observed between 
groups of respondents classified by the institution for which they worked 
(Table 4.17). As a group, those working in the Commission’s DG VIII 
(Development) had a mean response which roughly equates to neither
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agreement nor disagreement, and which significantly differed from the 
response of the group who most disagreed, those in the COREPER.
Table 4.17 - "The creation of the European Council (summits of heads of 
state and of government) is a sign of the disintegration 
of the Community."
Institution(s) Number Mean Response
Directorate General I 10 4.50
Directorate General VIII 14 3.50^
Directorate General X/General Secretariat 9 4.78
Economic and Social Committee, 
European Parliament, and 
Private Interest Groups 8 3.63
Council of Permanent Representatives 9 4.89
Total 50 4.20
^Differs significantly from COREPER respondents (at .05 by t)
There also appears to be an association between age and response to this 
statement. Those 40 and older tended not to disagree while the other 
two age groups clearly did. (Table 4.18)
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Table 4.18 - "The creation of the European Council (summits of heads
of state and of government) is a sign of the disintegration
of the Community."
Age Number Mean Response
Below 30 6 4.67
30-39 24 4.75
40 and above 20 3.40*
^Differs significantly from other two age groups (at .05 by t).
Perceptions of Support by Institutions 
The reports on European Union are essentially reports made by 
institutions of the Community. The Spierenburg and Tindemans reports 
differ from the others in this regard, although the Tindemans Report 
was made for and by one of the members of the European Council and much 
of his report reflects the contents of the reports of the Commission, 
Parliament, and Court of Justice (which were first submitted to him).
I asked the Eurocrats to assess the support given efforts to achieve 
European Union by their respective institutions for two important reasons: 
first, to attempt to measure different levels of support of the institu­
tions as part of an assessment of the present state of integration and, 
second, as an important gage of some of the institutions which produced 
reports on European Union.
Table 4.19 illustrates the total responses of the Eurocrats as 
to perceptions of institutional support for increased European integration.
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The data indicate that two out of three respondents strongly agreed that 
their institution supported European Union and that only four res­
pondents (8 percent) felt their institution did not support it.^
Table 4.19 - "The institution/organization for which I work supports 
increased European Union."
Strongly Mildly Mildly Strongly
Agree Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Disagree
34 (68%) 8 (16%) 4 (8%) 1 (2%) 1 (2%) 2 (4%)
Mean Response = 1.66 (where 1 = strongly agree; 6 = strongly disagree)
When, again, the Eurocrats' responses are separated by nation­
ality (Table 4.20), little difference is evident. The West Germans were 
unanimous in their strong belief that their respective institutions 
supported European Union, the Danes exhibited a mean response that very 
nearly indicates neither agreement nor disagreement, and, as a group, 
those from the three new countries were less positive than were those of 
the original six states. It appears here that personal and/or country 
views distort perceptions of institutions. The alternative conclusion 
is that the respondents were, more so than in previous cases, simply 
giving their own unique viewpoints.
Those who disagreed: mildly - 1 from COREPER; disagreed - 1
from a private interest group; strongly disagreed - 1 from COREPER and 
1 from the Economic and Social Committee.
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Table 4.20 - "The instution/organization for which I work supports
increased European Union."






United Kingdom 11 2.09
Italy 6 1.17
West Germany 8 1.00^
France 6 1.50
Benelux Countries 13 1.77
France/Germany/Italy 20 1.20
New Three Countries 17 2.12^
Original Six Countries 33 1.42
TOTAL 50 1.66
differs significantly from Italian and German respondents 
(at .05 at t).
Irish.
Differs significantly from all others except Belgians and
Differs significantly from France/Germany/Italy Group and
Original Six respondents.
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Considering the nature of the statement, the data presented 
in Table 4.21 are the most important. As one might expect, those in 
the Commission more strongly agreed than did those not in the Commission.
Table 4.21 - "The instituion/organization for which I work support 
increased European Union."
Institution(s) Number Mean Response
Directorate General I 10 1.20
Directorate General VIII 14 1.36
Directorate General X/General Secretariat 9 1.44
Total Commission 33 1.33*
Economic and Social Committee,
European Parliament, and
Private Interest Groups 8 2.50°
Council of Permanent Representatives 9 2.11
Total Outside the Commission 17 2.29
differs significantly from responses of those outside the 
Commission (at .05 by t).
^Differs significantly from those in DG land DG VIII.
118
Those in the Economic and Social Committee/European Parliament/Private 
Interest Groups were the least in agreement. This might have been 
anticipated, given the inclusion of the three respondents from private 
interest groups, were it not for the fact that the mean response for 
the three was only 2.67. The private interest group respondents did 
not by themselves account for the more negative mean response from that 
group. It is more interesting to note that the respondents from the 
COREPER were as positive as they were, given the fact that they were 
all national foreign office officials working for a group which many see
g
as a brake on the Commission's centralization tendencies.
The data in Table 4.22 appear to indicate a positive correla­
tion between those who favor federalism and the perception of the res­
pondents' institution^ support for European Union. It also indicates a 
significant difference between those opting for a world-wide development 
aid program and those preferring differing regional approaches. Those 
preferring the regional approach to development aid ("regionalists") 
were much less positive in their assessment of institutional support.
It appears that those who favor more Community centralization see their 
respective institutions as more strongly in favor of European Union.
g
See Chapter I and Chapter V, pp. 153-155.
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Table 4.22 - "The institution/organization for which I work supports
increased European Union."
Preferences Indicated in Self-Anchoring 
Scaling Responses: Number Mean Response
As to Government Structure:^
"Federalists" 31 1.39
"Non-Federalists" 19 2.11




^The "federalists" saw the federal model as the ideal state 
for European Union.
^The "mondialists" favor an overall world-wide approach to 
aiding developing nations over a region by region approach.
^17 respondents had no preference in this area.
Public Opinion Support for European Union 
When the Eurocrats were asked to assess the support given 
European Union by the people of their home countries, a greater span of 
opinion seemed evident. As is indicated in Table 4.23, the mean response 
indicates only mild agreement, and 17 Eurocrats (34 percent) felt that
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9the majority of their fellow nationals did not support European Union.
Table 4.23 - "The majority of people in my country support European 
Union."
Strongly Mildly Mildly Strongly
Agree Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Disagree
19 (38%) 7 (14%) 7 (14%) 2 (4%) 7 (14%) 8 (16%)
Mean Response = 2.90 (where 1 = strongly agree; 6 = strongly disagree)
When the respondents are separated by nationality (Table 4.24), 
it is again the Danes, the British, and, as a group, those from the 
three new member states whose responses are the most negative and differ 
significantly from the responses of others.
9It is difficult to fully assess why in all cases the Eurocrats 
responded as they did to this statement. Many told me that they knew 
that public opinion polls in their own country indicated strong support 
for European Union, but argued that the knowledge level is so low among 
the general public as to make the opinion polls quite meaningless. One 
official told me: "The Dutch population is very favorable to European
Union, but they wouldn't be at all were they to discover that there are 
as many communists in Italy as there are Dutch citizens or that European 
Union may mean losing some industries that are in type or style typically 
Dutch." He then responded by strongly disagreeing with the statement.
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Table 4.24 - "The majority of people in my country support European
Union."






United Kingdom 11 4.55^
Italy 6 3.17
West Germany 8 1.75
France 6 2.67
Benelux Countries 13 2.00
France/Germany/Italy 20 2.45
New Three Countries 17 4.12^
Original Six Countries 33 2.27
TOTAL 50 2.90
^Differs significantly from German responses (at .05 by t).
^Differs significantly from all others except Danes and Italians.
^Differs significantly from Benelux, Old Three, and Original 
Six respondents.
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It is interesting to note that the Eurocrats' perceptions of 
public opinion support for European Union is quite accurate; that, 
indeed, the only two nations in which the majority of people do not 
support European Union are Denmark and the United Kingdom (See Tables 
4.25 and 4.26).
The Support Rendered by the National Governments
A key consideration in any attempt to measure the likelihood of 
continued progress toward European Union is the role played by the 
national governments. Since nearly any definition of European Union 
includes some transfer of power from the member states to the central 
Community institutions, the support given the process by the member states 
is, perhaps, the most critical for the success of European Union. The 
Eurocrats were asked to assess support of the member states' governments 
(relative to each o t h e r ) . T h e  results of the rankings of the member 
states are provided in Tables 4.27 through 4.31. (The columns indicate 
how various groups of respondents ranked the 9 member states; the mean 
response given for each member state accompanies the ordinal ranking in 
parentheses).
Table 4.27 illustrates how the respondents grouped by nationality 
ranked the member states' governments. Two observations can be made 
about the ten sets of rankings (including the "total" column) in Table 
4.27. First, the correlation of the rankings is extremely high; no
^^The methodology is explained in Chapter II.
Table 4.25 —  Public opinion in the member states: "Should the unification
of Europe be speeded up, slowed down, or continued as at 
present?" (May, 1976)
Nation (Number) Speeded Up
Continued 
as at Present Slowed Down Don’t Know Total
Italy (923) 58% 16% 4% 22% 100%
Luxembourg (268) 55 20 9 16 100
Netherlands (904) 44 36 7 13 100
France (1241) 43 37 7 13 100
Belgium (963) 40 32 5 23 100
West Germany (1004) 39 34 10 17 100
Ireland (1007) 31 40 14 15 100
United Kingdom (1340) 23 42 24 11 100
Denmark (977) 13 33 32 22 100
Total Community 40% 33% 11% 16% 100%
SOURCE: Commission of the European Communities, Euro-Barametre: Public
Opinion in the European Community 5 (July, 1976) , p. 27.
Table 4.26 —  Public opinion in the Member States: For or against European
Political Union by 1980 (May, 1976).
Totally Approve on Disapprove Totally No Answer or
Nation (Number) Approve the Whole on the Whole Disapprove Don 'c Know Total
Italy (923) 38 % 33% 5 % 3% 21% 100 %
Luxembourg (268) 36 35 6 1 22 100
Netherlands (904) 37 31 10 8 14 100
West Germany (1004) 23 41 9 5 22 100
France 1241) 21 37 12 8 22 100
Belgium (963) 29 26 5 5 35 100
Ireland (1007) 16 28 19 12 25 100
United Kingdom (1340) 10 24 21 29 16 100
Denmark (977) 8 16 19 33 24 100
Total Community 24% 33% 12% 11% 20% 100%
SOURCE: Commission of the European Communities, Euro-Barometre: Public
Opinion in the European Community 5 (July, 1976), pp. 34-37.
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significant differences exist between any pair of rankings.Second,
the groups of respondents were very accurate in ranking their own
countries, when each ranking is compared to the rank order given by
all 50 Eurocrats. Only the French differed from the total ranking by
more than one position in their ranking of their own country.
Table 4.28 provides the ordinal ranking of the member states
as determined by the mean responses of nationality groupings. Again,
12the rank correlations between the three nationality groupings, the
13original six and the new three, and the North States and South 
14States are very high. Table 4.29 provides the rank orderings by insti­
tution. The rank correlations between the five institution groups 
(DG I, DG VIII, DGX/SG, ESC/Parliament/Interest Groups, and the COREPER)^^ 
and between the rankings by those in the Commission and those outside 
the Commission^^ are again very high. Similarly, the rankings resulting 
from the mean responses achieved using the variables indicated in
^Kendall's W=.88 for the nine sets of ratings by nationality. 
The lowest Spearman's rho value for any ranking compared with the total 
rankings was for the French, rho=.85. (Ml rank correlations reported 
in this Chapter have a P value< .005 by X .)
^^Kendall's W = .956.
13Spearman's rho = .90.
^^Spearman's rho = .95.
^&endall's W = .866.
^^Spearman's rho = .925.
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Tables 4.30 and 4.31 are equally similar and highly correlated.
Two general observations can be made about the relative 
support the member states have given and now give to European Union 
(Tables 4.27-4.31). First, the rankings appear to correlate with the 
size of the country - with the exception of Denmark, the smaller 
countries are rated highest and the larger lowest, particularly France 
and Britain who are almost always in a near tie for last place. Second, 
there appears to be a very high level of agreement among the Eurocrats 
as to the relative support given by each of the member states.
Age: Kendall's W = .937; Community Experience: Kendall's
W = .944; Private Sector Experience: Kendall's W = .940; Prior Civil
Service; rho = .986; federalists/non-federalists: rho = .913;
centralists/non-centralists: rho = .967; mondialists/regionalists:
rho = .838; and multi-lateralists/bi-lateralists: rho = .933.
Table 4.27 - Ratings of the Community's Member States from First (1) to Last (9) as to the Support Each Gives and




Belgians Dutch Luxembourgers Irish Danes Italians Germans
(n=6) (n=5) (n=2) (n=3) (n=3) <n=6) (n=8)
British French Total
(n=ll) (n=6) (n=50)
Belgium 1 (2.42) 1 (1.80) 1.5 (1.50) 4 (3.67) 2 (3.33) 1 (2.25) 1 (2.24) 3 (2.64) 3 (2.04) 2 (2.62)
Denmark 8 (7.17) 7 (6.60) 7 (7.50) 7 (6.67) 7 (6.17) 6 (6.00) 7 (7.13) 7 (6.91) 7 (7.00) 7 (6.70)
France 9 (8.00) 9 (8.10) 8 (8.00) 9 (9.00) 9 (7.00) 9 (8.33) 8 (7.31) 8 (7.91) 6 (8.04) 9 (7.64)
Ireland 4 (4.58) 4 (4.80) 4.5 (4.50) 3 (3.33) 5 (5.00) 4 (4.17) 6 (5.13) 4 (3.82) 5 (4.65) 4 (4.46)
Italy 6 (5.33) 5 (4.90) 4.5 (4.50) 6 (6.00) 7 (6.17) 5 (4.33) 5 (4.81) 5 (5.32) 8 (5.04) 6 (5.25)
Luxembourg 2.5 (2.92) 2 (2.00) 1.5 (1.50) 2 (3.00) 3 (3.67) 2 (2.42) 2 (2.56) 2 (2.36) 1 (2.35) 1 (2.60)
Netherlands 2.5 (2.92) 2. (3.20) 3 (4.00) 1 (1.00) 1 (3.00) 3 (3.50) 3 (2.81) 1 (2.k8) 2 (3.19) 3 (2.82)
United Kingdom 7 (6.83) 8 (8.00) 9 (8.50) 8 (7.67) 7 (6.17) 8 (7.67) 9 (7.88) 9 (8.00) 9 (7.54) 8 (7.60)
West Germany 5 (4.67) 6 (5.60) 6 (5.00) 5 (4.67) 4 (4.50) 7 (6.33) 4 (4.63) 6 (5.68) 4 (5.08) 5 (5.20)
t-*
N3<y>
A nation's rating by its own nationals is underlined. Mean responses appear in parentheses.
Table 4.28 - Ratings of the Community's Member States from First (1) to Last (9) as to the Support Each Gives and












(all but New 
Three)
North South 
(all but (Italy and 
Italy & France France)
Total
Member States (n=13) (n=20) (n=17) (n=33) (n=38) (n=12) (n-50)
Belgium 1 (2.04) 2 (2.73) 3 (2.94) 1 (2.45) 1 (2.53) 2 (2.92) 2 (2.62)
Denmark 7 (7.00) 7 (6.48) 7 (6.74) 7 (6.68) 7 (6.91) 7 (6.04) 7 (6.70)
France 9 (8.04) 8 (7.13) 9 (7.94) 8 (7.48) 9 (7.84) 8 (7.00) 9 (7.64)
Ireland 4 (4.65) 4 (4.78) 4 (3.94) 4 (4.73) 4 (4.43) 4 (4.54) 4 (4.46)
Italy 5 (5.04) 5 (5.10) 6 (5.59) 5 (5.08) 6 (5.24) 5 (5.29) 6 (5.28)
Luxembourg 2 (2.35) 1 (2.68) 2 (2.71) 2 (2.55) 2 (2.55) 1 (2.75) 1 (2.60)
Netherlands 3 (3.19) 3 (3.18) 1 (2.12) 3 (3.18) 3 (2.63) 3 (3.42) 3 (2.82)
United Kingdom 8 (7.54) 9 (7.63) 8 (7.62) 9 (7.59) 3 (7.64) 9 (7.46) 8 (7.60)
West Germany 6 (5.08) 6 (5.20) 5 (5.29) 6 (5.15) 5 (5.08) 6 (5.58) 5 (5.20)
(mean responses appear In parentheses)
Table 4.29 - Ratings of the Community's Member States from First (1) to Last (9) as to the Support Eâch Gives and
Has Given to European Union.
Institution of Directorate Directorate 
Respondents General General
I VIII
Dir. Gen. X and 
Secretariat- 
General
Total Econ and Soc Comm, Council of Total 
Commission Parliament and Permanent Outside
Private Groups Reps (COREPER) Commission
Member States (n=IO) (n=I4) (n-9) (n=33) (n=8) (n=9) (n=I7)
Belgium I (2.40) 3 (2.96) 2 (3.06) 2.5 (2.82) I (2.00) 2 (2.44) 2 (2.24)
Denmark 7 (7.00) 5 (5.29) 9 (7.72) 7 (6.47) 7 (6.38) 8 (7.83) 7 (7.15)
France 9 (7.80) 9 (7.79) 7 (6.44) 8 (7.42) 9 (8.63) 7 (7.55) 9 (8.06)
Ireland 4 (4.55) 4 (4.54) 6 (4.89) 4 (4.64) 3 (3.69) 5 (4.50) 4 (4.12)
Italy 6 (5.55) 6 (5.64) 4.5 (4.61) 5.5 (5.33) 5 (4.88) 6 (5.28) 6 (5.09)
Luxembourg 3 (2.50) 2 (2.68) 3 (3.39) 2.5 (2.82) 2 (2.38) I (2.00) I (2.18)
Netherlands 2 (2.45) I (2.61) I (2.39) I (2.50) 4 (3.88) 3 (3.06) 3 (3.44)
United Kingdom 8 (7.30) 8 (7.64) 8 (7.61) 9 (7.53) 8 (7.44) 9 (8.00) 8 (7.74)
West Germany 5 (5.35) 7 (5.79) 4.5 (4.61) 5.5 (5.33) 6 (5.63) 4 (4.33) 5 (4.94)
NJ00
(Mean responses appear in parentheses)
Table 4.30 - Ratings of the Community's Menter States from First (1) to Last (9) as to the Support Each Gives and
Has Given to European Union.
AGE
Below 30 30 - 39 40-Plus 
Member States (n=6) (n=24) (n=20)
COMMUNITY EXPERIENCE PRIVATE SECTOR EXPERIENCE PRIOR CIVIL SERVICE
1 - 6
(n-32)
12 13 - 18 Profession Business None





Belgium 3 (3.00) 2 (2.63) 1.5 (2.50) 3 (2.63) 2 (2.50) 1 (2.67) 3 (2.66) 1 (2.50) 1.5 (2.73) 1 (2.50) 2 (2.69)
Denmark 7 (7.00) 7 (6.50) 7 (6.85) 7 (6.81) 7 (6.33) 7 (6.58) 7 (6.69) 7 (6.92) 7 (6.43) 9(7.45) 7 (6.24)
France 9 (8.25) 8 (7.38) 9 (7.78) 9 (7.89) 8 (7.17) 9 (7.21) 9 (8.13) 9 (7.66) 8 (7.10) 8(7.32) 9 (7.84)
Ireland 5.5 (4.67) 4 (4.69) 4 (4.13) 4 (4.39) 4 (4.50% .5 (4.63) 4 (4.13) 5 (4.71) 4 (4.60) 4(4.56) 4 (4.40)
Italy 4 (4.50) 6 (5.46) 5 (5.23) 5 (5.08) 5 (5.83) 6 (5.42) 6 (5.66) 4 (4.63) 6 (5.60) 6(5.36) 5 (5.18)
Luxembourg 2 (2.33) 3 (2.75)1.5 (2.50) .1 (2.41) 3 (3.17) 2 (2.83) 2 (2.41) 2 (2.66) I..-5 (2.73) 2(2.55) 1 (2.63)
Netherlands 1 (2.17) 1 (2.54) 3 (3.35) 2 (2.59) 1 (2.00) 3 (3.83) 1 (2.25) 3 (3.29) 3 (2.83) 3(2.82) 3 (2.82)
United Kingdom 8.5 (8.08) 9 (7.67) 8 (7.38) 8 (7.83) 9 (7.33) 8 (7.13) 8 (7.84) 8 (7.37) 9 (7.63) 7(7.29) 8 (7.79)
West Germany 5.5 (4.67) 5 (5.29) 6 (5.25) 6 (5.23) 6 (6.17% .5 (4.63) 5 (5.23) 6 (5.08) 5 (5.33) 5(5.16) 6 (5.23)
N3M3
(Mean responses appear In parentheses)
Table 4.31 - Ratings of the Com,:'..nity's Member States from First (1) to Last (9) as to the Support Each Gives and




Non-Fed- Foreign Foreign Mondialists^Region-® 
eralists Policy Policy alists
Centralists Non-Gent.




Belgium 1 (2.47) 3 (2.87) 1.5 (2.27) 1.5 (3.13) 3 (2.75)1,.5 (2. 22) 1.5 (2.57)1 .5 (2. 61) 2 (2.62)
Denmark 7 (7.00) 7 (6.21) 7 (6.96) 7 (6.50) 7 (6.60) 9 (7.,33) 7 (6.04) 8 (7. 28) 7 (6.70)
France 8 (7.55) 9 (7.79) 9 (7.82) 8 (7.33) 9 (8.10) 7 (7. 17) 9 (8.23) 7 (7. 06) 9 (7.64)
Ireland 4 (4.69) 4 (4.08) 4 (4.48) 4 (4.48) 4 (4.38) 3 (3. 83) 4 (4.16) 4 (4. 33) 4 (4.46)
Italy 6 (5.15) 5 (5.42) 6 (5.43) 5 (4.80) 6 (4.94) 5 (5. 06) 6 (5.27) 5 (4. 39) 6 (5.25)
Luxembourg 2 (2.50)1.,5 (2.76) 1.5 (2.27) 1.5 (3.13) 1.5 (2.71)1..5 (2. 22) 1.5 (2.57)1 .5 (2. 61) 1 (2.60)
Netherlands 3 (2.85)1.,5 (2.76) 3 (2.66) 3 (3.18) 1.5 (2.71) 4 (4. 00) 3 (2.73) 3 (3. 56) 3 (2.82)
United Kingdom 9 (7.60) 8 (7.61) 8 (7.75) 9 (7.33) 8 (7.75) 8 (7. 28) 8 (7.61) 9 (7. 72) 8 (7.60)
West Germany 5 (5.05) 6 (5.45) 5 (5.29) 6 (4.93) 5 (4.92) 6 (5. 67) 5 (5.07) 6 (5. 33) 5 (5.20)
wo
Refers to handling of aid to developing countries.
^Not all respondents indicated preferences in these areas, 
(mean responses appear in parentheses)
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European Union; Will It Come Automatically?
A basic difference between the functionalists and neo­
functionalists is a disagreement concerning how integration occurs.
In this case, it also involves a consideration of proper strategies 
to achieve European Union. As was pointed out in Chapter II, the neo­
functionalists disagree with the functionalists' argument that integra­
tion occurs automatically; the neo-functionalists insist that spill­
over must be "cultivated", that it is dependent on the political skill
18of political leaders and "technocrats".
The reports on European Union address in various degrees the 
difficulties to be encountered in moving toward European Union and 
strategies as to how to proceed (for example, the Spierenburg Report 
argues the need to achieve first a monetary union; the Commission recom­
mends permitting the EC institutions to determine the means of achieving 
the Union while allowing the member states to determine the timetable). 
The reports, therefore, appear to reflect more the neo-functionalist 
than the functionalist approach to achieving European Union. It is 
interesting to see if the Eurocrats have similar leanings.
A first test (albeit indirect) is one of the attitudes of the 
Eurocrats toward the central concept of the neo-functionalists, spill­
over. The data in Table 4.32 indicate the majority of the Eurocrats 
(78 percent) agreed with the concept, at least as it is represented by 
the statement presented them. Table 4.33 indicates that the Belgians 
had a significantly more positive response, and Table 4.34 indicates
18Again, see Chapter II of this dissertation.
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those in the Economic and Social Committee, Parliament, and private 
interest groups to be the most in agreement. In no case did any group 
disagree with the statement.
Table 4.32 - "As the economies of the nine countries become more fully
integrated, further political integration becomes inevitable."
Strongly Mildly Mildly Strongly
Agree Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Disagree
22 (44%) 11 (22%) 6 (12%) 3 (6%) 3 (6%) 5 (10%)
Mean Response = 2.38 (where 1 = strongly agree; 6 = strongly disagree)
Table 4.33 - "As the economies of the nine countries become more fully
integrated, further political integration becomes inevitable."






United Kingdom 11 2.82
Italy 6 2.83
West Germany 8 2.88
France 6 2.00
Total 50 2.83
differs significantly from Luxembourger, Italian, German, and 
British responses (at .05 by t).
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Table 4.34 - "As the economies of the nine countries become more fully
integrated, further political integration becomes inevitable."
Institution(s) Number Mean Response
Directorate General I 10 1.90
Directorate General VIII 14 2.43
Directorate General X/General Secretariat 9 3.11
Economic and Social Committee,
European Parliament, and
Private Interest Groups 8 1.38*
Council of Permanent Representatives 9 3.00
Total 50 2.38
differs significantly from DG-X/SG and COREPER responses 
(at . 05 by t).
There did appear to be an association between the responses 
to the statement and the respondents’ ages. As indicated by Table 4.35, 
those under 30 years of age exhibited a mean response which shows the 
slightest disagreement with spillover, while other age groups were 
significantly different in their agreement with the statement.
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Table 4.35 - "As the economics of the nine countries become more fully
integrated, further political integration becomes inevitable."
Age Number Mean Response
Below 30 6 3.67^
30-39 24 2.13
40 and above 20 2.30
differs significantly from responses of 30-39 age group (at .05
by t).
Table 4.36 presents sufficient evidence to find that the Eurocrats 
reject the functionalist argument of automatic spillover in international 
integration. Ninety percent of the Eurocrats agreed with the statement 
in Table 4.36, with more than two-thirds of that number strongly agreeing.
Table 4.36 - "Increased European integration does not happen automatically 
or as a result of previous integration; it occurs through 
conscious effort and planning by individuals willing and 
able to make it happen."
Strongly Mildly Mildly Strongly
Agree Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Disagree
31 (62%) 9 (18%) 5 (10%) 3 (6%) 1 (2%) 1 (2%)
Mean Response = 1.74 (where 1 = strongly agree; 6 = strongly disagree)
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Table 4.37 - "Increased European integration does not happen auto­
matically or as a result of previous integration; it 
occurs through conscious effort and planning by individuals 
willing and able to make it happen."






United Kingdom 11 2.18^
Italy 6 1.33
West Germany 8 1.63
France 6 1.17
Benelux Countries 13 1.46
France/Germany/Italy 20
1.40
New Three Countries 17
2.35C
Original Six Countries 33
1.42
TOTAL 50 1.74
^Differs significantly from all others except Dutch and 
Luxembourgers (at .05 by t).
^Differs significantly from Belgians and French.
*^Differs significantly from Benelux, Old Three, and Original
Six respondents.
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Table 4.37 contains what should be, by now, a familiar pattern. The 
Danes continue to march to the beat of a different drummer, being the 
only respondents to disagree as a group. The British and New Three 
Countries' respondents again showed significantly different responses, 
and were slightly less in agreement than were other groups.
Age did not appear as an important variable, but working 
experience in the Community and prior experience in the private sector 
did provide differences in responses (Table 4.38). Those with the least 
experience were the least in agreement, but this is probably more a 
function of the Danes and British being among those with the fewest 
years experience in Community institutions. Those having had no prior 
experience before coming to work in or with the Community were signi­
ficantly more in agreement than were those who had had prior business 
experience.
Which Comes First: Economic or Political Union?
The Tindemans and Spierenburg reports specifically advocate 
beginning in the economic and monetary policy sectors in moving toward 
European Union. The other reports, with their emphases on institutional 
and decision-making systems reform appear to favor a political focus 
in the continuing efforts to achieve European Union (although none 
specifically take that stand). The Eurocrats appeared not to have taken 
a definitive stand on this question. In response to a statement arguing 
that political union must first be achieved, 68 percent of the Eurocrats 
did not agree. The mean response was roughly equivalent to mild 
disagreement (See Table 4.39).
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Table 4.38 - "Increased European integration does not happen automatically 
or as a result of previous integration; it occurs through 
conscious effort and planning by individuals willing and 
able to make it happen."

























differs significantly from responses of 13-18 year group 
(at .05 by t).
b_.Differs significantly from responses of Business experience
group.
Table 4.39 - "Economic and monetary union is possible, but only after 











6 (12%)  5 (10%) 10 (20%)  16 (32%)
Mean Response = 4.14 (where 1 = strongly agree; 6 = strongly disagree)
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When the responses are viewed as to nationality of the respondents, 
only the French agreed as a group, the Irish and Danes both demonstra­
ted unanimous strong disagreement. (Table 4.40)
Table 4.40 - "Economic and monetary union is possible, but only after 
political union has been achieved."






United Kingdom 11 3.73
Italy 6 3.67
West Germany 8 4.25
France 6 3.17
TOTAL 50 4.14
^Differs significantly from responses of Italians, Germans 
and French (at .05 by t).
The institutional group most unlikely to see political union as a pre­
requisite to economic and monetary union was the COREPER which, while 
none of the other groups had a mean response indicating agreement, was 
significantly more opposed to the statement (Table 4.41).
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Table 4.41 - "Economie and monetary union is possible, but only after
political union has been achieved."
Institution(s) Number
Directorate General I 10
Directorate General VIII 14
Directorate General X/General Secretariat 9
Economic and Social Committee,
European Parliament, and
Private Interest Groups 8








^Differs significantly from responses of all others (at .05 by t).
There appeared also to be an association between age and working experi­
ence in the Community and attitudes about the necessity for first 
achieving a political union. As indicated in Table 4.42, the younger 
respondents and those with the fewest number of years experience working
in the Community were significantly more negative than were those older
19and having more experience respectively.
19This finding supports in part a study done by Feld and Wildgen 
on national bureaucrats in the nine member states. Feld and Wildgen 
found age to be an important variable, that younger bureaucrats tended 
to prefer an emphasis on economic/nonetary union while their older, more 
experienced colleagues tended toward being "political unionists". See 
Werner J. Feld and John K. Wildgen, "National Administrative Elites and 
European Integration Saboteurs at Work?", Journal of Commonmarket Studies 
XIII (March, 1975), pp. 244-265.
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Table 4.42 - "Economie and monetary union is possible, but only after
political union has been achieved."
Number Mean Response
Below 30 6 5.17®
30-39 24 4.13
40 and above 20 3.85
Years experience working in 
or with the Community:
1-6 years 32 4.44^
7-12 years 6 3.00
13-18 years 12 3.92
^Differs significantly from responses of 40-and-above age 
group (at .05 by t).
^Differs significantly from responses of 7-12 years group.
When the opposite statement was made (Table 4.43), the Eurocrats 
split, half agreeing and half disagreeing, with a mean response almost 
perfectly in the middle of the scale (neither agreement or disagreement).
Table 4.43 - "Political union is possible, but only after economic and 
monetary union has been achieved."
Strongly Mildly Mildly Strongly
Agree Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Disagree
6 (12%) 12 (24%) 7 (14%) 10 (20%) 5 (10%) 10 (20%)
Mean Response = 3.52 (where 1 = strongly agree; 6 = strongly disagree)
141
When the respondents were grouped by nationality, the British were the 
most positive, significantly differing with the more negative Italians 
and Dutch (Table 4.44).
Table 4.44 - "Political union is possible, but only after economic and 
monetary union has been achieved."






United Kingdom 11 3.00*
Italy 6 4.67^
West Germany 8 3.00
France 6 3.50
TOTAL 50 3.52
^Differs significantly from responses of Dutch and Italians 
(at .05 by t).
^Differs significantly from responses of Belgians, Luxembourgers, 
Germans, and British.
By institutions, those in the Commission came very close to mild agree­
ment as a group, while those in the ESC/Parliament/Interest Groups cate­
gory were significantly more negative (Table 4.45).
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Table 4.45 - "Political union is possible, but only after economic and
monetary union has been achieved."
Institution(s) Number Mean Response
Directorate General I 10 3.50
Directorate General VIII 14 3.29
Directorate General X/General Secretariat 9 2.89
Economic and Social Committee, 
European Parliament, and 
Private Interest Groups 8 4.75®
Council of Permanent Representatives 9 3.44
Total 50 3.52
differs significantly from responses of DG-I, DG-VIII, and 
DG-X/SG (at .05 by t).
Again, age was an important variable. Those below 30
20agreed while those above 40 disagreed (Table 4.46).
Table 4.46 - "Political union is possible, but only after economic and 













^Differs significantly from responses of 40 and over age group.
20Again, support for Feld and Wildgen’s study. (See the previous
footnote - #19.).
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Toward European Union; An Evaluation
There does appear to be wide-spread attitudinal support for
continued European integration in the Community. This assessment
applies to national government leaders, bureaucratic elites, and the
general public, but it is based on measurements of the direction, not
the intensity of support for European Union. It is often mentioned by
Community officials that further integration is dependent on political
will, and there can be no political will until there is sufficient
21economic capability and social resolve. The collective assessment 
by the Eurocrats of efforts over the last five years to progress toward 
European Union (based on a scale from what for each is the worst to 
the best possible states) supports a conclusion of stagnation in the 
Community in this decade. As is indicated in Table 4.47, the mean values 
for the self-anchoring scaling responses of all 50 Eurocrats indicates 
almost no difference between ratings for 1971 and 1976.
Table 4.47 does demonstrate some degree of optimism for the 
next five years. The mean response of all Eurocrats for 1981 indicates 
a slight rise on the scale, demonstrating an expectation of progress.
Many of the responses do vary significantly by nationality. On the 1971 
ratings, the Dutch are significantly higher than the Luxembourgers,
21One Eurocrat explained that there is no urgency in political 
matters in the Community because there are no external threats perceived 
by, and there has developed a "softness of life" in, the general public. 
Another more senior official decried the fact that younger people coming 
out of European universities today did not know World War II and have 
been subjected to the "mollifying effect of detente." This, he argued, 
contributed to the lack of political will for further integration in the 
Community (from interviews in Brussels, June-July, 1976).
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Table 4.47 - Self-Anchoring Scaling (Mean) Responses for European Union
Now, Five Years Ago, and Five Years in the Future.
So•3CO 00 3"U 00 c COC •H ECO 3 kE t—1 o ■3 013 .3 c U "3 C3 <u•H (U E CO CO 0) u tH00 cu iH E 4J iH 4J e COr-4 ■u X 0) c •H CO CO CO -u(U (U 3 k (U C 4J cu w OYear PQ g iJ M Q P l-l S
1971 3.60 5.60 3.00 4.00 7.00 3.45 4.83 3.86 5.17 4.38
1976 3.80 5.80 3.50 4.67 6.33 3.91 4.50 3.86 4.00 4.35
1981 5.60 6.40 4.00 6.33 6.33 4.82 5.67 5.00 5.83 5.48
(N) 6 5 2 3 3 11 6 8 6 50
Italians, and British; the Danes differ significantly with the Italians 
and British; and the British with the French. For the 1976 ratings, 
the Dutch were significantly higher than the Italians, and the British 
significantly lower than the Dutch and Danes. The 1981 ratings found 
the Luxembourgers significantly lower than the Belgians and French (at 
.05 by t).
Table 4.48 illustrates that two of the groupings of nations, 
the Benelux and New Three Countries, saw improvement during the last 
five years while the mean responses of the French/German/Italian group 
indicate a retreat of one-half step. Generally, the Benelux and New 
Three states (particularly the Danes and British) saw Community enlarge­
ment as having had a positive effect on Community integration, and the 
French/Germans/Italians believed the opposite occurred. The rankings
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Table 4.48 - Self-Anchoring Scaling (Mean) Responses for European Union
Now, Five Years Ago, and Five Years in the Future.
Year
Benelux
Countries Germany/France/Italy New Three Countries Total
1971 4.33 4.59 4.18 4.38
1976 4.58 4.11 4.47 4.35
1981 5.67 5.47 5.35 5.48
(N) (13) (20) (17) (50)
were all quite close for the larger groupings, and exhibited no signi­
ficant differences (at .05 by t).
The only other variable for which significant differences 
occurred was the institution of the respondents. (Table 4.49) Those 
in DGI, DGX/S-G, and the ESC/Parliament/tnterest Groups indicated slight 
progress during both five year periods (past and future), while those 
in DG VIII and the COREPER felt a reversal had occurred during the last 
five years. On the ratings for 1971, the responses of the group from 
DGX/SG were significantly lower than were those from DG VIII and the 
ESC/Parliament/Interest Groups. For the ratings of the future 
(1981), the ESC/Parliament/Private Groups respondents were by far the 
most optimistic, rating the Community significantly higher than did 
the Commission's DG VIII and DGX/SG on their respective scales of expecta­
tion. Only those in DG VIII and the COREPER appeared to be pessimistic 
about the immediate future of efforts to achieve European Union.
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Table 4.49 - Self-Anchoring Scaling (Mean) Responses for European Union
Now, Five Years Ago, and Five Years in the Future.









1971 4.22 4.64 3.11 4.09 4.63 5.25 4.44
1976 4.44 4.14 3.67 4.09 4.89 4.88 4.88
1981 6.11 4.17 5.11 5.22 6.75 5.25 6.00
(N) (10) (14) (9) (33) (8) (9) (17)
^Directorate General I (external relations) of the Commission
^Directorate General VIII (development) of the Commission
^Directorate General X (information) and Secretariat General 
(Commission)
*^Economic and Social Committee, Parliament, and Private 
Interest Groups.
^Council of Permanent Representatives to the Community.
Some Preliminary Conclusions 
Although guarded in their expectations, the Eurocrats and the 
general public support the efforts to achieve European Union. The 
reports on European Union are not the only indication of attitudal sup­
port or ideological commitment for European Union in the Community. The 
collective assessment of the Eurocrats concerning recent progress toward 
European Union is that none has occurred, and that prospects for the 
immediate future are not very optimistic (as based on personal scales of 
expectations). Yet, when all aspects (sectors) of the Community are
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considered, progress is anticipated.
All of the Eurocrats were specific as to what goal they desired 
for the European Union, and the majority preferred a federal arrange­
ment (or even greater governmental centralization). The vast majority 
felt that further integration toward that goal would not happen auto­
matically, but must be contrived by political leaders. As such, they 
appear to opt for the neo-functionalist approach, and if the concept of 
"spillover" was supported, it was Haas* "cultivated spillover" which 
had their support. Again as a group, the Eurocrats disapproved of 
Tindemans* suggestion that a two-tiered or two-speed Community be 
instituted (to allow those states with the stronger economies to further 
integrate without having to wait for their weaker partners), but they 
seemed to support Tindemans * including the European Council in the 
European Union, by expressing the belief that the European Council had 
an integrative effect on the Community. An additional conclusion 
involving strategies is that the Eurocrats believed that neither politi­
cal nor economic union was a necessary precondition for the other (although 
they disagreed more with the argument that economic union should occur 
first).
As was previously mentioned, the Eurocrats believed that 
European integration was stagnating. However, they exhibited a positive 
(and accurate) perception of public opinion and institutional support 
for the future. As for the member states* governments, the rankings 
of the states* support for integration (relative to each other) seemed 
to indicate that the smaller the state, the greater its support for 
European Union. Except for Denmark, which for reasons mentioned earlier
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in this Chapter (footnote #4) does not fit the pattern, one might 
conclude that the smaller the state, the less it has to lose in 
surrenoering sovereignty, and therefore, the more it would support 
European integration.
In short, the hypothesis that European integration in general 
has reached a standstill and that the standstill is not due to a lack 
of widespread attitudinal support or ideological commitment is sup­
ported by the elite interviews and public opinion polls. That pro­
gress has been made in the Community's external relations sectors, 
particularly in efforts to achieve common foreign and development poli­
cies, requires further evidence. The reports on European Union 
specifically address the external relations of the Community and those 
recommendations have been purposely omitted from consideration in this 
chapter. They will, however, be the foci of the next four chapters.
CHAPTER V 
TOWARD A COMMON FOREIGN POLICY
Nearly all the reports on European Union contain recommenda­
tions to establish a common Community foreign policy. Actually, 
foreign policy formulation in the European Community is already quite 
advanced and unique among regional organizations. Through the Treaty 
of Rome, the Community’s member states have given its institutions 
extensive external relations competences, including the formulation 
of common commercial policies, the negotiation and conclusion of tariff 
and trade agreements, exclusive authority over the common external 
tariff, and the negotiation of external agreements. In general, how­
ever, the nine member states have acted together in international affairs 
in such a haphazard manner that they have failed to exercise political 
influence commensurate with their collective economic strength.^ This 
realization, in part, motivated the Heads of State and Government of 
the original six member states at the Hague Summit in December, 1969, 
to charge their respective Foreign Ministers to report on "the best way 
of achieving progress in the matter of political unification within the
^See Kenneth J. Twitchett, Europe and the World: The External
Relations of the Common Market (London: Europa, 1976), Chapter I.
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2context of enlargement" and on how the Community member states should 
move to increase political cooperation between them and find means to 
harmonize their views in the field of international politics. The man­
date was not the first but the third such attempt at political coopera­
tion and unification in Europe.
The first two attempts at achieving a political union within 
the European Community, the European Defense Community (EDC) and the 
French "Plan Fouchet", were unsuccessful, it is argued, because they were 
premature and too presumptuous. The EDC project of the early fifties 
would have linked the defense establishments of the six original member 
states and created a European army with a common military budget. The 
French National Assembly defeated the project in 1954, and its downfall 
also doomed the proposed European Political Community.
The Fouchet Plan of the early nineteen sixties, which provided 
for a political commission to develop common positions in foreign affairs, 
suffered the same fate. The commission was to be located in Paris, 
strictly separated from existing Community institutions, and based on a 
mandate having the member states' unanimous approval. The "Plan Fouchet" 
failed in 1962 due to disputes over theoretical approaches, the proposed 
location of the Commission, and political rivalries (particularly between
3the French and the Dutch).
Following the collapse of the Fouchet Plan, those who still 
hoped for a political cooperation arrangement in the Community saw their
2Bulletin of the European Communities 3 (November, 1970), p. 9.
3Robert McGeehan, "A Foreign Policy for the Nine?", European 
Community 161 (December, 1972), pp. 10-11.
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hopes dashed by the Community "crisis" of 1965-1966, which ended in the 
"Luxembourg Compromise" (the 1965 gentlemen's agreement to observe a 
unanimity rule in the Council of Ministers) and a significant increase 
in the power of the Council of Ministers over the other Community insti­
tutions. Later, encouraged by favorable economic conditions and indi­
cations of increasing integration in the Community’s internal affairs, 
the subject of political cooperation among the states was reopened at the 
Hague Summit.
The declared intention of the 1969 Summit at The Hague was "to 
pave the way for a united Europe capable of assuming its responsibilties 
in the world of tomorrow and of making a contribution commensurate with 
its tradition and its mission." The Heads of State and of Government 
instructed their foreign ministers to prepare a report on the best way 
of achieving political unification, particularly in respect to the anti­
cipated enlargement of the Community. The Ministers later reported 
that they
felt that foreign policy concertation should be the object of the 
first political endeavors to demonstrate to all that Europe has a 
political vocation....Being concerned to achieve progress towards 
political unification, the Governments should decide to cooperate 
in the field of foreign policy. This cooperation has two objec­
tives: (a) To ensure greater mutual understanding with respect
to the major issues of international politics, by exchanging 
information and consulting regularly; (b) To increase their soli­
darity by working for a harmonization of views, concertation of ^ 
attitudes, and joint action when it appears feasible and desirable.
When compared to earlier proposals, the Luxembourg Report (as 
the report of the Foreign Ministers was commonly called) was quite
^Bulletin of the European Communities 3 (November, 1970), p. 9. 
^Ibid., pp. 10-11.
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modest. It reflected Gaullist resistance to expanding the roles of the 
Commission and the European Parliament and insistence that political 
cooperation be conducted within a loose intergovernmental structure 
pursuing common policies distinct from and, perhaps, even opposed to 
those of the United States. The Dutch and Germans, who had resisted the 
French earlier on these matters, yielded in hopes of reducing French 
resistance to admitting the four applicant states.^ The modestly stated 
objectives of consultation, coordination, and (where possible or desir­
able) common action, reflected the disagreement among the Six as to 
what policy objectives and institutional frameworks were appropriate for 
cooperation in foreign policy. The result was an arrangement which "at 
its birth more closely resembled an unexpected bastard than a planned 
child welcomed into the family of European institutions."^
Structurally, this unexpected "illegitimate offspring" con­
sists of the ministerial meeting (Council of Ministers), the Committee 
of the Heads of Political Departments (often referred to as the Davignon 
Committee), and the Group of European Correspondents. There later developed, 
in addition, several expert working groups and meetings among the nine 
member states' ambassadors in the capital of whatever country might be, 
at any given time, the subject of discussion. This group of ambassadors 
provides asort of ancillary organ to insure on-the-spot coordination under 
the chairmanship of the ambassador of the country which is currently 
President of the Council of Ministers. The function and importance of
^David J. Allen and William Wallace, Die europaische politische 
Zusammenarbeit; (Bonn: Institut fur Europaische Politik, 1976), pp. 2-3.
^Ibid., p. 1.
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the primary organs are essentially similar to the Community's institu­
tional superstructure. The Ministers who meet for political cooperation 
are the same individuals in the Council of Ministers. The Committee of 
Political Directors roughly equates to the rank, importance, and task 
orientations of the Ambassadors to the Permanent Representations 
(COREPER), and the Group of European Correspondents (civil servants in 
the capitals of the nine Foreign Ministries whose function is to maintain 
contacts with the experts in the other eight Foreign Ministries and
to follow through on the implementation of decisions) can be roughly
8compared to the Action Groups in the COREPER. (See Figure 5.1)
The decision-making process in the area of external relations 
is different for matters where competence is bestowed by the Treaty than 
it is for matters not mentioned by the Treaty but considered under the 
preview of political cooperation. For the former, the usual procedure 
is for the Commission to submit proposals to the Council of Ministers 
which it can accept, reject, or modify. In a very few cases, consulta­
tion with the European Parliament is required, or consultation with the 
Parliament or the Economic and Social Committee has become a pro forma 
practice, but advice from either body is in no way binding. The Council 
will normally refer the Commission's proposals to the COREPER for study
9and recommendation. In that way, the COREPER acts as a sort of filtering 
agent, and fulfills a role which many perceive as a conservative check
Q
Ranier Lau, "Political Cooperation" (unpublished paper delivered 
before the European Community Conference at Chatham House, England,
March, 1976), p. 2.
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on an executive body (the Commission) inclined to extend its compe­
tences whenever p o s s i b l e . T h e  staff of the COREPER is frequently 
consulted informally by the Commission before it submits a proposal to 
the Council. In order to handle the workload, the nine ambassadors and 
their staffs of the Permanent Representations (totalling over four 
hundred civil servants) have established numerous working groups, sub­
committees, and ad hoc committees that parallel the functional structure 
of the Commission.Altiero Spinelli, one of the Commissioners until 
his recent election to the Italian Parliament, characterized the COREPER 
as a body that:
...constitutes a sort of legislative chamber for the member coun­
tries and examines, amends and approves (or disapproves with rele­
gation to the files) a large part of the proposals for rules of 
directives made by the Commission. It is an accepted constitu­
tional custom that when an agreement is reached in COREPER, the 
Council ratifies it without further discussion. COREPER, for its 
part, passes to the Council only those points on which the 
Permanent Representatives have not wished to reach agreement, either 
because the points at issue are politically too important for the 
level of authority granted them, or because they have been unable to 
reach agreement due to too many incompatible differences in their mandates.
^^Based on interviews with COREPER officials in Brussels, June - 
July, 1976. One official of the British Permanent Representation put 
it this way: "The role of the Commission is to be European integration-
oriented. The role of the missions is to pour cold water on Commission 
proposals that are too politically centralist." Most Commission func- 
tionaires repudiate the notion arguing that the Commission has too few 
personnel to fulfill its present responsibilities to want more compe­
tences. However, I overheard more than one conversation during my 
interviews in the Commission concerning how part of a Commission proposal 
to the Council might be worded to insure more Commission involvement and 
still get past the COREPER.
^Berner J. Feld, "Problems of Foreign Policy Formulation in 
Interstate Association: The European Communities" (unpublished dis­
cussion paper, March, 1975), pp. 4-6.
12Altiero Spinelli, The European Adventure (London: Charles
Knight and Co., 1972), pp. 32-33.
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The decision-making structure for political cooperation is
deliberately different from the institutional arrangements provided
in the Treaty of Rome. First, as a procedure, political cooperation
promises everything and nothing. The original mandate was very broad
and intentionally vague. There is no commitment to agree, but only to
consult on all important questions of foreign policy or on any question
13of their choice that the member states might propose. The major 
feature of political cooperation is that it has always been considered 
as a separate procedure, one which deals with matters of "high politics" 
(strictly political matters in the tradition of the Gaullist conception) 
as distinct from technical economic or "low politics" issues which fall 
within the legal framework of the Treaties. This insistence on the 
formalistic distinction between "high politics" (nation-state competence) 
and "low politics" (Community institution competence) reached a seem­
ingly absurd level in November, 1973, when the Conference of Foreign 
Ministers met in the morning in Copenhagen to discuss political cooper­
ation, then flew at mid-day to Brussels to meet as the Community's Coun­
cil of Ministers. Not all the member governments accepted the political/ 
economic, high/low politics distinctions at the beginning. Their adminis­
trators, however, were easily able to adjust to them. Political Directors, 
for example, were largely excluded from the relationship between Permanent 
Representatives in Brussels and Economic Directors and others who served 
to coordinate national policies and Community policies. Accustomed to 
the principle of multilateral negotiations in NATO, the political
13The "Luxembourg Report," Part II, iv (Bulletin of the European 
Communities 9 (1973), pp. 19-21.)
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cooperation machinery offered them and their directorates a similar 
role at the Community level. The zeal with which many Foreign Ministries 
adapted to and pushed for the development of political cooperation might 
also be explained as a natural bureaucratic reaction. Since political 
cooperation focused on the central concerns of diplomacy and foreign 
policy formulation, the Foreign Ministry's control of the procedure was 
neither threatened by any other Ministry nor by any one powerful domes­
tic constituency. Having lost some of their traditional role as gate­
keeper between domestic and foreign policy-making to the internal Minis­
tries on Community affairs, the creation of a Community functional area
14to be exclusively their domain was most welcome.
A problem that has plagued the political cooperation efforts 
in the Community since its inception has been one of what the proper 
relationship should be between political cooperation and Community insti­
tutions. Of particular concern was the overlap of functional competences 
between the two arrangements.^^ The overriding practical consideration 
is that an increasing number of topics have emerged (and continue to 
emerge) in which separation of the two areas is impossible and the
Allen and Wallace, pp. 5-6. In my interviews in The Hague,
I found that the Dutch had a Minister President's Cabinet Sub-committee 
on External Relations to coordinate all activities concerning the Com­
munity except one: political cooperation (the sole competence of the
Foreign Ministry).
^^McGeehan and Wamecke emphasized this point strongly in one 
of the first articles published on political cooperation in the Community. 
See Robert McGeehan and Steven Wamecke, "Europe's Foreign Policies: 
Economics, Politics, or Both?", Orbis, (Winter, 1974), pp. 1251-1279.
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simultaneous coordination of the economic and political positions of 
the member states is indispensible. Examples of these areas are the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the Eur- 
Arab Dialogue, the Community's Mediterranean Policy, relations with 
the United States, relations with COMECON, and many of the issues con­
sidered in the United Nations. The overlap is an especially important 
problem when one considers the relationship of political cooperation 
to the major Community institutions. Economic elements can be found 
within almost all political decisions and, in the European Community, 
these involve the Community's institutions in Brussels. For example, 
the political efforts to reach a common position on the war in Cyprus 
had an impact on the Community's association agreements with Cyprus, 
Greece and Turkey. Also, when political discussions on the Middle East 
are in progress, the Community's preferential agreement with Israel is 
bound to be raised. In an incident which seriously embarrassed the 
political cooperation participants (particularly those who most strongly 
advocated keeping the Community institutions out of their deliberations), 
an expert working group spent months drafting a proposal on the Nine's 
political relations with the Association of South-East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) and presented its proposal at a committee meeting at which, for 
the first time, the Commission was represented. Much to the consterna­
tion of the experts, Mr. Wallenstein, the Commission Representative, had 
to point out that the report failed to mention that the Commission had 
had regular relations with ASEAN at a fairly high level for many years, 
and that any "political relations" could do little more than supplement 
the existent relationship as the main linkages between the two groups
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were economic. The political cooperation experts had not included this
in their report and had devoted a great deal of unnecessary time and
work simply because the insistence on excluding Community institutions
had made them ingnorant of the EC-ASEAN linkages.
Of the four major Community institutions with which political
cooperation concerns overlap (the Council, COREPER, Parliament, and
Commission), the role played by the Parliament is the simplest and least
significant.^^ In 1973, the second Davignon Report suggested that the
Foreign Minister chairing the political cooperation machinery should
18make an annual report to the Parliament, and since 1975, members of
the European Parliament are entitled to put written or oral questions
concerning political cooperation, with the exception that questions
concerning political cooperation cannot be asked during "question time"
as such answers require the coordination and approval of all nine
19foreign ministries.
Relations between the Political Cooperation Ministers and the 
Council of Ministers is a matter of form, as both bodies are composed 
of the same individuals. An important development is that the Ministers 
are changing their political cooperation and Council "hats" with increas­
ing frequency and informality, often during the same meeting. Cross-
^^Based on interviews in Brussels, June-July, 1976.
^^Direct elections and Parliamentary control of the budget in 
1978 may change this significantly, however.
18"Second Report on European Political Cooperation on Foreign 
Policy," Part II, 10 (Bulletin of the European Communities 9 (1973),
P- 17).
19, cLau, p. 5.
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continent treks, like the one from Copenhagen to Brussels in November, 
1973, appear to be relegated to the past. There exists some difficulty 
in discerning the relationship between the Committee of the Heads of 
Political Departments (Davignon Committee) and the Committee of Per­
manent Representatives (COREPER) in Brussels. Here, again, problems 
arise with respect to competences in direct proportion to the extent 
a given topic under discussion involves both political and economic 
aspects. The resultant conflicts often amount to internal power 
struggles between a nation's Head of the Political Department and the
Permanent Representative in Brussels. Both are of equally high rank and
20both continually contend for their minister's ear. Professional
jealousies, traditional hierarchies of national civil servants, and
personality difficulties all combine to exacerbate difficulties in
relations between the Political Director, the Ambassador to the Community,
21and their respective staffs. These considerations serve to increase 
appreciation for the significance of the Commission's importance for 
political cooperation; the Commission is represented on both committees, 
often by the same individuals.
The Commission's participation in the political cooperation
20There are numerous examples. From several interviews in The 
Hague, I learned that the Dutch Permanent Representative had "more of 
the Minister's ear" by virtue of his extensive experience and forceful 
personality. The Irish appeared to have the opposite arrangement. An 
official of the Irish Permanent Representation told me that when Ireland 
had the Presidency of the Council and political cooperation, he got most 




machinery has been substantial since 1974, and particularly so because 
of the more open Council presidencies of, first, the Irish in January, 
1975, and then of the Italians, Luxembourgers, and the Dutch. Com­
mission representatives now take part in all meetings of the Heads of 
Political Departments, all ministerial meetings, meetings of the CSCE 
Follow-up Working Group, and all of the Eur-Arab Dialogue working 
groups. The Commission also takes part on an ad hoc basis in the 
Africa, Latin America, and Asia working groups, and are excluded from 
participating in only one, the Middle East Working Group (which dis­
cusses the purely political aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict). The 
major difference between the Commission's role in other Community bodies 
and in political cooperation is that in the Council and COREPER, the 
Commission has certain rights granted to it by the Treaties and, there­
fore, has nearly the status of a tenth delegation in the Council of
Ministers. In the political cooperation bodies, however, the Commission
22has no more than a sort of observer status.
To date, the topics discussed in and by those engaged in the 
political cooperation machinery have been numerous and cover a variety 
of interests. By 1973, the topics included the Middle East, the Con­
ference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Community's role in 
the less developed nations, the political institutions of the enlarged 
Community, preparation for the Paris and Copenhagen Summits, inter­
national terrorism, recognition of North Vietnam, relations with the 
United States, and an attempt to define a European identity. The most 
difficult topic proved to be the Middle East, where common positions
^^Ibid., pp. 7-9.
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were not reached by the Nine due to differing philosophies concerning
the OPEC oil boycott and Israeli pressure on the Germans concerning
23the Yom Kippur war.
The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
The most highly regarded area of political cooperation (and, 
therefore, the one most often mentioned by officials in the Community) 
is the CSCE. Political cooperation between the Nine was so successful 
during the negotiations which led to the Summit in Helsinki for two 
major reasons: all of the member countries saw potential gains in
cooperating to maximize their influence over the shape and agenda of 
the conference; and, given the relative lack of policy differences 
between them, few costs were anticipated. Also, the division of the 
conference into "baskets" of issues neatly coincided with the distinction 
between Community and non-Community ("high politics") m a t t e r s . W o r k  
in the conference began in late 1971. A political cooperation working 
group made up of foreign ministry officials was formed to prepare the 
security, humanitarian, and cultural aspects of the CSCE. During the 
long series of preparatory sessions which began in November, 1972, and
23McGeehan and Warnecke, pp. 1251-1279.
24Allen and Wallace, p. 7. The member states had differences, 
even in "Basket II" which involved items within Community competence 
under the Treaty of Rome. However, they managed to find compromises 
through daily meetings of representatives of the nine governments and 
the Commission. Some reservations remained even after the conclusion 
of the Final Act, however. France had wanted stronger guarantees of 
reciprocity in East-West mutual exchanges and had earlier proposed 
amending CSCE document Il/D/9 in CSCE document ll/D/150. Some of the 
Nine were concerned about "awkward problems over the nomination of 
representatives" concerning business contracts
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culminated with the Final Act, the practice of political cooperation
was gradually extended into other multi-national organizations and 
25conferences. Perhaps the most singularly successful aspect was 
totally symbolic, but nonetheless most significant. Despite consistant 
objections by the Soviet Union, which had refused to recognize the 
Community, the European Community became a signatory to the CSCE Final 
Act when Mr. Aldo Moro signed both as Prime Minister of Italy and as 
President of the European Community’s Council of Ministers. Despite
and facilities. Germany, France, and Italy took exception to 
Ease German and Hungarian positions which "diluted" industrial coopera­
tion arrangements in the Final Act, and, in the area of cooperation in 
science and technology, Germany had reservations concerning specific 
bilateral arrangements involving industrial cooperation; Belgium, Germany, 
France, and Italy had expressed a particular point of view concerning 
discussions about the environment; and Italy, Ireland, and the Netherlands 
had proposed stronger measures in the promotion of tourism. (This informa­
tion is taken from an unpublished, not as yet released analysis of the 
CSCE Final Act by the Davignon Committee: Cooperation Politique Européenne,
"Cooperation dans la Domaines de l 'Economie, de la Science et de la 
Technique, et de l 'Environment: Analyse des Resolutions," GT(76)1,
Luxembourg, March 9, 1976, Annexes, pp. 1-115.)
25The Community has observer status in 26 U.N. institutions and 
special agencies, and maintains relationships with 14 non-U.N. inter­
national organizations (ranging from direct voting delegates for the 
Nine to the status of "auditeur") and 10 commodities councils. See, 
Commission des Communautés Européennes, Direction Generale des Relations 
Extérieures, "Tableau synoptique des relations entre la Communauté et les 
Organizations intemationelles". Note d 'information 1/212/75 - F, June,
1975. Also see the interesting study of voting cohesion of the member 
states in the U.N. (based on 518 role call votes in the General Assembly 
from 1948 to 1973) by Leon Hurwitz reported in his "The European Economic 
Community in the "United Nations: The Voting Behaviour of Eight Countries,
1948-1973" , Journal of Common Market Studies XIII (March, 1975), pp. 224-
243.
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the limited aims of political cooperation in the CSCE (proposals, for 
the most part, were at the very general level rather than in the form 
of detailed, specific agreements), and the consequently limited pos­
sibilities for disagreement, the almost daily successes of political
cooperation in the CSCE paved the way for the 1972 Luxembourg Report,
26the Copenhagen Report, and the optimistic call for political union 
in the 1973 Paris Summit of the European Council.
The optimism ended late in 1973, however. Political coopera­
tion in the Community effectively disintegrated after the OPEC oil 
embargo was begun. The shock of the embargo and the resultant "go- 
it-alone" strategies of the member states did, however, have a positive 
side. During 1974, the "boundaries" between Community institutions 
and political cooperation were lowered (primarily in discussions in the 
Council of Ministers), the Commission was accepted as a "tenth member" 
of the Community, and the Eur-Arab Dialogue, a direct result of the oil 
embargo, was begun.
The Eur-Arab Dialogue 
Following the formal declarations of the Nine in Copenhagen on 
November 6, 1973, and the Arab Summit held soon after in Algiers (both 
of which professed an awareness of producer/consumer economic inter­
dependence and a need for closer contacts and relations based on reci­
procity) ,the Eur-Arab Dialogue was officially opened in Paris, on
26The Copenhagen Report led to the Commission’s involvement 
in Basket II of the CSCE, and took note of the fact that in 1973, the 
number of meetings of the Political Directors was nine, five more than 
had been initially proposed per annum.
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July 31, 1974. The conference included thirty-one participants: the
nine Community nations, the twenty Arab League states, and delegations 
both from the Community and the Arab League. It was the format of the 
negotiations that constituted its most unique feature; each side, the 
Europeans and the Arabs, had co-chairmen speaking on behalf of their 
respective member states. For the European Community, it was the Presi­
dent of the Commission and the President of the Council of Ministers 
(the latter rotates every six months among the member states). The
designated co-chairmen for the Arab States were the President of the
27Arab League and the League's Secretary-General. This arrangement has 
had two interesting effects on political cooperation in the Community. 
First, it significantly lessened the politics/economics dictomy which 
had been the basis for the separation of political cooperation from 
Community institutions. Although the discussion (so far as the Nine are 
concerned) is to concern only commerce, raw materials and energy, no 
one has ever doubted that the conference had political importance from 
the beginning. The Arabs have made no secret of their desire to include 
the Arab-Israeli confict and the Palestinian question on the Dialogue's
27The Arab League has patterned much of its organization since 
the beginning of the Eur-Arab Dialogue using the European Community as 
a model. One Commission official told me that delegates from the Arab 
League had made several trips to the Commission in Brussels to study 
its operation and, on their last visit, took back with them a copy of 
the Commissions Directory to use as a guide in restructuring the League's 
executive organs (from an interview in Brussels, July, 1976).
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28agenda. The Community, which has separate commercial agreements 
with Israel and with several of the Arab States, has indicated on 
numerous occasions that it opposed any such inclusion on the agenda.
Many feel the talks may well be expanded to discussions of the conse­
quences of the CSCE, coordination at the U.N., and the struggle against 
29terrorism. The second major effect of the Eur-Arab Dialogue's format 
is the official integration of the Commission into an area of prime 
concern for political cooperation. Supplying the co-chairman, the 
Commission is much more than a "tenth delegate" in the Dialogue; indeed, 
the Council of Ministers' attempts to confine the talks to commercial 
and economic matters gives the Commission the dominant role as the talks 
center on competences the Commission alone exercises under the Treaty 
of Rome.
Despite several pessimistic assessments made in the press and 
by many Community bureaucrats,^^ there are reasons to believe that, at 
a minimum, some positive results should come out of the Dialogue. The 
Arabs have some advantages they hope to gain from the Dialogue beyond
28At the first meeting of the General Commission in Luxembourg 
(May 18-21, 1976), Ambassador Abd El Aziz Saad El Chamlan, Chairman of 
the Arab side of the Dialogue, made two demands in his introductory 
speech: that the Europeans exert pressure on Israel to give up occupied
territories, and that the Europeans recognize de jure and de facto the 
Palestine Liberation Organization. Europolitique 327 (May 22, 1976), 
"Relations Extérieurs", p. 5.
29Ranier Lau, "Le Dialogue Euro-Arabe et Sa Place Dans La 
Politique Méditerranéenne des Neuf," Revue du Marché Commun 193 
(February, 1976), pp. 71-73.
^^Europolitique 328 (March 27, 1976), "Featured Document",
p. 1.
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using it, as many have suggested, as a political forum. The oil 
reserves are finite (estimates vary between thirty and forty years), 
and the Arab States need modern development while they have the wealth 
to invest in it. Europe offers technology, trained labor, and long­
term capital investment opportunities. On the European side, there is 
more of importance than the need to guarantee oil supplies and turn 
dependence into interdependence. One high official in the Economic 
and Social Committee summed it well: "We Europeans have two cards (up
our sleeves) in this game with the Arabs. We have a traditional and 
historic relationship with the peoples of the Arab states and, given a
choice of dealing with the Americans, the Russians, or the Europeans,
31which do you think the Arabs would prefer?"
The Eur-Arab Dialogue is now in its operational stage. The 
joint body, the "General Commission", met in May, 1976 (six months after 
initial plans called for it to meet), and issued a two-part final 
communique which indicated a balanced approach to the discussions —  
between the exchange of general declarations of a political nature and 
measures on practical cooperation and procedures. The following five 
points summarize the results of the meeting:
1. For the first time an exchange of declarations took place within 
the framework of the Eur-Arab Dialogue on the positions of the 
two parties on political issues.
2. In the economic field in general the common interest was recog­
nized which each party to the Dialogue has in the other's 
economy being healthy and prosperous and the need to do every­
thing possible to promote this objective.
31From an interview in Brussels, June, 1976.
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3. In the field of practical cooperation not only were the prior­
ities laid down at the Rome and Abu Dhabi meetings formalized 
but on a proposal from the European side the General Committee 
adopted a list comprising a number of initial concrete projects, 
such as a rural development project in the South Darfour region, 
the establishment of a polytechnic institute in an Arab country, 
etc. For these schemes, the preparatory work is in progress.
4. The tricky problem of financing was discussed and the two 
parties agreed to contribute in an appropriate manner to the 
projects adopted by common agreement. On this matter the 
European side to some extent gave ground since it had hitherto 
proceeded on the principle that the studies and schemes should 
be financed solely by the Arab side.
5. The General Committee formally established the Dialogue's 
working machinery: the Working Groups and the various 
Specialized Groups were set up, their timetables and the 
venues of their next meetings fixed.^ ̂
The Eur-Arab Dialogue has weathered many "political storms".
The conclusion of the EEC/Israeli Agreement, the adoption of an "anti-
Palestinian resolution" in the European Parliament, Arab reactions to
holding the Second International Conference on Jews in the USSR, and
33the "Zionism vote" in the U.N., comprises but an incomplete list of 
the most highly reported incidents. The final communique of the General 
Commission revealed a note of optimism for the Eur-Arab Dialogue in 
particular, and political cooperation in general, as is indicated by 
the following:
On the whole this has been a good week for Eur-Arab relations. The 
tensions still exist, but, following the first meeting of the 
Eur-Arab Dialogue's general commission in Luxembourg May 18-21, they 
no longer seem insurmountable. Indeed, not only did the meeting 
avoid the political showdown many had feared, but it invested a 
dialogue which was stuck in the mud of its own making with a new 
dynamism.
32Speech by Ranier Lau before a group of Arab students in Rome, 
July 12, 1976.
^^Europolitique 303 (February 21, 1976), "Institutions", p. 1.
^‘̂Europolitique 327 (May 22, 1976), "Focus", p. 1.
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A discussion of political cooperation which cites only the
successes of the CSCE and the Eur-Arab Dialogue provides, certainly,
an incomplete and inaccurate account. Political cooperation in the
Community has had some definite failures, perhaps the greatest of which
was the failure to negotiate a "new relationship" with the United
States. In a more recent example, France announced on February 17, 1976,
its unilateral recognition of the MPLA government in the People's
Republic of Angola without having notified the other members of the
Community. France acted even though the Nine had agreed the day before
to recognize the Neto government collectively, but at a time yet to be 
35determined. Three months later, France again proved to be the "bête
noire" in political cooperation. Without consulting its EC partners,
France proposed sending its troops to Lebanon to attempt to end the
civil war there after the Nine (through the political cooperation
machinery) had agreed that there should be no European initiative in
Lebanon beyond low-keyed diplomatic efforts. The reaction of the other
eight member states was to insist on the complete disassociation of the
36French announcement from Community political cooperation.
External Influences 
A more serious rift in the Community resulted from an extra- 
EC initiative. When President Ford called for a second "Rambouillet" 
to be held in Puerto Rico in late June, 1976, he invited only the large 
Community states (Britain, France, Italy, and West Germany) to meet with
35Europolitique 302 (February 18, 1976), "Institutions", p. 4.
36Europolitique 328 (May 27, 1976), "Institutions", p. 3.
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37the United States, Canada, and Japan. After noting the negative
reaction of the smaller five EC states to having been ignored, the
United States indicated that it would invite a Community delegate if
the Community so wished. The smaller states reacted sharply at not
having been consulted by the larger four and drafted a proposal to have
Gaston Thom, the President of the Council of Ministers, attend, but
France blocked the draft at the last minute because it objected to
38establishing a precedent for future summit meetings. The reaction,
in part, by the smaller states was expressed by Hermann Bohle (of
Germany's Per Zeit):
EC manners deteriorate rapidly. The foreign ministers meeting, 
in which a last attempt is to be made to agree on the first European 
election before the chiefs of government meet in July, can of course 
be rescheduled for compelling reasons. But the fact that four 
partner states do not even consult the other five is far worse than 
the inconsiderateness of many lords of creation who stand their 
wives up. But our equal-rights ladies can at least defend them­
selves in this age of emancipation. The smaller EC states, however, 
feel passed over as weaklings even before the summit giants begin 
their palavers in Puerto Rico. The EC states, which urgently need 
a unification of equal peoples, can no longer take such liberties - 
this is already the second time. The EC, as a partnership between 
bigger and smaller countries, would break up and forfeit its 
fascination of East Europe and the Third World. The Germans, who 
for no good reason are in ill favor in Europe at this time, have 
just missed an opportunity. They could have insisted on Community 
participation by Council President Gaston Thorn.
This incident, like the breakdown of political cooperation as 
a result of the OPEC embargo, is indicative of the political cooperation's
37New York Times editorial reprinted in The International Herald 
Tribune, July 1, 1976, p. 4.
38David Haworth, "EEC Seeks Plan for Summit Roles," International 
Herald Tribune, June 28, 1976, p. 2.
39Herman Bohle, "Row in the EC," Luxembourger Wort, June 9,
1976, p. 1.
171
frail succeptability to outside influences. Indeed, many Europeans 
blamed the United States for causing the split in the Community. They 
point out that in a May 25th (1976) Luncheon address. Secretary 
Kissinger had called for Europeans to build European unity stating, "We 
believe that it is imperative that Europe unify itself. We will encourage 
it, we will cooperate with it, and indeed we think the most meaningful 
cooperation between Europe and the United States will occur only after 
Europe has achieved political u n i t y . T h e y  also point out that the 
United States had contributed nothing but harm to that end by inviting 
only four of the Community's member states and then, only as an after­
thought, a Community representative.
Dissention Within: A European Directorate?
One further related development has cast a shadow on the future 
of political cooperation in the Community. Despite denials by Prime 
Minister Callaghan, President Giscard d'Estaing, and Chancellor Schmidt, 
something resembling a European Community "directorate" may be taking 
shape. The annual bilateral talks between France and Germany were 
conducted in Hamburg the first week in July, 1976, only a few days after 
the Declaration of London (an agreement on French-British yearly summits) 
was signed during Giscard's visit to W h i t e h a l l . W h a t  these events 
leave open to question is whether the institutionalization of Franco-
"Kissinger Calls on Europeans to Build European Unity," 
Public Affairs Office, U.S. Mission to the European Communities, no. 25, 
May 28, 1976, p. 1.
^^International Herald Tribune, June 24, 1976, p. 1.
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British meetings at all levels, added to the same arrangement for
France and Germany, will amount to a willful avoidance of Brussels by
the "big three" enabling them first to coordinate policies that can then
be implemented in and by the European Council. The possible development
of a Bonn-Paris-London Axis would be a blow to Italy and the smaller
42states and to political cooperation among the Nine.
Positive Aspects: Toward Continued Integration
There are many indications that political cooperation is having 
an integrative effect in the Community. One such condition actually 
resulted from an initial breakdown in political cooperation. The French 
had always wanted a permanent political secretariat to be located in 
Paris, but others, particularly the Dutch, questioned the motives of the 
French and objected to the proposed location. The French, who were the 
most adamant at keeping political cooperation separate from the 
Community, would hear nothing of placing the secretariat in Brussels.
(The Dutch had argued that after enlargement, Brussels would more nearly 
be the geographical center of the Community.) The compromise solution was 
for the member state holding the office of the Presidency of the Council 
to fulfill the function of secretariat for political cooperation, with 
the understanding that the other foreign ministries would offer staff 
assistance should the workload become too great (an important considera­
tion for the smaller states). The work of this travelling secretariat 
has been confined to the purely technical matters of organizing for the
James Goldsborough, "Who's in Charge Here?", International 
Herald Tribune, July 1, 1976, p. 2.
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meetings and recording the proceedings. Yet, the process suffers from 
a lack of continuity, since each time the Presidency changes hands the 
new incumbent must form its own political cooperation secretariat. A 
new development in this area occurred when Ireland took the Presidency 
in January, 1975. Lacking a sufficient number of multi-lingual secre­
taries, the Irish recruited four women from the Commission in Brussels 
to work in the foreign office in Dublin (Irish Foreign Minister 
Fitzgerald is said to have jokingly refered to the four secretaries as 
his "European Secretariat"). When the Italians took the Presidency 
in July, 1975, they took over en bloc the four multi-lingual secretaries, 
prompting many to see the move as the possible germ of an acceptable 
permanent (administrative) political secretariat. When Luxembourg 
assumed the Presidency in January, 1976, however, they had neither the 
need nor the resources to continue the arrangement, and the four women 
found jobs once again in B r u s s e l s . T h e  problem of the political secre­
tariat has not as yet been resolved. During the CSCE, the necessity for
44daily meetings compensated for the lack of a secretariat, but no other 
development has provided anything to fulfill that role, not even the 
Eur-Arab Dialogue. There appears to be no insistence on the part of any 
of the member states for an independent secretariat for political 
cooperation. But there also appears to be growing consensus that the 
"rotating secretariat" should be (and will eventually be) replaced by
^^Based on interviews in the Commission and COREPER in Brussels, 
June-July, 1976.
Allen and Wallace argue that the CSCE made a decisive contri­
bution to the development and tone of political cooperation. See, Allen 
and Wallace, p. 7.
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some sort of arrangement in Brussels, probably in a section of the 
Council of Ministers* General-Secretariat.
A structural arrangement exists among the Nine which is a 
direct result of political cooperation and which has had an integrative 
effect, at least between the nine foreign ministries. This key ele­
ment is the CORED network, a telex system which links the nine capitals 
in a sort of "European hotline". The system was highly praised by the 
foreign ministry officials with whom I spoke in the COREPER and in the 
Foreign Ministries in Brussels and The Hague. Officials in the Commission, 
however, point to the fact that the system connects nine technically 
different machines (cooperation is all very well, but each ministry 
naturally prefers its own equipment), and that the machinery failed
miserably when the attempt was made to transmit voluminous working papers
46containing tables of figures concerning the Eur-Arab Dialogue. But 
this shortcoming may soon be corrected. A high official in the Dutch 
foreign ministry told me that one of the initiatives during the Dutch 
Presidency would be to encourage all to adopt telex transceivers (a 
system linking photocopying machines) which are now in use by the Danes.
There are continuing indications that the Eur-Arab Dialogue is 
having some integrative impact on the Community. The Dialogue not only
45This opinion was shared by all nine of the COREPER officials 
with whom I talked, and all were relating what each believed to be their 
respective governments’ official positions at that time.
^^R. Lau, "Political Cooperation," p. 3.
Based on interviews in The Hague, July 15, 1976.
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has helped to narrow the gap between low and high politics (the 
Community and political cooperation), but, in addition, the commitment 
to an economic response in the Dialogue necessitated a similar lower­
ing of boundaries between political and economic considerations in the 
national administrations.^^ The format of the Dialogue has enhanced 
the role of the Community institutions, particularly the Commission.
As co-chairman of the Eur-Arab Dialogue, the Commission also co-chairs 
the preparatory and expert working groups for the Dialogue. For example, 
the European chairmen of the meetings of groups of experts provide the 
presiding chairman of the European Coordination Group, who changes 
every six months (in July, 1975, in Cairo it was Mr. E. Gallagher, 
Assistant Secretary in the Irish Foreign Ministry; in July, 1975,in 
Rome and in November, 1975, in Abu Dhabi it was Italian Ambassador H. E.
M. C. Regard; and in Luxembourg in 1976, it was His Excellency Mr. J. 
Wagner), and, for the Commission, it was in all cases the Deputy 
Secretary-General of the Commission, Mr. Klaus Meyer. (The Arabs also 
rotated the representation of one co-chairman among representatives of 
the Arab League states; the representative of the League was, for all
the meetings, Mr. Mahmoud Riad, Secretary-General of the League of Arab 
49States.) The fact that the Council of Ministers representative 
rotates affords one decided advantage to the Commission, that of con­
tinuity. Meyer has had longer (and, in this case, stronger) ties with 
participants on the Arab side, he has had more experience in the dialogue.
^^Allen and Wallace, p. 13.
49R. Lau's speech in Rome, July, 1976.
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and, because of his continuous presence and involvement, a long-range 
perspective throughout the discussions. Meyer once jokingly com­
plained of the arrangement, pointing out that at every meeting of 
experts he had to introduce a new co-chairman to the Arab officials.
Perhaps the most solidly integrative aspect of political 
cooperation is that, while failing to achieve common positions and 
although "political cooperation has seldom led to anything more than the 
Community reacting to events,political cooperation has instilled 
the "habit" of working together, at least among the nine Foreign 
Ministers. As Viscount Etienne Davignon, then Director-General of the 
Belgian Foreign Office and the man considered the "father of political 
cooperation" in the Community, stated in an interview in March, 1976, 
"Nowadays, the difficulties are recognized but joint action is not 
rejected out of hand. It is obvious that there will be difficulties and 
problems, but as I said at the outset, the changes resulting from
52working together mean that there are no longer any taboo subjects."
This "habit" is sufficiently advanced that "non-EEC countries in inter­
national frameworks such as the U.N. and UNESCO are increasingly atten­
tive to what position the nine will collectively take...our consultation 
has become a political phenomenon and is recognized as such externally...
^^Based on interviews in Brussels, July, 1976. 
^^Commission’s Report on European Union, Bulletin of the
European Communities, Supplement 5/75, para. 65 
p. 5.
^^Europolitique 313 (March 27, 1976), "Featured Document",
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53which is clear progress over what existed previously."
Many questions concerning political cooperation and efforts to 
achieve common foreign policy stances in the Community persist. Case 
study analyses fail to provide adequate clues as to the direction and 
intensity of political cooperation initiatives, and the general reports 
on European Union are vague or silent concerning the desired end- 
products (goals) of political cooperation, the preferred (or a priority 
listing of) strategies to achieve those ends, and assessments of the pre­
sent state of integration in Community political cooperation/foreign 
policy. Of the very few attempts to address these points, nearly all are 
by news reporters rather than scholars, and virtually all such attempts 
are based on public opinion polls or speeches/interviews with government 
leaders. The next chapter. Chapter VI, will contain (as did Chapter TV 
for Chapter III) the collective insight of the fifty "Eurocrats". 
Moreover, the next chapter is their evaluation of the Community's insti­
tutions and member states both in terms of the present state of integra­
tion and the support each gives to moving toward a common foreign policy. 
Also included are surveys of the Eurocrat's opinions of positive and 
negative political cooperation/foreign policy end-products, of their 
perceptions concerning the choice of certain strategies designed to 
achieve positive end-products and expectations as to the future develop­
ment of political cooperation in the Community. Again, as was argued in 
Chapter IV, the collective insight of the Eurocrats has an importance 
that goes beyond its use in evaluating the findings presented in this
^^Ibid., p. 2.
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policy analysis chapter. It represents the thinking of many of those 
who are in a position to directly influence decisions made in the 
Community; some of these people will be at the highest levels of 
decision-making in the not-so-distant future.
CHAPTER VI
THE ’EUROCRATS'; TOWARD A COMMON FOREIGN POLICY
The European Community is moving toward a time when the 
member states will "speak with one voice" in all its external rela­
tions. The statements, official reports, and case studies mentioned 
in Chapter V indicate that some progress has been made, particularly in 
narrowing the gap between "low and high politics" and in increasing 
routine cooperation among the nine foreign ministries. In attempting 
to assess the extent of this progress, there are certain questions for 
which the statements, official reports, and case studies fail to pro­
vide definitive answers. What, for example, is the desired goal for 
future foreign policy-making in the Community? Should the process con­
tinue to be one of inter-governmental or centralized decision-making?
Will a common foreign policy depend on a common defense policy, or will 
it come only in reaction to some external threat or development? Is there 
sufficient support among the Community’s institutions and among member 
states’ governments and publics?
In order to attempt to answer these questions, and to assess
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the current and immediate future state of integration in attempts to 
achieve a common Community foreign policy, we must again turn to the 
"Eurocrats the group of European Community officials who are among 
those most knowledgeable about the Community's external relations. It 
is their collective expert opinion which we shall explore.
Personal Commitment to a Community Foreign Policy
Before attempting to discern which goals and strategies are
preferred by the Eurocrats to achieve "Europe's speaking with one voice",
it should be instructive to discover whether or not the Eurocrats agree
with the notion at all, and if any differences exist between groups
based on nationality, institution, attitude toward the Community, or
2demographic variables. As one of the more sensitive considerations 
involving a common Community foreign policy is the recognition that some
For an explanation of the Eurocrats, a profile of the fifty 
respondents, and details as to methodology, see Chapter II of this 
dissertation.
2As a convention, only those independent variables that showed 
a significant relationship (at .05 by t) will be reported throughout 
this chapter for all questions asked the Eurocrats.
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3significant loss of sovereignty of the member states must occur,
I chose to include the important issue of sovereignty in a question
designed to measure agreement at the most general level. Rather than
attempt to measure degrees of support for yielding varying amounts
of national sovereignty to the Community in the area of foreign
affairs, I asked the Eurocrats whether they agreed or disagreed with
4a comment made recently by an Italian official. The statement and 
total response results are contained in Table 6.1.
3As H. R. Nord, Secretary-General of the European Parliament, 
put it; "You cannot have a Community without stepping on the toes of 
national sovereignty." Quoted from Daniel Yerkin, "Europe’s Endless 
Crisis," European Community 194 (April-May, 1976), p. 11. Examples 
of the concern over the loss of sovereignty and its possible implica­
tions may be found in the great numbers of books and pamphlets which were 
meant to combat "anti-marketeer" efforts in Britain and Denmark to equate 
Community membership with a substantial loss of sovereignty and, hence, 
national self-determination. See, for example, Robert J. Lieber, British 
Politics and European Union: Parties, Elites, and Pressure Groups
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970); Uwe Kitzinger,
Diplomacy and Persuasion: How Britain Joined the Common Market (London:
Thames and Hudson, 1973); Uwe Kitzinger, Europe’s Wider Horizons (London: 
The Federal Trust, 1975); and Commission of the EC (London Information 
Office), "Europe at a Glance" (particularly the section, "What the 
Community is not," pp. 1-4).
4The comment is quoted from Yerkin, p. 4.
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Table 6.1 - "In Foreign Affairs, sovereignty is the ability to influence 
the external world; if Europeans want to establish a pre­
sence in foreign affairs, the way to do it is to unite."
Strongly Mildly Mildly Strongly
Agree Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Disagree
28 (58%) 12 (24%) 4 (8%) 1 (2%) 2 (4%) 3 (6%)
Mean Response = 1.92 (where 1 = strongly agree; 6 = strongly disagree)
When the Eurocrats' responses were analyzed as to the nationality 
of the respondents, some significant differences appeared (Table 6.2).
The Belgians, all of whom strongly agreed, and the only negative group, 
the Dutch, had responses that differed significantly from certain other 
groups and from each other. Further differences were evident when the 
respondents were grouped as to work experience before coming to work in 
or with the Community, and as to the respondents' answers as to possible 
states for European Union (see Table 4.4 in Chapter IV) and for foreign 
policy (Table 6.4). As is indicated in Table 6.3, those having had 
prior business experience were less in agreement than those with pro­
fessional or no prior working experience. Those who opted for a federal 
arrangement or a unitary state (designated here as the "federalists") 
and those who preferred foreign-policy making to be made totally by the
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Community's central institutions were significantly more in favor of 
the statement than were those who opted for less ambitious goals (the 
"non-federalists" and "non-centralists") for European Union and 
Community foreign policy-making.
Table 6.2 - "In foreign affairs, sovereignty is the ability to 
influence the external world; if Europeans want to 
establish a presence in foreign affairs, the way to 
do it is to unite."






United Kingdom 11 2.18
Italy 6 1.33
West Germany 8 2.00
France 6 1.50
TOTAL 50 1.92
differs significantly from responses of the Dutch, Danes, 
British, and French (at .05 by t).
^Differs significantly from responses of the Belgians, 
Italians, and French.
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Table 6.3 - "In foreign affairs, sovereignty is the ability to influence 
the external world; if Europeans want to establish a pre-
sence in foreign affairs, the way to do it is to unite."
Previous Experience in the Private Sector: Number Mean Response
Professional 16 1.50
Business 19 2.47*
No Prior Experience 15 1.67
Preferences Indicated in Self-Anchoring 
Scaling Responses:
As to Government Structure:^
"Federalists" 31 1.58
"Non-Federalists" 19 2.47
As to Foreign Policy-Making:*^
"Centralists" 28*̂ 1.46
"Non-Centralists" 20^ 2.45
^Differed significantly from the responses of the other two 
groups (at .05 by t).
^The "federalists" saw the federal model as the ideal state for 
European Union.
^The "Centralists" saw foreign policy-making by the Community's 
central institutions as a goal for European Union.
*̂ Two respondents had no preference in this area.
185
End-Products
There are numerous speeches, official pronouncements, and 
special reports that address the subject of a Community foreign policy.
For example, the European Parliament has resolved that "foreign 
policy...must be strengthened. New procedures must be developed to 
enable the Community to speak with a single voice in international 
politics.."^ And the Commission has argued that there is a "need to 
ensure, when dealing with the outside world, that the common policies 
pursued inside the Union are effective makes it vital in this connection 
for a common foreign policy of the Union to be developed."^ Both official 
statements are indicative of a common problem: no specifics are men­
tioned as to where the process should lead. In other words, there 
appears to be a general inability or unwillingness to define goals. It 
is in part for this reason that the expert opinions of the Eurocrats were 
sought, as they are all officials who either worked directly with or had 
substantial knowledge of the Community's external relations. Their answers 
to the open-ended question, "What, in your opinion, would be the best pos­
sible state for a common foreign policy for the Community?", were quite 
varied. The responses fell into the categories indicated in Table 6.4.
Note that more than half of the respondents advocated a common foreign 
policy to be made by the Community institutions. (Two qualified their 
answers to include the necessity for prior consultation with the member 
states, and three mentioned that a Community defense policy is a
^Supplement 9/75, Bulletin of the European Communities, p. 11. 
^Supplement 5/75, Bulletin of the European Communities, para.
60, p. 22.
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prerequisite.) Only two respondents felt that reaching common positions
in the Community's central institutions was unwise and opted for keeping
political cooperation outside the Community.
Table 6.4 - The Best Possible State for Community Foreign Policy-Making
Ideal State Number
Common foreign policy made entirely by Community institutions 23
Policy made by central Community institutions but only after
consulting each member state first 2
Policy made by central Community institutions but only after
a common defense arrangement exists in the Community 3
Most foreign policy decisions made by Community institutions,
but a few areas reserved to the member states 4
Coordinate/consult on all foreign policy matters 8
Coordinate one position only on vital issues or only
when necessary 5
Coordinate common positions for international organizations
only 1
No central decision-making - keep political cooperation
machinery outside the Community 2
No preference 2
Total 50
The responses to the question, "What, for you, would be the 
worst development for foreign policy-making in the Community?" were also 
varied (Table 6.5) but half of the respondents indicated that the worst 
possible development for them would be no coordination or cooperation in
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foreign policy matters, and an additional 30 percent felt that agree­
ment on minor or relatively unimportant issues (but a failure of the 
Community to agree on major issues) would be the worst anticipated 
result. Two respondents saw bloc agreements without the ability to 
implement or enforce decisions as the worst possible outcome. It is 
significant that only one felt that foreign policy-making in the Com­
munity's central institutions would be the worst possible end-product.
Table 6.5 - The Worst Anticipated Development for Foreign Policy-Making 
in the Community.
Worst Anticipated Development Number
No coordination or cooperation 25
States generally "go it alone" (political disintegration) 2
No common position on major issues 15
No progress (stagnation) 2
Putting limits on political cooperation (e.g., exclude
Commission) 2
Failure to agree on common positions in international
organizations 1
Acting as a bloc but with no result 2
Community central decision-making in foreign policy 1
Total 50
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The Eurocrats were asked to assess the support given to efforts 
to achieve common foreign policies by the Community institutions, the 
general public in the home country of each respondent, and by governments 
of the member states. In their assessments of the support given by 
their own respective institutions (Table 6.6), 92 percent agreed (of 
which 64 percent strongly agreed) that their respective institutions 
support moving toward a common foreign policy in the Community. Only 
two mildly disagreed (both were in DG-X of the Commission), and two 
strongly disagreed (one in the Economic and Social Committee, the other 
an official of one of the private interest groups).
Table 6.6 - "The institution/organization for which I work supports
moving toward a common foreign policy for the Community."
Strongly Mildly Mildly Strongly
Agree Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Disagree
32 (64%) 9 (18%) 5 (10%) 2 (4%) 0 (0%) 2 (4%)
Mean Response = 1.70 (where 1 = strongly agree; 6 = strongly disagree)
No significant differences were evident when the respondents 
were grouped by nationality (the mean responses ranged from 1.0 to 2.0), 
but significant differences did occur when the responses were analyzed as 
to the institution of the respondents (Table 6.7). The responses of those 
in the Commission were significantly different than those outside the 
Commission, and the strong agreement by all respondents in DG I differed 
significantly from the other four institutional groupings. In addition.
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the positive mean response by those in DG VIII differed significantly 
from the ESC/Parliament/Private Interest Groups which had the least 
positive response.
Table 6.7 - "The institution/organization for which I work supports
moving toward a common foreign policy for the Community."
Institution Number Mean Response
Directorate General I 10 1.00*
Directorate General VIII 14 1.36^
Directorate General X and the 
General Secretariat 9 2.00
Total Commission 33 1.42^
Economic and Social Committee,
European Parliament, and Private Groups 8 2.75
Council of Permanent Representatives 9 1.78
Total Outside Commission 17 2.24
differs significantly from the other four institutional 
groupings (at .05 by t).
b_.Differs significantly from the ESC/Parliament/lnterest Groups
responses.
c ^ . ."Differs significantly from the responses of those outside 
the Commission.
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Generally, those who were younger or who had relatively less 
experience in the Community were more favorable in their assessments of 
their institution’s support for a common foreign policy. The responses 
of those younger than 30 years of age were more positive and differed 
significantly from those who were 40 or older (Table 6.8).
Table 6.8 - "The institution/organization for which I work supports
moving toward a common foreign policy for the Community."
Age Number Mean Response
Below 30 6 1.00®
30-39 24 1.88
40 and older 20 1.70
^Differs significantly from the responses of those 40 and 
older (at .05 by t).
When the responses to the same question were cross-tabulated 
with other variables, only one significant difference could be seen. 
Unaccountably, those who might be considered "mondialists" (favor a 
world-wide approach to the Community’s development aid program) were 
more positive in their assessments of their respective institutions’ 
support for a common foreign policy than were those who favor a regional 
approach to development assistance. (Table 6.9)
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Table 6.9 - "The institution/organization for which I work supports
moving toward a common foreign policy for the Community."
Preferences Indicated in Self-Anchoring 
Scaling Responses:
Number Mean Response
As to Governmental Structure:
"Federalists"* 31 1.65
"Non-Federalists" 19 1.79
As to Foreign Policy-Making:
"Centralists"^ 28^ 1.57
"Non-Centralists" 20 1.90
cAs to Scope of Community Development Aid:
"Mondialists" 24® 1.46
"Regionalists" 9® 2.56
^The "federalists" saw the federal model as the ideal state 
for European Union.
^The "centralists" saw foreign policy-making by the Community's 
central institutons as a goal for European Union.
^The "mondialists" favor an overall world-wide approach to aiding 
developing nations over a region by region approach.
^Two respondents had no preference in this area.
^17 respondents had no preference in this area.
The perceptions of the Eurocrats concerning the extent of 
public opinion support in each respondent's home country (Table 6.10) was 
generally less favorable when compared to their own perceptions as to 
the support rendered by the institutions in which they worked (Table 6.6).
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Table 6.10 - "The majority of people in my country favors Europe's
speaking with one voice to increase Europe's influence
in the world."
Strongly Mildly Mildly Strongly
Agree Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Disagree
12 (24%) 13 (26%) 8 (16%) 4 (8%) 7 (14%) 6 (12%)
Mean Response = 2.98 (where 1 = strongly agree; 6 = strongly disagree)
Differences in responses were especially marked between those who favored 
centralized foreign policy-making and those who did not (as from Table 6.4), 
and between those favoring "mondialism" and those advocating "regionalism" 
(for development aid), suggesting, perhaps, that both points of view 
colored the perceptions of each group of respondents as to how they saw 
public opinion in their own country (Table 6.11). It was, in both cases, 
more positive for the centralists, more negative for those favoring 
solutions short of centralized decision-making. When mean responses to 
the question of public opinion support in the respondents' home countries 
are analyzed by the nationality of the respondents, interesting differences 
are evident (Table 6.12). Table 6.12 suggests an association exists 
between natonality and perceptions of public opinion support for a common 
foreign policy for the Community. With the exception of the Irish, the 
respondents from the three new member states disagreed with the statement 
that the majority of their fellow countrymen favored Europe's speaking 
with one voice.
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Table 6.11 - "The majority of the people in my country favors Europe's
speaking with one voice to increase Europe's influence in
the world."
Preferences Indicated in Self-Anchoring 
Scaling Responses:
Number Mean Response
As to Governmental Structure:
"Federalists"^ 31 2.81
"Non-Federalists" 19 3.26
As to Foreign Policy-Making;
"Centralists"^ 28^ 2.50
"Non-Centralists" 20^ 3.50
As to Scope of Community Development Aid:^
"Mondialists" 24® 2.29
"Regionalists" 9 4.22
^The "federalists" saw the federal model as the ideal state for 
European Union.
^The "centralists" saw foreign policy-making by the Community's 
central institutions as a goal for European Union.
^The "mondialists" favor an overall world-wide approach to 
aiding developing nations over a region by region approach.
*̂ Two respondents had no preference in this area.
^17 respondents had no preference in this area.
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Table 6.12 - "The majority of people in my country favor Europe's
speaking with one voice to increase Europe's influence
in the world."






United Kingdom 11 4.oof
Italy 6 2.83
West Germany 8 2.75
France 6 3.00
Benelux Countries 13 2.08
France/Germany/Italy 20 2.85
New Three Countries 17 3.82*
Original Six Countries 33 2.55
TOTAL 50 2.98
differs significantly from all other nationalities except the 
British (at .05 by t).
^Differs significantly from the responses of the Belgians, Dutch, 
and Irish.
differs significantly from the Benelux, France/Germany/Italy, 
and Original Six responses.
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Perceptions of public opinion support in the Community's 
member states by the Eurocrats are more enlightening (at least as a 
function of its accuracy) when compared to actual results of public 
opinion polls in the member states. The results of the most recent 
poll, in which a question was asked concerning foreign policy in the 
European Community, are reflected in Table 6.13.
Table 6.13 - Public Opinion, May, 1976: "The Member Countries of












Belgium (963) 31% 26% 6% 5% 32% 100%
Denmark (977) 16 21 17 25 21 100
West Germany 
(1004)
33 41 10 4 12 100
France (1241) 28 36 9 9 18 100
Ireland (1007) 28 37 10 6 19 100
Italy (923) 33 33 10 4 20 100
Luxembourg (268) 45 34 3 3 15 100
Netherlands (904) 30 36 9 7 18 100
United Kingdom 
(1340)
19 37 14 12 18 100
Total Community 29% 36% 11% 7% 17% 100%
SOURCE: Commission of the European Communities, Euro-Baremetre: Public
Opinion in the European Community 5 (July, 1976), p. A22.
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The only country in which public opinion appears to be weighted against 
a common foreign policy for the Community is Denmark. Although a large 
number (26 percent) in Britain opposed the proposition, the majority of 
those polled were in favor (56 percent). The percent of those in 
Britain opposed was significantly higher than that in all other Community 
states except, of course, in Denmark; no other member state had more 
than 16 percent of the respondents opposed to the idea of a common 
Community foreign policy. When, however, a particular issue is men­
tioned, such as the formation of a common Community "front" to the United 
States or the Soviet Union, public opinion, even in Denmark, largely 
favors a common Community position, as is suggested by Table 6.14. The 
results indicate that the percent of those strongly favoring the state­
ment was larger than of those less strongly in favor (which was not the 
case in the results shown in Table 6.13), and Danish public opinion indi­
cated 48 percent believed that such a common position was important with 
only 23 percent thinking it of little or no importance.
In an attempt to get an assessment by the Eurocrats of support 
for a common foreign policy by the governments of the member states, the 
respondents were asked to rank the nine member states from first to last 
(they were not asked to indicate relative degrees of support nor if they 
felt any of the states did not support moving toward a common foreign 
policy in the Community). The results of these rankings, computed as to 
the nationality of the respondents, are reported in Table 6.15.
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Table 6.14 - Public Opinion, May, 1975: The Importance of Achieving a
Common Foreign Policy in Discussions with the United States 
and Russia
Very Of Little Not at all No
Nation (Number) Important Important Importance Important Reply Total
Belgium (1507) 22% 24% 16% 10% 28% 100%
Denmark (1073) 20 28 11 12 29 100
West Germany (1039) 36 34 15 5 10 100
France (1000) 40 27 10 9 14 100
Ireland (1000) 15 36 17 11 21 100
Italy (1043) 38 25 17 9 11 100
Luxembourg (311) 26 20 17 9 28 100
Netherlands (1093) 28 26 13 10 23 100
United Kingdom 
(1328)
28 38 11 8 15 100
Total Community 34% 31% 13% 8% 14% 100%
SOURCE: Commission of the European Communities, Euro-Barometre: Public
Opinion in the European Community 3 (June-July, 1975), p. A15.
The data suggest three general observations. First, the ordinal rankings 
of the member states are significantly alike;^ only the Danes differed 
significantly in their rankings of the member states (e.g., they rank 
Germany first, France second, and have Ireland tied for last; the total
^Rank correlation by Kendall's "W" = .682 for the nine sets of 
ratings (all rank correlations reported in this chapter have a P value = 
.005).
Table 6.15 - Ratings of the Community's Member States from First (1) to Last (9) as to the Support Each Gives and Has Given 
to Efforts to Achieve Common Foreign Policies in the Community.
Nationality
of Respondents Belgians Dutch Luxembourgers Irish Danes Italians Germans British French Total
(n«=6) (n=5) (n=2) (n=3) (n=3) (n=6) (n=8) (n=ll) (n=6) (n«50)
Member States
Belgium 1 (2.50) 1 (2. 30) 2 (2.00) 3.5 (3.33) 4 (4.33) 1 (2. 33) 2.5 (3.06) 3.5 (3.73) 1 (2.00) 1 (2.95)
Denmark 8 (7.17) 5 (4. 50) 7 (7.00) 7 (7.00) 8.5 (7.00) 6 (6,,08) 7 (5.88) 7 (6.50) 8 (6.25) 7 (6.28)
France 9 (7.67) 7 (6. 70) 8 (8.00) 9 (9.00) 2 (3.67) 9 (8,,08) 9 (8.00) 9 (7.50) 7 (6.17) 8 (7.31)
Ireland 4 (4.17) 4 (4. 20) 3 (3.00) 3.5 (3.33) 8.5 (7.00) 4 (4,,25) 6 (5.25) 3.5 (3.73) 4 (5.17) 4 (4.45)
Italy 6 (5.67) 6 (5, 20) 4.5 (4.50) 6 (5.67) 6 (5.67) 5 (4.,42) 5 (5.13) 6 (5.50) 6 (5.50) 6 (5.28)
Luxembourg 2 (2.67) 2. (3. 00) 1 (1.00) 2 (2.67) 7 (6.00) 2 (2.,67) 1 (2.88) 2 (3.14) 2 (2.67) 2 (2.97)
Netherlands 3 (3.75) 3 (3. 20) 4.5 (4.50) 1 (1.00) 3 (4.00) 3 (3.,67) 2.5 (3.06) 1 (2.68) 3 (3.92) 3 (3.24)
United Kingdom 7 (7.00) 9 (7. 80) .9 (8.50) 8 (8.00) 5 (5.33) 8 (7.,50) 8 (7.13) 8 (7.18) 9 (8.00) 9 (7.34)
West Germany 5 (4.25) 8 (7. 10) 6 (6.50) 5 (5.00) 1 (2.00) 7 (6. 17) 4 (4.50) 5 (4.95) 5 (5.33) 5 (5.09)
VO00
A nations rating by its own national is underlined. Mean responses appear in parentheses.
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rankings by all fifty respondents for those states is, respectively,
g
fifth, eighth, and fourth.) A second observation concerns the relative 
accuracy of each nationality group's self-rating. In no case were the 
ratings off by more than 1.5 when compared to the total rank order. 
Third, the rank order of the member states appears to be closely associ­
ated with the size of the member states. The smaller countries (with 
the exception of Denmark) were rated as those most in support of a 
common foreign policy. The larger states were ranked fifth, sixth,
9eighth, and ninth.
Rank correlations between rank orders of the member states
analyzed by nationality groups (e.g., old six/new three, North/South)^^,
11 12 13by institution of the respondents, by age, by prior experience,
and by responses to the self-anchoring questions(indicating preferences
g
There is no correlation between the rankings by the Danes and 
those by all the Eurocrats (Spearman's rho = -.038).
9As an example, one of the Belgian respondents invited me to 
visit the Belgian Parliament when foreign policy was to be debated. He 
assured me that Belgium has lost so much self-interest in this area, 
that at such times the chamber is nearly empty. Thus, the willingness 
to support a Community foreign policy.
^^Benelux/Old Three/New Three: Kendall's "W" = .99; Original
Six/New Three: Spearman's rho = .883; North/South: Spearman's rho =
.'.825. (Table 6.16)
^^For the five institution groups: Kendall's "W" = .901; for
the Commission/Outside the Commission; Spearman's rho = .917.
^^Kendall's "W" = .931.
13Community Experience: Kendall's "W" = .954; Private Sector
Experience: Kendall's "W" = .949; Prior Civil Service: Spearman's
rho = .967.
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either for centralization or decentralization in the Community)were 
also significantly similar (see Tables 6.16, 6.17, 6.18, and 6.19). 
Although the mean responses are in some cases extremely close (e.g., 
rankings between France and the United Kingdom), no matter what vari­
ables are employed to compare mean responses of the respondents, the 
Benelux countries are consistently ranked in the top three positions, 
France and the United Kingdom are, interchangeably, eighth and ninth.
Two general observations can be made about the relative support 
the member states' governments are seen to have given to efforts to 
achieve a common Community foreign policy (Tables 6.15 through 6.19). 
First, with the exception of Denmark, the rankings appear to correlate 
with the rank order by size of the country (from smallest to largest), 
as was true for the rankings of support for European Union in general 
(See Chapter IV). Second, except for the Danes, there appears to be a 
high level of agreement among the Eurocrats as to the relative support 
given by each of the member states.
Federalists/non-federalists: Spearman's rho = .917;
centralists/non-centralists: Spearman's rho = .979; mondialists/re-
gionalists: Spearman's rho - .917; multilateralists/bilateralists: 
Spearman's rho = .993.
Table 6.16 - Ratings of the Community's Member States from First (1) to Last (9) as to the Support Each Gives and






























Belgium 1.5 (2.54) 1 (2.53) 3 (3.76) 1 (2.53) 3 (3.19) 1 (2.17) 1 (2.95)
Denmark 7 (6.12) 7 (6.05) 7 (6.68) 7 (6.08) 7 (6.32) 7 (6.17) 7 (6.28)
France 8 (7.35) 8 (7.48) 9 (7.09) 8 (7.42) 9 (7.37) 8 (7.13) 8 (7.31)
Ireland 4 (4.00) 4 (4.93) 4 (4.24) 4 (4.56) 4 (4.37) 4 (4.71) 4 (4.45)
Italy 5 (5.31) 5 (5.03) 6 (5.56) 5 (5.14) 6 (5.38) 5 (4.96) 6 (5.28)
Luxembourg 1.5 (2.54) 2 (2.75) 2 (3.56) 2 (2.67) 1.5 (3.07) 2 (2.67) 2 (2.97)
Netherlands 3 (3.65) 3 (3.50) 1 (2.62) 3 (3.56) 1.5 (3.07) 3 (3.79) 3 (3.24)
United Kingdom 9 (7.54) 9 (7.50) 8 (7.00) 9 (7.52) 8 (7.21) 9 (7.75) 9 (7.34)
West Germany 6 (5.69) 6 (5.25) 5 (4.44) 6 (5.42) 5 (4.88) 6 (5.75) 5 (5.09)
(mean responses appear in parentheses)
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Table 6.17 - Ratings of the Community's Member States from First (1) to Last (9) as to the Support Each Gives and







Dir. Gen. X and 
Secretariat- 
General
Total Econ and Soc Comm, Council of Total
Commission Parliament and Permanent Outside
Private Groups Reps (COREPER) Commission
Member States (n=10) (n=14) (n=9) (n=33) (n=8) (n=9) (n=17)
Belgium 1 (2.40) 3 (3.29) 2 (3.50) 2 (3.08) 1 (2.31) 2 (3.06) 2 (2.71)
Denmark 7 (7.00) 5 (5.25) 7.5 (6.61) 6 (6.15) 7 (6.38) 8 (6.67) 7 (6.53)
France 8 (7.25) 9 (7.43) 7.5 (6.61) 8 (7.15) 9 (7.88) 9 (7.39) 9 (7.62)
Ireland 4 (4.60) 4 (4.43) 6 (5.11) 4 (4.67) 4 (3.50) 4 (4.50) 4 (4.03)
Italy 6 (5.10) 7 (6.07) 4 (4.11) 6 (5.24) 5 (5.13) 6 (5.56) 6 (5.35)
Luxembourg 3 (3.40) 2 (2.93) 3 (3.61) 3 (3.26) 2 (2.69) 1 (2.17) 1 (2.41)
Netherlands 2 (2.85) 1 (2.79) 1 (3.17) 1 (2.91) 3 (3.31) 3 (4.39) 3 (3.88)
United Kingdom 9 (7.55) S (7.39) 9 (7.39) 9 (7.44) 8 (7.81) 7 (6.56) 8 (7.15)
West Germany 5 (4.75) 6 (5.29) 5 (4.89) 5 (5.02) 6 (5.31) 5 (4.72) 5 (5.24)
NJ
g
(Mean responses appear in parentheses)
Table 6.18 - Ratings of the Community's Member States from First (1) to Last (9) as to the Support Each Gives and Has
Given to Efforts to Achieve Common Foreign Policies In the Community.
Member States
AGE
Below 30 30 - 39 40-Plus
(n=6) (n=24) (n=20)
COMMUNITY EXPERIENCE PRIVATE SECTOR EXPERIENCE PRIOR CIVIL SERVICE
(n«32)
7 - 1 2  13 - 18 Profession Business None Yes No
(n=19) (n=l.'j) (n=19) (n-31)(n=6) (n=12) (n=16)
Belgium 3 (3.75) 1 (2. 73) 2 (2.98) 3 (3.20) 2 (3.08) 1 (2.21) 1.5 (3.13) 2 (3.05) 1 (2.63) 1 (2.74) 2 (3.08)
Denmark 7 (6.33) 7 (6.54) 7 (5.95) 7 (6.48) 7 (5.92) 7 (5.92) 7 (6.56) 7 (6.03) 7 (6.30) 7 (6.47) 7 (6.17)
France 8.5 (8.25) 8 (6.98) 9 (7.43) 8.5 (7.25) 9 (7.50) 8 (7.38) 9 (7.41) 8 (7.05) 9 (7.53) 9 (7.11) 8 (7.44)
Ireland 6 (4.75) 4 (4. 79) 4 (3.95) 4 (4.48) 4 (4.58) 4 (4.29) 5 (4.53) 4 (4.47) 4 (4.33) 4 (4.58) 4 (4.37)
Italy 4.5 (4.67) 6 (5. 13) 6 (5.65) 6 (5.22) 5.5 (5.25) 6 (5.46) 6 (5.28) 6 (5.39) 5 (5.13) 6 (5.53) 6 (5.13)
Luxembourg 2 (2.33) 3 (3. 38) 1 (2.68) 1 (3.03) 3 (3.25) 2 (2.67) 3 (3.44) 1 (2.61) 2 (2.93) 2 (2.89) 1 (3.02)
Netherlands 1 (1.83) 2 (3. 35) 3 (3.53) 2 (3.06) 1 (2.67) 3 (4.00) 1.5 (3.13) 3 (3.26) 3 (3.33) 3 (3.29) 3 (3.21)
United Kingdom 8.5 (8.25) 9 (7. 17) 8 (7.28) 8.5 (7.25) 8 (7.33) 9 (7.58) 8 (7.00) 9 (7.68) 8 (7.27) 8 (6.92) 9 (7.60)
West Germany 4.5 (4.67) 5 (4. 94) 5 (5.40) 5 (5.02) 5.5 (5.25) 5 (5.21) 4 (4.34) 5 (5.37) 6 (5.53) 5 (5.37) 5 (4.92)
to
5
(Mean responses appear In parentheses)
Table 6,19 - Ratings of the Community's Member States from First (1) to Last (9) as to the Support Each Gives and Has
Given to Efforts to Achieve Common Foreign Policies in the Community.
Member States
Federalists Non- Foreign Foreign
Federalists Policy Policy
Centralists Non-Cont.
Mondialists^ Region-® Multilat-® Bilat-®










§Belgium 1 (2,63) 3 (3,47) 1 (2,84) 2 (3,10) 2 (3,10) 2 (2,61) 1 (2,93) 3 (3,22) 1 (2,95)
Denmark 7 (6,32) 7 (6.21) 7 (6,52) 7 (5,98) 7 (6,15) 6 (6,50) 7 (6,36) 7 (6,67) 7 (6,28)
France 8 (7,39) 9 (7,18) 9 (7,48) 8 (7,00) 9 (7.60) 8 (7,17) 9 (7,75) 9 (6.94) 8 (7,31)
Ireland 4 (4,50) 4 (4,37) 4 (4,41) 4 (4,50) 4 (4.54) 3 (3,50) 4 (4,32) 4 (4,28) 4 (4,45)
Italy 6 (5,32) 6 (5,21) 6 (5,34) 6 (5,23) 6 (5.35) 5 (5,00) 6 (5,30) 5 (4,67) 6 (5,28)
Luxembourg 2 (2,81) 2 (3,24) 2 (2,86) 1 (3,03) 1 (2,98) 1 (2,00) 2 (3,09) 1 (2,50) 2 (2,97)
Netherlands 3 (3,34) 1 (3.08) 3 (3,32) 3 (3,25) 3 (3,19) 4 (3,72) 3 (3,36) 2 (3.17) 3 (3,24)
United Kingdom 9 (7,45) 8 (7.16) 8 (7,11) 9 (7,65) 8 (7,21) 9 (7,89) 9 (6,95) 8 (8,06) 9 (7,34)
West Germany 5 (5,18) 5 (4.95) 5 (5,05) 5 (5.15) 5 (4,65) 7 (6,72) 5 (4,84) 6 (5,33) 5 (5,09)
Refers to handling of aid to developing countries,
^Not all respondents indicated preferences in these areas, 
(mean responses appear in parentheses)
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Strategies
Strategies as to how the Community might best move systemati­
cally toward making common foreign policies are not daily topics of dis­
cussion in the Community. In those few instances when means-to-ends are 
discussed, prescriptions as to how to reach certain ends are intention­
ally vague. For example, the Tindemans Report on European Union, usually 
considered to be the most pragmatic and practical of all such reports, 
simply mentions that the ultimate authority lies with the European 
Council and that the existing political cooperation machinery must be 
improved in order to permit the Community to act rather than just react 
to the external world. The only hard recommendation Mr. Tindemans makes 
in this area is that the Community must first establish a common 
defense policy.
Having asked the group of external affairs experts in the 
Community what they saw as the goals of political cooperation/foreign 
policy-making in the Community, I then put to them certain statements 
concerning techniques and prerequisites to those ends, and asked them to 
indicate various levels of agreement or disagreement with each statement. 
These "strategies" included giving the central institutions more power in 
this area, the suggestion to end the "schizophrenia" between high 
politics outside the Community and low politics or economic and trade 
matters inside the Community, the necessity for an external pressure or 
shock to make political cooperation happen, and the necessity for a com­
mon European defense organization as was suggested by Mr. Tindemans.
^^See Chapter III.
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More Foreign Policy-Making Power for the Central Institutions?
In general, the Eurocrats favored a common foreign policy 
for the Community. In answer to the question quoted in Table 6.20 
below, a total of only 16 percent disagreed, and half of those told me 
they did so only because they disagreed with the assertion that it 
ought to be the Commission which makes foreign policy for the Nine.
Table 6.20 - ’’The European Community, particularly the Commission, should 
be given more power to conduct foreign relations on behalf 
of the nine member states."
Strongly Mildly Mildly Strongly
Agree Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Disagree
18 (36%) 15 (30%) 9 (18%) 4 (8%) 3 (6%) 1 (2%)
Mean Response = 2.24 (1 = strongly agree; 6 = strongly disagree)
When the responses were compared as to the nationality of the respondents, 
the most positive responses were the Irish and those in the Benelux 
countries; the less positive responses came from the larger states: in
order, the French, British, and the Germans. The least positive, having 
a mean response indicating neither agreement nor disagreement, were the 
Danes (see Table 6.21). Mean responses to the same question by institution 
of the respondents found those in the Commission slightly more positive 
than those outside the Commission. The least positive were the foreign 
office officials in the COREPER (indicating slightly less than mild 
agreement). The COREPER responses differed significantly from those in
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Table 6.21 - "The European Community, particularly the Commission,
should be given more power to conduct foreign relations 
on behalf of the nine member states."






United Kingdom 11 2.45
Italy 6 1.83
West Germany 8 2.63
France 6 2.33
Benelux Countries 13 1.85
France/Germany/Italy 20 2.30
New Three Countries 17 2.47
Original Six Countries 33 2.12
TOTAL 50 2.24
differs significantly from the Belgian, Irish, and Italian 
respondents (at .05 by t).
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the DG-I, DG-VIII, and the ESC/Parliament/Interest Groups (Table 6.22), 
As the nine respondents in the COREPER were all national and not 
Community civil servants, their more negative mean response was anti­
cipated, particularly given the stipulation in the question that the 
Commission in particular should be given more power to make common 
foreign policies.
Table 6.22 - "The European Community, particularly the Commission,
should be given more power to conduct foreign relations 
on behalf of the nine member states."
Institution Number Mean Response
Directorate General I 10 1.80
Directorate General VIII 14 2.00
Directorate General X and 
General Secretariat 9 2.67
Total Commission 33 2.12
Economic and Social Committee 
European Parliament, and 
Private Interest Groups 8 1.75
Council of Permanent Representatives 9 3.11*
Total Outside Commission 17 2.47
differs significantly from DG I, DG VIII, and the ESC/Parliament/ 
Interest Groups (at .05 by t).
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"High" versus "Low" Politics in the Community 
One of the most crucial concerns relative to the Community's 
institutional structure is the question of merging political coopera­
tion into the Community institutions (a move which many argue will 
necessitate amending or renegotiating the Treaty of Rome). Table 6.23 
contains the exact working of the statement and the results for all 
respondents:
Table 6.23 - "A coordinated foreign policy for the Nine must take place 
in the context of the Community's external commercial and 
economic functions. Attempts at political cooperation 
through specifically constructed machinery outside the major 
Community institutions will be unsuccessful."
Strongly Mildly Mildly Strongly
Agree Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Disagree
12 (24%) 12 (24%) 5 (10%) 7 (14%) 7 (14%) 7 (14%)
Mean Response = 3.12 (where 1 = strongly agree; 6 = strongly disagree).
Although 28 (56 percent) of the Eurocrats favored the long-range goal of 
centralized foreign policy decision-making (see Table 6.4), and 42 
(84 percent) agreed that the Community (and particularly the Commission) 
should be given more power in foreign policy-making (Table 6.20), only 29 
(58 percent) agreed that political cooperation ought to be merged into 
the Community (less than was anticipated, particularly given the positive 
response in Table 6.20). Again, differences between the Eurocrats' 
responses when analyzed by nationality were quite marked, particularly
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Table 6.24 - "A coordinated foreign policy for the Nine must take place 
in the context of the Community's external commercial and 
economic functions. Attempts at political cooperation 
through specially constructed machinery outside the major 
Community institutions will be unsuccessful."






United Kingdom 11 4.09
Italy 6 4.17
West Germany 8 3.13
France 6 2.33®
Benelux Countries 13 2.23
France/Germany/Italy 20 3.20
New Three Countries 17 3.71^
Original Six Countries 33 2.82
TOTAL 50 3.12
^Differs significantly from the Italians and British (at .05 by t),
^Differs significantly from the Benelux and Original Six 
respondents.
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between the most positive (the Dutch, Belgians, and the French) and 
the most negative (the Italians and British). The responses of those 
from the three new member states were more negative than and differed 
significantly from those from the Benelux countries and those from the 
original six member states (Table 6.24). The relatively positive 
agreement to this statement by the six French respondents may appear 
to be contrary to what one might have expected, given the traditional 
French (Gaullist) insistence on keeping "high politics" separate from 
Community matters. Since 1973, however, it has been the Germans and 
the British who have been most enthusiastic about continuing the 
development of political cooperation (as an entity outside Community 
institutions) and the French who, reportedly, have been urging caution 
in that development.^^
Significant differences were found in the responses to this 
statement when the respondents were grouped by the institution to which 
each belonged (Table 6.25). Respondents outside the Commission were 
slightly more in favor than were those in the Commission. Of particular 
interest, the COREPER had the second most positive response. Those who 
had prior civil service experience before coming to Brussels (which 
includes the nine COREPER officials who were still national civil ser­
vants) responded far more positively to the statement than did those who 
had no prior civil service experience. The more positive response by 
former national civil servants, particularly the foreign office officials 
in the COREPER, was unexpected. A possible explanation is that those in
^^David J. Allen and William Wallace, Die europaische Politische 
Zusammenarbeit (Bonn: Institut fur Europaische Politik, 1976), p. 8.
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Table 6.25 - "A coordinated foreign policy for the nine must take place 
in the context of the Community's external commercial and 
economic functions. Attempts at political cooperation 
through specially constructed machinery outside the major 
Community institutions will be unsuccessful."
Institution Number Mean Response
Directorate General I 10 2.10*
Directorate General VIII 14 3.71
Directorate General X and 
General Secretariat 9 3.67
Total Commission 33 3.21
Economic and Social Committee, 
European Parliament, and 
Private Interest Groups 8 3.50
Council of Permanent Representatives 9 2.44*
Total Outside the Commission 17 2.94
Prior National Government Service
Yes 19 2.37^
No 31 3.58
^Differs significantly from those in DG VIII and DGX/S-G (at .05 by t)
^Differs significantly from those having had no prior civil ser­
vice experience.
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DG-I (the external relations section of the Commission) and the COREPER 
believe that they, in particular, should have more input and involvement 
in political cooperation, and therefore favor its incorporation into the 
Community institutions.
A European Defense Policy?
A rather critical and often discussed foreign policy strategy 
is the need to enforce the common foreign policy with a common Community 
defense policy and/or organization.^^ As was previously stated, the 
Tindemans Report specifically mentions a common defense policy (although 
Tindemans had little more in mind than a military hardware procurement 
agency for the Community) as a pre-condition to formulating common 
foreign policies. The statement put to the Eurocrats received responses 
that were the most varied, but the mean response for all the respondents 
indicated slight opposition (Table 6.26). When the responses are 
analyzed by nationality (Table 6.27), only the French and those from the 
Benelux countries agreed with the defense concept, and the response of 
those from the three new member states indicated decided disagreement with
See, for example. Sir Bernard Burrows and Christopher Irwin, 
The Security of Western Europe; Towards a Common Defense Policy 
(London: Charles Knight and Co., 1972) and Michael D. Butler, European
Defense Problems in the 1970's: The Case for a New European Defense
Community (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Affairs, Harvard 
University, February, 1971). The topic has been discussed more recently 
by the Defense Ministers of the ten-member Eurogroup of NATO (Norway, 
Greece, Turkey, and the EC member states minus Ireland and France). Due, 
in part, to the General Dynamics F-16 contract, it is a continuing item 
of discussion. Europolitique 332 (June 12, 1976), "Institutions", p. 1.
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Table 6.26 - "There is a need to establish a new European Defense
Organization in order to counter the fact that not all 
Community members belong to or participate in NATO, and 
other problems in NATO."
Strongly Mildly Mildly Strongly
Agree Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Disagree
8 (16%) 6 (12%) 9 (18%) 3 (6%) 8 (16%) 16 (32%)
Mean Response = 3.90 (where 1 = strongly agree; 6 = strongly disagree)
the idea. The responses of the Danes and of the Irish appear to be con­
sistent with the positions of their respective governments. The Danes 
have strongly favored keeping NATO as it is, particularly keeping their 
costs at a minimum and the role of the United States in NATO exactly as 
is. A member of the Irish Permanent Representation told me that the 
Irish have no intention of joining NATO, and, within the context of 
political cooperation, that they refuse to take part in discussions con­
cerning "defense"; he said they may, however, sit in on matters having
to do with "security". The distinction may appear to be one of semantics,
18but it is, for the Irish, an important one.
Significant differences in the responses exist between the Danes 
and the Belgians, the Italians, and the French. The mean response of 
those from the three new member states is significantly more negative than 
that of the Benelux respondents, the other three states of the original 
six and the original six member states. It is interesting to compare
18Based on interviews with officials in the COREPER, in Brussels,
June, 1976.
215
Table 6.27 - "There is a need to establish a new European Defense
Organization in order to counter the fact that not all 
Community members belong to or participate in NATO, and 
other problems in NATO."






United Kingdom 11 4.55
Italy 6 3.50
West Germany 8 4.13
France 6 2.83
Benelux Countries 13 3.38
France/Germany/Italy 20 3.55
New Three Countries 17 4.71»
Original Six Countries 33 3.48
TOTAL 50 3.90
^Differs significantly from the responses of the Belgians, 
Italians, and French (at .05 by t).
Differs significantly from the Benelux, Old Three, and 
Original Six member states' respondents.
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the data in Table 6.27 to the public opinion responses contained in 
Table 6.28. While the Eurocrats did not seem to support the creation 
of a European Defense Organization to supplement or replace NATO, the 
majority of those who replied to the Community public opinion poll 
question concerning the importance of strengthening a common military 
defense (49% of the total) felt that it was important or very important.
Table 6.28 - Public Opinion, May, 1976: Relative Importance Attached
to Strengthening Military Defense Against Possible Enemies.
Very Of Little Not at all No
Nation (Number) Important Important Importance Important Reply Total
Belgium (963) 8% 18% 26% 38% 10% 100%
Denmark (977) 22 25 23 21 9 100
West Germany (1104) 15 29 28 20 9 100
France (1241) 15 35 28 17 5 100
Ireland (1007) 19 33 21 19 8 100
Italy (923) 9 27 30 23 11 100
Luxembourg (268) 11 25 20 27 17 100
Netherlands (904) 17 29 27 21 6 100
United Kingdom 
(1340)
32 38 15 10 5 100
Total Community 18% 31% 25% 19% 7% 100%
SOURCE: Commission of the European Communities, :Euro-Barometre: Public
Opinion in the European Community 5 (July, 1976), p. A13.
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Further, Belgian and Luxembourger respondents supported "Defense" while 
the majority in their country did not, the Irish, Danish, and British 
respondents did not support "Defense" while the majority in their res­
pective home countries did. The Dutch and Italian respondents expressed 
"no opinion" while the majority of their countrymen disapproved of the 
common defense idea; the German respondents opposed it while the people 
in West Germany appeared evenly divided on the issue. Only the French 
Eurocrats and French general public agreed - both supported a European 
defense suggestion.
Significant differences in the responses were also found when 
the variables of age and previous experience were considered (Table 6.29).
Table 6.29 - "There is a need to establish a new European Defense Organi­
zation in order to counter the fact that not all Community 
members belong to or participate in NATO, and other problems 
in NATO."
Age: Number Mean Response
Below 30 6 5.17*
30-39 24 3.75
40 and older 20 3.70




No Previous Experience 15 3.53
^Differs significantly from the responses of those 40 and older 
(at .05 by t).
^Differs significantly from those having had professional or 
no prior experience.
218
Those who were under thirty disagreed much more strongly than those who 
were forty and older, and those who had previous business experience were 
more opposed to establishing a European Defense Organization than were 
those having prior professional or no prior experience in the private 
sector before coming to work in the Community.
When cross-tabulated with preferences that had been indicated by 
the respondents in the self-anchoring scaling questions (centralization 
vs. decentralization), the "Federalists" and the "Centralists" agreed 
more with the statement than did the "non-federalists" and "non-centralists" 
(Table 6.30).
Table 6.30 - "There is a need to establish a new European Defense Organiza­
tion in order to counter the fact that not all Community 
members belong to or participate in NATO, and other problems 
in NATO."
Preferences Indicated in Self-Anchoring 
Scaling Responses:
Number Mean Response
As to Governmental Structure:
"Federalists" 31 3.35*
"Non-Federalists" 19 4.79
As to Foreign Policy-Making:
"Centralists" 28 3.21^
"Non-Centralists" 20 4.65
^Differs significantly from responses of "non-federalists" 
(at .05 by t).
^Differs significantly from responses of "non-centralists."
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The Necessity of an External Threat?
There are those In the Community who argue that European 
integration will not progress substantially until some external event 
or actor threatens the member states sufficiently to force them to 
unite further. As a group, the Eurocrats came close to expressing no 
opinion on this matter (a mean response of 3.88), but more than half 
(56 percent) disagreed with the statement quoted in Table 6.31.
Table 6.31 - "European integration has nearly reached a standstill. It
will take a shock, such as a worsening of relations with the 
U.S.S.R. or the unilateral removal of U.S. combat forces to 
reactivate it."
Strongly Mildly Mildly Strongly
Agree Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Disagree
5 (10%) 5 (10%) 12 (24%) 8 (16%) 9 (18%) 11 (22%)
Mean Response = 3.88 (where 1 = strongly agree; 6 = strongly disagree)
When the responses were broken down by nationality (Table 6.32), 
only the Irish, Germans, and French agreed, and those from the Benelux 
countries exhibited a mean response more negative and significantly 
different only from those from the France/Germany/Italy group. When all 
other variables were cross-tabulated with the Eurocrats' responses, no 
significant differences could be found. For all comparisons, the mean 
responses ranged between 3.50 (no opinion) to 4.50 (mild disagreement).
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Table 6.32 - "European integration has nearly reached a standstill. It
will take a shock, such as a worsening of relations with the 
U.S.S.R. or the unilateral removal of U.S. combat forces to 
reactivate it."






United Kingdom 11 4.09
Italy 6 4.50
West Germany 8 3.13
France 6 2.67
Benelux Countries 13 4.54^
France/Germany/Italy 20 3.40
New Three Countries 17 3.94
Original Six Countries 33 3.85
TOTAL 50 3.88
differs significantly from the responses of the Irish and 
French (at .05 by t).
^Differs significantly from the France/Germany/Italy respondents.
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The fairly wide spread of responses indicated in Table 6.31 
accounts for the mean responses centering near the middle of the scale, 
but, more importantly, indicates general differences of opinion among 
the Eurocrats concerning the necessity for an external shock or pressure 
for continued integration to occur. It should be pointed out that in 
all cases the respondents were reacting to the second sentence of the 
statement; not one of the Eurocrats told me he or she disagreed with the 
premise, "European integration has nearly reached a standstill."
The Future for Political Cooperation/Foreign Policy 
in the Community; An Evaluation 
The efforts in the European Community to achieve greater politi­
cal cooperation and to move toward the making of common foreign policies 
are experiencing severe "growing pains". But that, in itself, is its 
most positive feature; it is an area in which progress is being made.
Many scholars who have studied this process conclude that the states will 
continue to insist on forming common policies based on the "lowest common 
denominator" between the member states, that the process remains an 
intergovernmental process subject at all times to the member states' 
governments' control. They tend to agree with British Prime Minister 
Callaghan that pragmatic "intergovemmentalism" offers the best model for
the Community as it avoids any worry about legal structures or formal 
19controls. Yet, the entire process is a dynamic one. It has managed 
at least to avoid what those closest to the process fear most, stagnation.
19Allen and Wallace, pp. 14-16.
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As Viscount Davignon stated in March, 1976, "the most dangerous thing 
about the whole European cooperation exercise is stagnation because 
stagnation implies reversal. Therefore it is better to have continual 
and consistent progress even if it is not necessarily the speed one would 
wish for."^^
In response to the self-anchoring scaling questions concerning 
a Community foreign policy (as described in Chapter II), the Eurocrats, 
as a group, rated (from the worst possible state, "0", to the best,
"10") the efforts to achieve a common foreign policy in the Community 
five years ago quite low (the mean response was 2.82), but indicated they 
felt some improvement had occurred in the last five years (up 1.56 to 
4.39). Moreover, their responses indicated a relatively optimistic 
assessment for the future of this area in the Community. The mean res­
ponse of all respondents was 6.10, higher by nearly two steps from the 
present rating (Table 6.33).
The responses did not differ significantly as to ratings of the 
Community five years ago. Responses by nationality of the respondents 
did differ significantly with the group giving the most positive present 
rating, the Danes (7.33), differing significantly from the Luxembourgers, 
the Irish, the Germans, the British, and the French. The mean response 
of the Dutch, the second most positive present rating, differed signi­
ficantly from the mean response of the British. In their ratings of a 
Community foreign policy five years from now, significant differences 
occurred between the Belgians and the Irish, Germans, and British; between 
the Dutch and the Irish, Germans, British, and French; and between the
20Europolitique 313 (March 27, 1976), "Featured Document", p. 3.
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Table 6.33 - Self-Anchoring Scaling (Mean) Responses for Foreign Policy
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1971 2.83 2.60 2.50 2.67 3.67 2.45 3.50 2.63 3.00 2.82
1976 5.00 5.60 3.50 3.67 7.33 3.55 4.67 3.86 3.83 4.39
1981 7.17 7.20 5.50 5.33 8.00 5.55 6.66 4.86 5.60 6.10
(N) 6 5 2 3 3 11 6 8 6 50
Danes and the Luxembourgers, Irish, Germans, British and French.
Mean responses computed by grouping the respondents into groups 
of nations (Table 6.34) yielded essentially the same pattern as in 
Table 6.33:
Table 6.34 - Self-Anchoring Scaling (Mean) Responses for Foreign Policy 
in the Community: Now, Five Years Ago, and Five Years in
the Future.
Year Benelux Countries Germany/France/Italy New Three Countries Total 
1971 2.69 3.00 2.71 2.82
1976 5.00 4.11 4.24 4.39
1981 6.92 5.67 5.94 6.10
(N) (13) (20) (17) (50)
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The more positive ratings by those from the Benelux countries, in 
particular their mean responses for 1981, differed significantly from 
the 1981 ratings of the other three of the original six (France, Italy, 
and Germany), and from those of the three new countries (Ireland, Denmark, 
and the United Kingdom).
When the self-anchoring scaling mean responses are compared to 
the institution of the respondents, greater differences appear (Table 
6.35). Those outside the Commission gave the Community higher "marks"
(on their respective scales of expectation) than did those in the 
Commission. Statistically different responses did not occur in the res­
ponses for 1976. However, for the 1971 ratings, significant differences 
occurred between DG X/Sec-Gen. and DG I, DG VIII, the COREPER, and the 
others outside the Commission. For the ratings of the future of Com­
munity foreign policy (1981), significant differences exist between the 
ESC/Parliament/Interest Groups and the three groups in the Commission:
DG I, DG VIII, and the DG X/Sec-Gen. Differences on the 1981 ratings 
are also apparent between the larger groups, those in the Commission and 
those outside the Commission.
In summary, most of the Eurocrats favored efforts to move toward 
a common foreign policy in the Community; the majority agreed that foreign 
policy ("high politics") decision-making should be incorporated into the 
Community's central institutions and agreed as a group that the member 
states should give up sovereignty in the area of foreign affairs in 
order to make Community foreign policies effective. The Eurocrats dis­
agreed with the notion that a negative influence by an outside actor is 
a necessary condition for Community cooperation, and, as a group.
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Table 6.35 - Self-Anchoring Scaling (Mean) Responses for Foreign
Policy in the Community: Now, Five Years Ago, and Five
Years in the Future.







1971 2.80 3.36 1.33 2.64 3.13 3.22 3.18
1976 4.60 4.50 3.44 4.24 4.63 4.75 4.69
1981 6.00 5.29 5.89 5.66 7.38 6.63 7.00
(N) (10) (14) (9) (33) (8) (9) (17)
^Directorate General I (External Relations) of the Commission
^Directorate General VIII (Development) of the Commission 
^Directorate General X (Information) and Secretariat General 
^Economic and Social Committee, Parliament, and Interest Groups 
^Council of Permanent Representatives to the Community
exhibited slight disagreement with the contention that there is a need for
a common defense organization in the Community. Again, as a group, the
Eurocrats appear to believe that political cooperation in foreign policy
matters has progressed since 1971, and will continue to improve in the
next five years. There is no reason to doubt that the majority would
agree with the recent comments of Viscount J)avignon:
Above all I would stress that political cooperation should not be 
thought of as intrinsically inter-governmental in nature. Let me 
explain myself. It is just one example of cooperation which should 
be considered in the more general context of European unification.
In this respect some progress has certainly been made, since it is 
now fully accepted that political affairs can be discussed
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at Council meetings and there is no longer a question-mark hanging 
over the participation of the European Commission. This shows that 
one day all our political activities will have to come within the 
general framework of European Union. The aim is not to have inter­
governmental cooperation as opposed to institutionalized cooperation 
at Community level. Political cooperation should not eclipse 
Community questions. On the contrary, it must form part of the 
overall force of Community action, be it economic, political, social, 
or ideological.
21Europolitique 313 (March 27, 1976), "Featured Document", p. 6.
CHAPTER VII
TOWARD A COMMON DEVELOPMENT POLICY
The distinction between "high" and "low politics" discussed in
Chapters V and VI suggests two levels of Community foreign relations, the
statecraft of diplomacy and the economic relations of trade and other
international commercial transactions. Indeed, for the European
Community, the greater part of its external relations falls into this
second category and is of immense importance. As Sir Christopher Soames,
former Commissioner for External Relations, noted:
The European Community today has a gross national product that does 
not fall far short of that of the United States. Our population is 
greater, our production of many key manufactures is second to none.
Our member states together transact 40 percent of the free world's 
trade. They hold 30-40 percent of the world's currency reserves.
They are the source of over 40 percent of official development 
assistance to the third world; and they are by far the biggest single 
market for the exports of the developing world...Magnitudes of this 
order impose obligations: obligations of responsible behaviour and
of imagination in our trading policies, obligations in our aid poli­
cies, obligations indeed in some of what look at first sight simply 
domestic policies (on agriculture, on textiles and such like) but 
which inevitably impinge on the economies of the rest of the world. 
Perhaps there were times in the past when our nation states indivi­
dually, and ever a smaller Community, could afford to be sensitive 
above all to the economic boundaries. Today I think we all recog­
nize that good citizenship of this planet involves an awareness of 
the implications of each of our actions on each other, imposes the 
added burden of thinking through their world-wide implications in this
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increasingly interdependent global economic system, and demands 
mutual consideration for each other’s vital needs.
The "trade and aid" side of the Community's foreign relations, in parti­
cular the move toward the creation of a common development policy, has 
evolved slowly over the past two decades, but has received tremendous 
impetus since the OPEC oil embargo of 1973 and the successful negotia­
tion of the Lome Convention in 1975. It is this evolution, this move 
toward a common development policy as concerns the developing nations of 
the world that provides the focus of this chapter.
External Relations Provisions in the Treaty of Rome
Provisions in the Treaty of Rome concerning external relations 
aspects of the Community are relatively modest and small in number. When 
the Foreign Ministers of the original six member states met at Messina in 
1957, they were determined to construct a secure, prosperous, and politi­
cally cohesive Europe; relations with other states was a topic limited 
to a common commercial policy and the creation of a common external tariff. 
Moreover, the consideration of a Community development policy was not even 
on their agenda. Nevertheless, the present foreign economic affairs of 
the Community are based of necessity on these few articles in the Treaty 
of Rome.
The first such article. Article 18, provides for the common 
external tariff designed to aid the development of international trade 
and the reduction of trade barriers on the basis of reciprocity. Articles 19
^From a speech in Kuala Lumpur, September 19, 1974 (Quoted in, 
Uwe Kitzinger, Europe’s Wider Horizons (London: The Federal Trust,
1975), pp. 8-9.
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and 20 specified separate lists of duty items, with other provisions 
related in Articles 21-29, e.g., customs harmonization (Article 27).
Commercial matters external to the Community's member states 
are not again mentioned until Articles 111-116. These articles envision 
a common Community commercial policy as follows:
The undertaking of all tariff negotiations by the Commission on 
behalf of the Community, on the basis of a mandate and directives 
from the Council of Ministers, and in consultation with a special 
committee (known as the 111 Committee); this provision is applicable 
from the start of the transition period (Article 111);
- the conduct of commercial policy on uniform principles, notably 
for tariff changes, the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements, 
the alignment of liberalization measures, export policy, and also 
measures for trade protection, including those against dumping and 
subsidies; as with tariff negotiations, the Commission negotiates on 
behalf of the Community on the basis of a mandate and directives 
from the Council (Article 115);
- cooperation by the member states should trade diversions threaten 
to hold up the carrying out of the common commercial policy, or
if the latter causes economic difficulties in one or several member 
states (Article 115);
- joint action only, for all matters of particular interest for the 
Common Market, in international economic organizations (Article 116).^
The most pervasive provision of the Treaty of Rome as concerns 
the Community's external relations is Article 131. It is in and by this 
article that the original six member states agreed to associate with the 
Community the non-European countries, territories, and colonies with which 
they had special relations (particularly those of Belgium, France, Italy 
and the Netherlands). With Article 113, Article 131 is also the legal 
justification for most of the existing special commercial relations the 
Community maintains with non-EC member states (see Figure 7.1). The 
article suggests, as its motivation, aid for economic and social
2Derek Frag, "The Treaty of Rome," in John Calmann (editor).
The Common Market: The Treaty of Rome Explained (London: Anthony Blond,
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By Article 238, Treaty of Rome 
^By Article 113, Treaty of Rome
^African, Caribbean, and Pacific nations of the Lome Convention 
'^on-preferential trade agreement
Figure 7.1
EEC Agreements with Non-Member Countries
SOURCE: Commission of the European Communities (DG-X), Information-
External Relations, "EEC Agreements with Non-Member Countries" 115/76 
(703/75-F(E)).
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development in those countries and colonies with the expressed aim of 
establishing close relations between them and the Community as a whole.
In matter of fact, France had insisted that special arrangements be made 
for her overseas countries and colonies as a condition to proceding with 
the Treaty negotiations. Since there already existed free trade between 
these areas and France, they argued there could not be free trade between 
Germany and France without including the overseas territories in the 
trading area. But France was far more interested in harnessing some 
German money to help its already overextended economy in the development 
of its African territories than it was in extending the area of free
3trade. Article 131 later served as the basis for the two Yaounde Con­
ventions and other association agreements in East Africa (the Arusha 
Agreement) and with Nigeria. Its immediate effect was to necessitate an 
annexed implementing convention (Part IV) of the Treaty to set up the 
first European Development Fund (EDF) in 1958. The EDF's initial resour­
ces were $381.25 million of which the "colonyless" Germans contributed 
$200 million.
The Treaty of Rome contains some important structural external 
relations provisions. Article 228 specifies that any agreements envisioned 
under the Treaty between the Community and other states or international 
organizations are to be negotiated by the Commission and concluded by the 
Council of Ministers. Such agreements are binding on the member states.
The Commission is made responsible for maintaining necessary contacts 
with the United Nations and with GATT (Article 229) and with the Council 
of Europe and the OECD (Articles 230, 231).
^Kitzinger, pp. 27-28.
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Finally, the Treaty of Rome provides for negotiations with 
European states desiring membership in the Community (Artcle 237). The 
Community is also given competence to conclude, on behalf of its member 
states, association agreements with any other countries or groups of 
countries. Such agreements may include reciprocal rights and obliga­
tions and joint actions, and must be concluded by the Council of Ministers
4acting unanimously (Article 238).
Lomd’s Predecessors 
The Convention which brought together the nine European Community 
states and the whole of independent Black Africa, the Caribbean, and three 
groups of islands in the Pacific at Lomé, Togo, on February 28, 1975, 
did not happen suddenly nor did it occur in a vacuum. The 18 months of 
negotiations to reach the treaty were but a small part of the evolution 
of Community/Third World cooperation which began in the Treaty of Rome 
on March 25, 1957. Using as a legal basis Article 113 and Part IV of the 
Treaty, the original six member states unified trade relations between 
1958 and 1962 with a large part of Africa. At the same time, the Community 
began supplying development aid to these states through the first EDF. 
During the period 1960-1962, many of these African colonies became inde­
pendent and therefore were in a position to discontinue the special rela­
tionship they had with the Community. Eighteen of these new states 
decided to remain associated economically with the Community and, on
4For the full text of Article 238 and others previously men­
tioned, see. Commission of the European Communities, The Treaties of the 
European Communities (Brussels: first English edition published in 1958)
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July 20, 1963, signed the First Convention of Yaounde.
The Yaounde Convention featured several positive developments 
for the associated Francophone African states. It encouraged the forma­
tion of the Associated African States and Madagascar (AASM), increased 
trade between them and the Community, and gained a slight increase in 
financial aid for the five year period, to 730 million units of account 
(U.A.).^ Trade relations were governed by a system of mutual preferences 
stressing reciprocity and, for the first time, joint institutions were 
set up to administer the arrangement.^ However, the appearance in the 
convention of equal partners negotiating an agreement providing equal 
benefit over which there would be equal control was highly illusionary.
The first Yaounde was certainly the strong confronting the weak on its 
own terms. As I. William Zartman notes:
While the Africans were asking for a continuation and strengthening 
of the Rome Treaty Association and its advantages, the evolving 
European position worked toward a loosening of protection for exports 
from the former French, Belgian, and Italian Africa in the European 
market and an opening of the flood gates of competition. This the 
Africans regarded with fear, since they felt that their economies had 
not yet been sufficiently prepared for the cold world of the open 
market, while the Europeans moved closer to a common feeling that the 
only way to leam to survive was by being thrown into the water - with 
varying kinds of life jackets - and not being paid to sit on the shore.^
The unit of account is a form devised by the Commission as a 
"shopping basket" unit; its value is determined by reference to the value 
of a group of currencies. Before 1972, the U.A. equalled one dollar. In 
1975, it was equal to $1.24. For a complete explanation, see. Commission 
of the European Communities, Information: Economic and Finance 114/76,
January, 1976.
^Charles Schiffman, "A Negotiation and a Convention," The Courier 
31 (Special Issue - March, 1975), pp. 3-6.
^I. William Zartman, The Politics of Trade Negotiations Between 
Africa and the European Economic Community: The Weak Confront the Strong
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 40-41. Zartman
provides an excellent account of the Yaounde negotiations in pp. 24-76.
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Yaounde was criticized for other reasons. Some argued it 
was colonialism by another name while others felt it ought to have been 
extended to all developing countries. Many believed that it unfairly 
discriminated against the Community’s competitors, while still others 
felt insufficient protection was given the associates against competing 
products from Asia and Latin America. Perhaps the most noticeable 
reaction occurred due to an unrelated development. Discouraged by de 
Gaulle's refusal to permit British entry into the Community, those who 
saw this French intransigence as "post-colonial" and oriented to "spheres 
of influence" which purposely omitted most developing nations (and 
particularly the British Commonwealth) began to talk of "mondialism", or 
a world-wide approach to trade and development. The result was the 1963 
Declaration of Intent in which the Community declared itself willing to 
extend the Yaounde or any similar arrangement to any countries having 
economic and production structures similar to the AASM. The Dutch, in 
particular, recommended three options for those outside the AASM: 1) 
participation in the convention negotiated with the Associates: 2) nego­
tiation of a different but similar convention; or 3) negotiation of trade 
8agreements.
The reaction of the Commonwealth nations was guarded. Nigeria 
entered three years of laborious negotiations, but the Lagos Convention 
signed in July, 1966, was never brought into force. The first Arusha 
agreement with East Africa (Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda) expired without 
going into effect and the second Arusha Convention, negotiated in 1969,
QKitzinger, p. 29.
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did not go into effect until 1971. Its operation until 1975 is generally
9believed not to have been a success.
The Second Yaoundé Convention was negotiated with the same 
Yaounde I participants and signed in July, 1969. The second convention 
was essentially Lhe same as the first with one substantial difference, 
the customs preferences problem. The GATT duty restructions and the 
generalized tariff preferences the Community granted all developing nations’ 
exports through the System of Generalized Preferences (GSP)^^ eroded the 
advantages the AASM had under Yaounde. Further, the flow of trade had 
not been substantially increased and the elimination of customs duties 
had not had the desired effect of stabilizing raw material prices. The 
AASM states did get concessions in Yaoundé II in aid to trade promotion 
and provisions for emergency aid. What they wanted most they did not 
receive. The EDF was raised only to 900 million units of account for the 
next five years (U.A. 5 million was added later when Mauritius became 
an associate.;
When, finally, the British were to be admitted into the Community, 
the Community member states realized that future "Yaoundes" would have to
9Zartman, pp. 77-115.
^^The GSP is a system of customs franchise which favors manu­
factured and semi-finished goods from developing countries. The Community 
system, in operation since July 1, 1971, is non-reciprocal and non- 
discriminatory, and is based on preferential imports free of customs duty 
up to specified ceilings. Items such as agricultural products, basic 
industrial products and industrial raw materials are not included. 
(Commission of the EC, Information; External Relations 02/75).
^^Schiffmann, p. 4.
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include the Commonwealth developing states as well. Consequently, 
Protocol 22 of the Treaty of Accession extended again the options pro­
vided in the 1963 Declaration of Intent, but only to the African, 
Caribbean, and Pacific members of the Commonwealth (areas where the 
French had colonies or former colonies), and not to the Asian members 
(the British did not wish to jeopardize their membership by demanding 
more for their Commonwealth). But the Commonwealth nations did not leap 
at the chance. Partially out of unfamiliarity with the nature of "asso­
ciation" and in response to the Third World criticism that "association"
was neo-colonialistic, too dependent on Paris, and an obstacle to African 
12unity, the African states outside the AASM made no response for more 
than a year. After an African trade ministers' meeting in Abidjan in 
May, 1973, interest was expressed in "bloc-to-bloc" negotiation with the 
Community. This effectively provided the necessary foundation on which 
the Lome Convention was to be built.
The Lome Convention
While the meeting at Abidjan (and later reaffirmation at the
OAU Summit at Addis Ababa) portended a change of attitude on one side,
the real psychological impetus for the negotiations which led to Lome
13came from the "Deniau Memorandum". This document suggested a flexi­
bility on the part of the Community on the question of reciprocity, the
12M. K. Whiteman, "The Lome Convention," World Survey 82 
(October, 1975), p. 4.
13Named after Jean-Francois Deniau, the Community Development 
Commissioner.
237
"Stabex" concept (a scheme for stabilization of export earnings on 
certain commodities),^^ and an indication of less rigid adherence to 
the three options of Protocol 22.^^ The OAU states responded by taking 
to the first meeting in Brussels eight principles on which they based 
their side of the negotiations;
(i) the principle of non-reciprocity in trade and tariff concessions 
given by the EEC:
(ii) the extension on a non-discriminatory basis, towards third 
countries, of the provision on the right of establishment:
(iii) the revision of the rules of origin must be formulated so as 
to facilitate the industrial integration of African countries, and 
in particular, they must grant the status of original products to 
all goods which have been produced in one or several of the African 
countries (whether or not they are members of African groupings) or 
which have been processed with mutually accepted criteria, whether 
or not they enjoy preferential relations with the EEC:
(iv) a revision of the provisions for the movement of payments and 
capital to take account of the objective of monetary independents in 
African countries, and the need for monetary co-operation among 
African countries:
(v) the disassociation of EEC financial and technical aid from any 
particular form of relationship with the EEC:
(vi) free and assured access to EEC markets for all African products 
including processed and semi-processed agricultural products, 
whether or not they are subject to the Common Agricultural Policy
of the EEC:
(vii) the guaranteeing to African countries of stable, equitable, 
and remunerative prices in EEC markets for their main products in 
order to allow them to increase their export earnings:
(viii) any form of agreement made with the EEC should not in any 
manner adversely affect intra-African cooperation.^®
Stabex is a feature of the Lome Convention designed to com­
pensate ACP states for instability of export earnings for certain of their 
products. For an explanation of the aims, products covered, machinery, 
and financial arrangements in Stabex see. Commission of the European Com­
munities, Information: Development and Cooperation 94/75 (202/X/75-E),
pp. 1-23.
^^From interviews in Brussels, June-July, 1976.
^^Quoted from Whiteman, p. 6.
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The African (OAU) members were subsequently joined by six Caribbean
and three Pacific nations, while the North African OAU members (Egypt,
Algeria, Tunisia, Lybia, and Morocco) remained only as o b s e r v e r s . T h e
resulting group later came to be known as the ACP (African, Caribbean,
18and Pacific) nations. (See Figure 7.2)
When the Community entered into formal negotiations with the 
ACP group in October and November, 1973, the member states pledged 
themselves to more than the creation of another external commercial 
agreement. Prior to this time, the Yaoundé Conventions represented the 
sum total of anything that might have been called a development policy. 
With the agreement to abandon reciprocity and to consider "Stabex”, it 
was clear from the beginning that a Community development policy would 
be dramatically altered and enhanced. The negotiations proceded quite 
slowly during the first six months. Several events took place in the 
environment of the negotiations that, in part, contributed to the initial
North Africa falls under the Community's Mediterranean Policy. 
Those states had already decided to negotiate separate trade agreements 
with the Community. Indeed, the Mabgreb negotiations had already begun 
in 1972. For reference, see Avi Shlaim and G. N. Yannopoulos (editors). 
The EEC and the Mediterranean Countries (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1976). See also an excellent analysis of the Mabgreb negotia­
tions in Glenda G. Rosenthal, The Men Behind the Decisions: Cases in
European Policy-Making (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1975).
18The ACP states, particularly those in the Commonwealth dis­
liked the terms "associate" or "association" thinking they suggested a 
children's table set up next to the grown-ups' table (the Europeans).
The French and many of the Francophone African states wanted to keep 
the terms, suggesting that dropping them would render the relationship 
less close. The terms association and associates do not appear in the 
Convention; at all times the developing states are referred to as the 
"ACP" or "ACP states". (From interviews in Brussels, June-July, 1976).
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slow pace. The OPEC boycott occurred at about the same time the nego­
tiations began, and the problem of British opposition became acute when 
the Labor Party returned to power in Britain in March, 1974. Both 
events contributed to difficulties among those on the Community side, 
and the Arab oil embargo provided the ACP side with a unifying influence. 
According to Nigerian Ambassador Sami, who chaired the ACP side during 
the entire 18 months of negotiations, the embargo indirectly cemented
ACP solidarity by convincing them to shed the image of "beggar nations"
19seeking charity. The result was a far different relationship across
20the negotiating table than existed during the two Yaounde negotiations.
The negotiations reached a watershed at the joint ministerial 
meeting in Kingston, Jamaica. It was here the Community formally drop­
ped its insistence in reciprocity, and announced that the ACP states 
would have free access to EC markets without having to give corresponding 
commitments. There was also a Community promise to reexamine the different
19Whiteman, p. 9.
20Other factors contributed to disunity on the Community side 
of the negotiations. Certain of the member states had strong reserva­
tions on certain issues or products. The French held out for reciprocity 
with half-hearted support from the Belgians, while the British and 
Germans vehemently opposed it. The British had reservations on bananas 
and sugar, the French and Germans on rum, the Danes on cut flowers, and 
the Italians on nearly all fruits and vegetables. The Germans were the 
biggest supporters of Stabex, but the most reluctant on the size of the 
EDF, or more particularly their rather disproportionate share of the EDF. 
The British wanted a larger EDF, the French were concerned about the 
Yaounde group (Francophone Africa) getting less because of the expanded 
number of the ACP, and the Italians felt the EDF ought to go to the 
Italians. (From interviews in Brussels, June-July, 1976.)
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questions of rules of origin and concessions on competitive agricultural 
21products. The Kingston "breakthrough" also included the decision on
exports earnings stabilization ("Stabex") and that industralization should
be given priority in the future cooperation. The ACP memorandum at the
Kingston Conference served, for all practical purposes, as a draft for
the Lome" Convention with two major exceptions - the sugar agreement and
22the size of the EDF.
Sugar was an issue that dominated the closing stages of the 
negotiations. Those negotiations were made especially difficult by the 
state of the world sugar market in the Fall, 1974, when prices were 
particularly high and supplies short. It was also a test of European 
good faith vs. third world "producer power": sugar from ACP states would
be competing with Europe's own producers. The result was a victory for 
ACP "solidarity"; the Community agreed to buy 1.4 million tons of ACP 
sugar at the same price guaranteed European sugar beet producers.
21The concerns are outlined in: Commission of the European
Communities, Information: Development and Cooperation 73/74 (633/X/74-E),
pp. 6-11. The issue of reciprocity is a sore point for some Community 
officials. One Frenchman in the Commission's DG VIII (Development) told 
me that there is much the Community could and should ask of the develop­
ing countries other than tariff reductions. He argued that the Community 
should require predictability from the Third World states in the form of 
safeguards against overnight changes in health regulations, quotas, and 
customs duties. Further, he pointed out that after the Community dropped 
reciprocity and the United States and the Community haggled over further 
reductions in the GSP, Japanese businesses moved into the Ivory Coast 




The other last minute negotiation concerned the new amount of 
the EDF. The chairman of the Community side, Jean Sauvagnargues of 
France, indicated a willingness to go as high as U. A. 3 billion, but 
the ACP chairman, Babacar Ba of Senegal, demanded total aid of U. A. 8 
billion. However, Babacar Ba announced just prior to the final mara­
thon negotiating session that honor forbade undignified bargaining on
23the issue, and accepted the Community's figure.
The negotiations which led to the signing of the Lome Convention 
on February 28, 1975, produced 350 joint documents in 183 EC/ACP nego­
tiating sessions and 493 coordinating meetings of the ACP delegations. 
Moreover, the negotiations produced a convention which provides for very 
significant institutional arrangements, commercial cooperation, and finan­
cial, technical, and industrial cooperation.
Provisions of the Lome Convention
The Lome Convention is for five years, beginning after ratifi­
cation and dated from March 1, 1975. The agreement is based on:
— Free access without reciprocity to the European market for goods 
exported from the ACP (the ACP agreed only not to discriminate 
between EC member states);
— A stabilization fund (Stabex) to compensate the ACP in the event 
of reductions in the receipts they derive from the export of their 
principle basic products (not all products are included - the 
only raw material involved is iron ore, and the total number of 
products involved is 29);
— Financial aid for the ACP, including U. A. 3 billion from the 
EDF and U. A. 390 million from the European Investment Bank 
(included as a major feature is the provision for increased parti­
cipation by the ACP states in planning the aid, drawing up and 
appraising projects, preparing financial decisions, carrying out 
projects and appraising results);
^^Whiteman, p. 11-12.
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— Industrial and technical cooperation, aimed at promoting a better 
international division of labor on lines advantageous to the ACP 
(including the development of infrastructure linked to industriali­
zation, assistance in setting up industries (particularly for raw 
material processing), training schemes, technology, transfer plans, 
and trade promotion);
— Joint institutions to supervise the agreement involving a Council 
of Ministers made up of the EC Council of Ministers and Commission, 
and one member from each ACP state; a Committee of Ambassadors (to 
supervise other bodies and standing or ad hoc working groups), and 
an advisory assembly composed of European Parliamentarians and 
representatives appointed by the ACP states (as many ACP nations 
do not have Parliaments).^"*
There are provisions in the Lome Convention which have had and 
will continue to have an integrative impact on both the Community and 
the ACP. The Community has always encouraged regional integration pre­
ferring to negotiate "bloc-to-bloc" with other regional groupings. (The 
Eur-Arab Dialogue, discussed in Chapter V above, is an example). As 
was previously pointed out, the format of the negotiations and the 
resultant institutional arrangements for the Lome Convention encourage 
the representation of the member states on either side by a central repre­
sentative. The EC Commission has always advocated having a specific fund 
to encourage regional integration among developing countries. An example 
of a technique employed to encourage regional integration may be found 
in the technical and financial parts of the Convention. Article 7 pro­
vides for the creation of customs duties or free trade areas among the 
ACP states. To further encourage regionalization, the Convention makes 
the rules of origin cumulative; the Community treats the ACP states as a 
single customs area for purposes of origin. Therefore, cotton grown in 
one ACP state could be processed in another, and styled in a third without
^^The complete text of the Lome Convention is reprinted in The 
Courier 31 (Special Issue - March, 1975).
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25calling into question the origin and tariff list of the product. An 
integrative (centralizing) aspect operating in the Community is the pro­
vision that posts representatives of the Commission in each of the ACP 
states. It is the Commission, not the Council or the member states 
that has full-time emissaries in all fifty-two countries and control
over the flow of information concerning the progress and maintenance of 
26the convention.
Criticisms of the Lomé Convention
The most often heard criticism of the Lomé Convention concerns
it scope, that it still grudgingly embodies a regionalist approach.
Although much larger in scope than was Yaoundé, it is still predominantly
a special arrangement between Europeans and their former African colonies.
Other detractors argue that the most serious need, direct development
aid, was not permitted to be a major point in the negotiations and that
27the total amount falls far short of what is needed. The Stabex scheme 
has been criticized on various technical points, including the limited 
number of products covered and the relatively paltry fund (U. A. 375 
million). Another criticism concerns the recipient of Stabex funds; money
^^Kitzinger, p. 34.
26The terms of this arrangement are specified in Article 31, 
Protocol II of the Lome Convention and in Commission of the European 
Communities, "Regulation of the Rules of Competition in the Awarding of 
Works and Supply Contracts Financed by the EDF" (Brussels, April, 1976) 
(VIII/242 (76)-E, VIII-E-4) .
27The point is well argued by Carol Cosgrove-Twitchett, "From 
Association to Partnership," in Kenneth J. Twitchett (editor), Europe 
and the World; The External Relations of the Common Market (London: 
Europa, 1976), pp. 121-150.
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paid from the fund goes directly to ACP governments and, as such, may be
28more a tax subsidy than any guarantee of h elping farmers and producers. 
Despite these valid concerns, the Lome Convention does represent a 
decided break with the past, a move toward First-Third World equality 
in the face of "producer power" and the call for a "new economic order", 
a significant move on the part of the Community toward treating all
developing states equally, and the emergence of a cohesive development
29policy in the Community. Both the Community and the ACP leaders were 
justified in their self-congratulations. But the detractors were not long 
to find encouragement. The UNCTAD IV meeting in Nairobi appeared to 
reverse many of the psychological and political gains of the Lome Conven­
tion in European/Third World relations.
UNCTAD IV
The Fourth Conference of the United Nations Conference on Trade
30and Development (UNCTAD) was, in many respects, a failure for the 
Community. First, it revealed how far apart many of the member states
28From interviews in Brussels, June-July, 1976.
29See, for examples, I. V. Gruhn, "The Lome Convention: Inching
towards Interdependence," International Organization 30 (Spring, 1976), 
pp. 241-262; and I. William Zartman, "Europe and Africa: Decolonializa-
tion or Dependency?", Foreign Affairs 54 (January, 1976), pp. 325-343.
^^UNCTAD was established as an organ of the United Nations 
General Assembly in December, 1964, by resolution 1995 (XIX). It is a 
world-wide forum having a membership of 152 states. Its aim is to 
evolve a coordinated set of policies, to be adopted by all governments, 
designed to accelerate the economic development of the developing countries. 
These policies concern external trade and payments as well as economic 
development.
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were on certain issues and, therefore, how far the Community was from 
the common development policy envisioned (albeit embryonically) in the 
Convention of Lome. The failure of the Community to "speak with one 
voice" during the conference in Nairobi, Kenya, in May, 1976, also indi­
cated that the Community would have to admit that it could no longer 
participate in one conference as though other conferences in which it 
took part did not exist or were not significantly interrelated. The 
UNCTAD IV Conference seemed to have ended the sort of practice in which, 
for exançle, generalized preferences schemes are promised in GATT rounds
while preferential arrangements are negotiated with ACP and other third 
31world states.
Preparations for UNCTAD IV began in earnest in the United Nations 
in 1975. The topics prepared for the agenda were commodities, manu­
factures and semi-manufactures, money and finance, transfer of technology, 
the least developed developing states, economic cooperation among develop­
ing countries, trade between nations having different economic and
32social systems, and shipping and insurance. Preparation in the Community
31In all of my interviews, I could find no indication that any 
effort was made in the Commission to link any of the concurrent negotia­
tions together. Although this does not in itself prove that no such 
consultation or coordination took place, of one related observation I am 
quite certain. Those who I interviewed in DG I or.DG VIII who had taken 
part in negotiating similar arrangements with different countries all 
told me that no effort was mads to base new negotiations on the achieve­
ments or lessons learned in previous agreements, preferring instead to 
begin the new negotiations on a tabula rasa, often with a different 
negotiating team. It was as though the entire process could be character­
ized as "incremental ^  hoc opportunism."
^^UNCTAD/CESI, Preparing for UNCTAD IV (New York; United 
Nations, 1975), TAD/INF/PUB/75-3, pp. 1-24.
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did not begin until the middle of January, 1976 when it was learned
33that the Group of 77 were to meet in Manila from January 26 to 
February 6 to prepare a common position both for the UNCTAD Trade and 
Development Board meeting in March and for the general conference in 
May. The Dutch government was the first to act, sending an observer 
to the Manila meeting in order to aid the Community's preparation for 
UNCTAD IV.
The Commission finally sent to the Council its proposals for
the Conference in February, 1976. These included an international
"Stabex" scheme (for export earnings, not purchasing power as had been
35hoped by many Third World states), the use of commodity agreements
"where appropriate", and the application of accompanying trade measures.
The communication specifically recommended rejection of the indexation
36of primary products proposed by the Group of 77 at Manila. The 
ideas contained in the Communication were little more than a comparison 
of past positions with the positions of other groups of nations and ideas
33The "Group of 77" is the name commonly used for meetings of 
the non-aligned members of the Third World. The group actually con­
sists of about 110 members.
^^Europolitique 292 (January 14, 1976), "External Relations",
p. 1.
35Abd-El Rahman Khane, executive director of UNIDO, criticized 
the Lome Stabex scheme as "not sufficient at all" during a February, 1976, 
press conference in Davos, stating that future arrangements must stabilize 
the purchasing power of developing states. Europolitique 299 (February 7,
1976) "External Relations", p. 3.
36Commission of the European Communities, "Preparation for the 
U.N. Conference on Trade and Development." ((COM 176) 39 final:
Brussels, February 4, 1976), pp. 1-23.
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on coordinating UNCTAD IV with the Conference on International Economic 
Cooperation (henceforth referred to as CIEC or the "North/South 
Dialogue")?^
The meeting of the UNCTAD Trade and Development Board in Geneva,
March 8-19, served as a pre-negotiating session for UNCTAD IV. The
session also served to point out the differences between the developed
and developing states - no recommendations or resolutions emerged from
the conference - and between members of the Community. For example, the
Germans and British were most adamantly opposed to a binding code of
ethics on multinational corporations and the transfer of technology; the
Dutch were in favor of the integrated commodities approach advocated by
the Group of 77, to the point of offering to contribute immediately to
38an international buffer stock. The French still limited any decisions
39on aid funding to a long term review of both the CIEC and UNCTAD IV, 
and the Germans maintained their insistence that there should be no aid
37The CIEC has been meeting in Paris since May, 1975. It is 
attended by the developed states (major raw material consumers) and 19 
Third World raw material producer states. The Conference is divided into 
four commissions dealing respectively with energy, raw materials, finan­
cial questions, and development strategy. By a decision at the Rome 
Summit in December, 1975, of the European Council, the nine Community 
states are represented in the CIEC by a single delegation. For back­
ground, see Jahangir Amuzegar, "The North/South Dialogue: From Conflict
to Compromise," Foreign Affairs 54 (April, 1976),pp. 547-562.
Europolitique 312 (March 24, 1976), "External Relations",
pp. 1-3.
39Europolitique 295 (January 24, 1976), "External Relations",
p. 3.
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allocation without harmonization of aid p r o g r a m s . T h e  internal dif­
ferences, differences with the Group of 77, and limited time remaining 
made it very clear that speaking with one voice at Nairobi would require 
continuous ad hoc consultation by the nine Community governments.
During the first eight days of April, 1976, the Council of 
Development Ministers of the Community met in Luxembourg in an attempt 
to resolve their differences before moving on to Nairobi. The meeting 
produced no results. For example, France still refused to support the 
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). However, some 
positive debate was held on the German memorandum. The Danes asked about 
the need to harmonize GNP shares devoted to aid. The French suggested 
concentrating aid coordination on the ACP and Mediterranean countries as 
an initial phase, while the British wanted a discussion of paid technical
40The Germans submitted a memorandum to the Council in early 
April, 1976, the main points of which were:
— given the greater weight of Member States' development policy, as 
a result of EEC enlargement, an integrated development policy is 
required, implying greater coordination and harmonization;
— major efforts are needed to smooth the path to greater "Communiti- 
zation" of development policy through progressive transfer of 
bilateral aid to Community responsibility (which, given the national 
prestige some countries derive from aid-giving, is not likely to 
be a welcome suggestion everywhere);
— in stage one, improved bases for national decision-making should be 
created by more exchange of information taking into account plans 
for existing EEC policy; this should make the interdependence of 
bilateral consideration clearer;
— in stage two, common planning of aid distribution by country and 
region;
— in stage three, progressive transfer to the Community of various 
instruments and resources.
Europolitique 315 (April 3, 1976), "External Relations", p. 3.
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assistance to richer developing states. But the debate soured when 
France suggested spending the U. A. 20 million set aside for develop­
ment assistance to non-associates entirely in Lebanon. The Dutch, 
British, and Belgians reacted heatedly to what they saw as another game 
of favoritism and an effort to abrogate 2 1/2 years of discussions on
aid to non-associates. The meeting ended with an agreement only to
.. 41disagree.
UNCTAD IV began in Nairobi on May 6, 1976. The tone of the 
Conference was set immediately and was evident by the fact it took more 
than a week (or nearly half the alloted time) to reach agreement on the 
composition of the five specialized groups and who should chair them. 
Tensions between the Nine then arose due to a stalemate in the first 
commission which was charged with examining the problem of commodities.
No longer wishing to wait for the developed states, the "Group of 77" 
announced plans to go it alone and create a common fund to finance buffer 
stocks for seventeen commodities.^^ The fund was to have been financed 
by the OPEC nations ($300 million), the Philippines ($50 million) and 
India ($25 million). The consternation among the industrialized nations 
at the prospect of an international market instrument set up outside 
their control was exacerbated by dissention within their ranks. The 
Netherlands and Denmark immediately expressed a willingness to contribute 
to such a common fund, while Germany (supported by Britain) continued to
^^Europolitique 317 (April 10, 1976), "External Relations", p. 2. 
42The commodities are coffee, cocoa, tea, sugar, cotton, rubber, 
jute, sisal, copper, tin, wheat, rice, bananas, beef and veal, wool, 
bauxite, and iron ore.
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reserve the right to decide on its own the timing of contributing to
43separate funds for commodities.
When the issue of indebtedness of the poorest countries joined 
in furthering the stalemate of the Conference, and the United States and 
Japan let it be known they would not oppose any compromise worked out 
among the EEC nine, the spotlight shifted to frantic efforts among the 
Community member states' delegates to find such a compromise. The most 
difficult obstacle remained the United Kingdom's and Germany's opposition 
to automatic market stabilization measures of world prices of commodi­
ties.^^ Faced with the prospect of seriously damaging the future of 
the North/South dialogue, the Germans softened their positions on com­
modities funds and debt financing. A two-day extension of the Conference 
permitted a qualified successful conclusion of UNCTAD IV on May 30th. 
Although some consensus was reached at the Conference concerning com­
modities, debt, transfer of technology, and institutional and monetary 
questions, the only major result was to pave the way for a large number 
of future international negotiations. The United States (whose proposal 
to set up an international resource bank was rejected) announced at the 
final meeting that it would not pledge itself to negotiate at any later 
date either agreements on certain products or on setting up the common
^^Europolitique 326 (May 19, 1976), "External Relations", p. 4. 
^^Europolitique 328 (May 27, 1976), "External Relations", pp.
6-7.
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f , 45 fund.
The U.S. announcement was supported by the United Kingdom,
Germany, and Japan. The Dutch led the Benelux and Scandanavian countries
in their support of the common fund and a desire to assume obligations
to help in the case of the indebtedness of the poorest nations. The
French took a middle-ground position, stating only that they supported
46the final resolution of the Conference.
Community officials hailed UNCTAD IV as a "happy success"; 
but the press and the third world countries declared it a failure, and 
pointed to a lack of cohesion among the Community's member s t a t e s . T h e
45It was generally believed among Community officials that the 
United States played a disruptive role at the Nairobi Conference. Many 
of the member states expressed fear that some (especially Germany and the 
U.K.) would be more interested in maintaining close ties with the U.S. 
than in compromising with the Group of 77. A persistent rumor in the 
Commission was that a member of the U.S. delegation broke into a private 
meeting of the Nine (designed to find a common EC position) and success­
fully pulled away the British delegate to sign a joint U.S./U.K. position. 
I could not substantiate the rumor, but its existence is significant in 
itself. (From interviews in the EC Commission, Brussels, June-July, 1976),
46For the final resolution concerning an integrated program for 
commodities, and related declarations of the Netherlands (speaking for 
16 countries of Group B including Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, and 
Luxembourg), West Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Columbia, and 
Australia, see, UNCTAD document TD/L. 131, 30 May, 1976. (5/898 e/76
(COMER 224)) Add. 1. France's position during the conference was 
pointed out in more than one of my interviews as an example of its voting 
"technique" on the Council since 1973. Tired of being labelled the 
Community's "bite noire", the French are careful to vote after the Danes, 
Germans, or British, whichever can be counted upon to cast a negative 
vote. (From interviews in the EC Commission, Brussels, June-July, 1976).
4-5.
^^Europolitique 329 (June 2, 1976), "External Relations", pp.
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official Community assessment was based on the fact that UNCTAD IV did 
not directly hinder progress in the timetables and forms of the North/ 
South Dialogue. Indeed, the situation was an example of recognized 
linkage between multinational negotiations. That any cohesion among 
the nine occurred at all was credited to a fear that an absolute failure 
in UNCTAD IV would jeopardize any chance of success in the North/South 
Dialogue (which continues at the time of this writing). It is, then, 
in the context of the North/South Dialogue that the formulation of any 
common Community policy on development will occur. The experience of 
UNCTAD IV demonstrates that the Lome Convention was not sufficient to 
insure further progress. Further, the Community may have gambled unsuc­
cessfully by sacrificing UNCTAD IV to save the CIEC. There was some 
indication that many third world states would have much preferred sub­
stantial progress in Nairobi, where each had a voice, to the Paris talks 
where they must depend on one of the 19 developing states representing
them.48
A Community Development Policy?
Before the Lome Convention was signed and the UNCTAD IV 
Conference took place, the Commission of the European Community published 
a "philosophical statement" on development aid commonly referred to as 
the "Fresco".4^ This document, based on the theme, "To each according
4^Ibid., p. 3.
4^Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 8/74, (November, 
1974), pp. 1-26. Prior to that, the Commission had published an exten­
sive report arguing the need for a common development policy. See Com­
mission of the European Communities, Memorandum of a Community Policy on 
Development Cooperation (Communication of the Commission to the Council 
of July 27, 1971 and February 2, 1972).
254
to his needs, by bringing all our means to bear", stresses the need for 
commodity stabilization, food production programs, and for stockpiling 
reserves. The "message" is that the diversity between developing states 
requires different approaches designed to respond to differing sets of 
needs and circumstances. The Commission was far more specific in a 
follow-on Communication to the Council in March, 1975.^^ These pro­
posals were meant to complete an overall development policy by adding 
to those already included in the Lome Convention. The proposals address 
rural development, food production, funds to encourage regional inte­
gration, and some modest allotments for emergency aid and technical 
assistance in trade promotion. The Commission recommended a total fund 
for all non-ACP developing states of U. A. 105 million for 1976, to be 
raised gradually to Ü. A. 210 million by 1980.
Despite the specificity of these proposals, it is the philoso­
phical nature of the "Fresco" which both embodies what common Community 
development policy can be said to exist at present, and the very differences 
which were the bases for the disharmony between the member states and which 
now stand as barriers to any common policies. While the Community member 
states disagree as to what form of market stabilization should be con­
structed and for what products from which countries, more fundamental 
questions have not as yet been resolved. For example, given that an even­
tual common development policy is a proper Community goal, what form should 
that objective take? Should the goal be mondialism, regionalism, or a
Commission of the European Communities, "Community Financial 
and Technical Aid to Non-Associated Developing Countries 1976-1980" 
(C0M(75) 95 final, Brussels, March 5, 1975), pp. 1-11.
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form somewhere between the two? Do special arrangements in Africa or 
the Mediterranean discriminate against other third world nations? Should 
Community aid programs be entirely multilateral, coordinated or con­
trolled by the Community's central institutions, or should national 
bilateral aid programs continue in addition to multilateral Community 
aid? As was done in previous chapters, the answers to these questions 
were sought in the collective wisdom of the Eurocrats. Their thinking 
on these fundamental concerns, plus their assessments of the present 
state of integration and the prognosis for a Community development policy 
are presented in Chapter VIII.
CHAPTER VIII
THE 'EUROCRATS': TOWARD A COMMON DEVELOPMENT POLICY
The European Community is moving toward the achievement of a 
common policy vis ^  vis the less developed countries of the world. The 
continuation of this progress depends now on the ability of the Community 
to prepare and negotiate a common position in the "North/South Dialogue". 
It is particularly important to the Community that in the "North/South 
Dialogue", the lack of unity and subsequent failure to achieve results 
in negotiations with the Third World experienced in UNCTAD IV not be 
repeated. That difficulty, added to the lack of any significant results 
in the North/South to date do not detract from the recent progress made 
toward a common development policy relative to the past. The Lome 
Convention is sufficient evidence of that progress.
As I did in Chapters IV and VI above, I shall present in this 
chapter the collective attitudes and wisdom of the "Eurocrats",^ a group
^For an explanation of the term "Eurocrat", a profile of the 
fifty respondents, and details as to methodology, see Chapter II.
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of European Community officials who are among those most knowledgeable 
regarding the Community's external relations. This chapter is, then, 
their collective expert opinions concerning the immediate and future 
state of integration in the area of development assistance outside the 
Community. Unlike previous chapters, however, the Eurocrats were not 
asked to specify or clarify different means and ends that had been left 
unclear by events and official statements. Indeed, the provisions of 
the Lome Convention, the sources of contention between the member states, 
and the various recommendations now under consideration are relatively 
unambiguous and often expressed in technical clarity and hard Units of 
Account. If anything, the responses of the Eurocrats serve to under­
score a real lack of consensus in the Community concerning efforts to 
move beyond the Lome Convention. Nowhere is this more evident than in 
their expressions of preferences as to the goals for a Community develop­
ment policy.
End-Products
The Eurocrats were asked to specify what for them would be the 
best possible goal for a common development policy. Their responses to 
the open-ended question, "What for you would be the best possible policy 
by the Community toward the developing countries of the world?", fell into 
the categories indicated in Table 8.1. Thirty-six percent specifically 
mentioned the Lome Convention in some way. Although this constituted 
the largest group, the group was far from being a majority. The other 
responses indicated preferences for varying degrees of centralization 
(three specifically wanted no centralization of development policy) and
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Table 8.1 - The Best Possible Community Development Policy
Ideal State Number
The Lome Convention (in spirit, theory, or principle) 18
More cooperation with Less Developed Countries 7
A common policy but on a "case-by-case" basis 6
A world-wide (mondialist) common policy 5
Increase aid to the poorest nations 3
Create a central Community development policy 3
Coordinate national bilateral programs (no central policy) 3
End ethnocentric development policies 2
Decrease aid, increase technical assistance and investment 2
Improve the General System of Preferences 1
Total 50
certain strategies: the mondialist approach, regionalist (or "case-by-
case") approach, increasing or decreasing aid, etc. (The mondialist/ 
regionalist and multilateralist/bilateralist controversies will be dis­
cussed in detail later in this chapter.) The responses in Table 8.1 
indicate a willingness to state preferences on the part of the Eurocrats, 
but a general lack of consensus among them that fairly accurately reflects 
the situation in the Community as described in the previous chapter.
The responses to the question, "What for you would be the worst 
possible arrangement for the Community’s relations with the developing
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countries?", were indicative also of a lack of consensus. As indicated 
in Table 8.2, the responses ranged from the multilateralists’ fear that 
only uncoordinated national bilateral programs would exist or that the 
Lome would fail, to a state of no development programs at all.
Table 8.2 - The Worst Anticipated Community Development Policy
Worst Anticipated State Number
No coordination, only national bilateral programs exist 17
A failure of the Lome Convention 10
States favor former colonies and are too stingy with the
poorest nations 6
Overall, inflexible policy without regard for special needs
and circumstances (characterized by over-centralization) 5
"Beggar-Thy-Neighbor" Policy (competition between the Nine) 4
A "cold war" with the Third World/increasing the gap between
rich and poor nations 2
Should the Community loose its development role in the world 2
No aid, just trade, or giving aid only 2
No aid programs at all 2
Total 50
The Current State of Integration 
As there appears to be a lack of consensus about what the end- 
product of a common Community development policy should be, the same
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situation exists as to whether such a common policy is an important 
endeavor. Public opinion in the Community member states indicates that 
only in Germany, France, Italy, Ireland, and Luxembourg do a majority 
feel that achieving a common development policy is important or very 
important. (These countries also had the lowest percents giving no 
reply; see Table 8.3 below). Indeed, the data for the total Community 
relate that 47 percent of the general publics believe a common development
Table 8.3 - The Importance of Achieving a Common Community Policy on 













Denmark (1023) 14 24 17 18 27 100
West Germany (1002) 14 33 29 14 10 100
France (1276) 20 31 24 16 9 100
Ireland (998) 18 42 22 10 8 100
Italy (1110) 22 30 22 17 9 100
Luxembourg (297) 17 44 22 6 11 100
Netherlands (1006) 15 28 25 15 17 100
United Kingdom (1438) 12 31 24 23 10 100
Total Community 16% 31% 25% 17% 11% 100%
SOURCE: Commission of the European Communities, Euro-Barometre: Public
Opinion in the European Community 4 (December, 1975), p. A22.
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policy important or very important, while 42 percent see it of little 
or no importance. This may be explained, in part, when the relative 
intensity of the importance of problems dealt with by the Community is 
considered. Table 8.4 demonstrates that aid to developing states receives 
a low priority from the general populations in the member states rela­
tive to other Community concerns. Only in Denmark, the Netherlands, and 
the United Kingdom was a common development policy rated ninth rather 
than last.
The Eurocrats were asked to assess the support for a common 
development policy by the governments of the member states. Rather than 
an assessment of positive or negative support or of varying degrees of 
support, the Eurocrats were asked to rank the member states from first 
(1) to last (9) as to the support each gives and has given to efforts to 
achieve a common Community development policy. The results of these 
rankings, compiled as to the nationality of the respondents, are reported 
in Table 8.5. The data in the table suggests several observations.
2First, the ordinal rankings of the member states are significantly alike, 
but they are not as similar as were the rankings based on support for 
European Union or a common foreign policy (see Table 4.27 in Chapter IV 
and Table 6.15 in Chapter VI). For example, Denmark is variously ranked 
from second to a tie for seventh, Germany's rankings range from first to 
7.5, and Luxembourg from second to a tie for last. A second observation 
also requires a comparison with Tables 4.27 and 6.15. Except for the 
rankings of the Netherlands, which was clearly the first choice of eight
2Rank correlation by Kendall's W = .553 for the nine sets of 
rankings (all rank correlations reported in thi? chapter have a P value 
< .005).
Table 8.4 - Mean Scores on Intensity of the Importance Attached to Problems Dealt with by the European Community.
Belgium Denmark
West









1. Rising prices 2,63 2.46 2,58 2,63 2,78 2,57 2,33 2,38 2,70 2,61
2. Protection of nature 2,31 2.37 2.23 2,46 2,36 2,33 2,23 2,32 2,29 2,32
3. Protection of con­
sumers
2,31 2,28 2.17 2,30 2,48 2,31 2,22 2,14 2,31 2,27
4. Policy on energy 
supplies
2,30 2,05 2.18 2,21 2,11 2,23 2,16 2,03 2,13 2,18
5. Social policy 2,15 1,79 1.91 2,25 2,33 2,11 2,10 1.97 1,99 2.06
6. Negotiations with 
the United States and 
Russia
1.91 1,68 2,00 2,05 1,61 2,04
i
2,09 1,81 2,04 2,01
7. Modernisation of 
agriculture
1,99 1,78 1,67 1.88 2,26 2,32 i
i
1,82 1,82 2.11 1,98
8. Differences between 
regions
1,83 1.80 1.74 1,98 2,14 2,19 j 2,00 1,61 1,78 1,90
9. European currency 1, 70 1,12 1.48 1,80 1,78 1,84 ! 2,11 1,48 1,28 1,59
LO. Aid to underdeveloped 
countries
1,41 1.47 1 
j
1,51 1.59 1,74 1.62 !
1








2,12 2,16 2,16 j 2,09 1,91 2,00 2,04
to(T>to
Scores calculated for each country by weighting the percentages of the answers by the coefficients 3, 2, 1, 0 following the in­
tensity attached to the problem and l>y dividing the number obtained by the percencages of people having given an answer. 
Weighted, for the European Community,, following the relative part of the population aged 15 years and over in each country. 
SOURCE: Commission of the European Communities, Euro-sarametre; Public Opinion in the European Community 4 (December, 1975),
pp. A25.
Table 8.5 - Ratings of the Community’s Member States from First (1) to Last (9) as to the Support Each Gives and Has Given to 
Efforts to Achieve a Common Development Policy.
Nationality 
oi Respondents Belgians Dutch Luxembourgers Irish Danes Italians Germans British




Belgium 2 (4.17) 4 (4.50) 4.5 (5.00) 4.5 (4.33) 4 (4.83) 2 (4.00) 2 (4.50) 6 (5.91) 4 (4.58) 4 (4.75)
Denmark 4 (5.17) 5 (4.60) 3 (4.50) 3 (4.00) 2 (2.33) 7.5 (5.50) 3 (4.63) 2 (2.95) 6 (4.83) 2 (4.27)
France 5 (5.67) 6 (5.10) 9 (8.00) 9 (8.00) 5 (5.33) 9 (7.83) 9 (6.88) 9 (8.32) 4 (4.58) 9 (6.73)
Ireland 7.5 (5.92) 8 (6.20) 6.5 (5.50) 2 (3.33) 6 (6.00) 3 (4.83) 5,5 (4.88) 5 (5.27) 8.5 (6.58) 6 (5.42)
Italy 9 (6.08) 9 (7.30) 8 (6.50) 7.5 (7.33) 9 (7.67) 5 (5.08) 8 (6.31) 7 (6.73) 7 (5.75) 8 (6.41)
Luxembourg 3 (4.33) 7 (5.80) 2 (3.50) 4.5 (4.33) 7 (6.17) 6 (5.25) 7 (5.13) 8 (6.77) 8.5 (6.58) 7 (5.60)
Netherlands 1 (2.00) 1 (3.20) 1 (1.50) 1 (1.33) 1 (1.33) 1 (2.00) 1 (3.00) 1 (1.77) 2 (3.67) 1 (2.33)
United Kingdom 7.5 (5.92) 3 (4.40) 6.5 (5.50) 6 (5.00) 8 (6.67) 7.5 (5.50) 5.5 (4.88) 3 (3.23) 4 (4.58) 5 (4.77)
West Germany 6 (5.75) 2 (3.90) 4.5 (5.00) 7.5 (7.33) 3 (4.67) 4 (5.00) 4 (4.81) 4 (4.05) 1 (3.50) 3 (4.68)
to' <j\w
A nation’s rating by its own nationals is underlined. Mean responses appear in parentheses*
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of the nine groups, the mean responses were often quite close tending 
to cluster between 4 and 7. This again is indicative of a lack of any
consensus of opinion excepting that concerning the support by the
Netherlands. Note that the total rankings place Denmark second and 
France last; the mean scores are respectively 4.27 and 6.73. A third 
observation concerns each nationality groupings' self-ratings. Most of 
the self-ratings were either first, second, or third, but no higher than 
fourth (the French and Germans) or fifth (the Italians). When compared 
to the overall ratings, these self-ratings are not very accurate. For 
example, the Luxembourgers, rated seventh by all others, rated their 
government second; the Irish rated their government second as compared
to overall ranking of sixth; the Italians fifth against an overall rank­
ing of eighth: and the French, whose nation ranked last overall, ranked 
their country fourth.
Rank correlations between rank orders of the member states ana-
3lyzed by nationality groups (e.g., old six/new three, North/South), by
4 5 Ginstitution of the respondents, by age, by prior experience, and by
responses to the self-anchoring scaling questions (indicating preferences
3Benelux/Original Three/New Three: Kendall's W = .785; Original
Six/New Three: Spearman's rho = .500; North/South: Spearman's rho =
.600.
4For the five institution groups: Kendall's W = .653; for the
Commission/Outside the Commission: Spearman's rho = .783.
^Kendall's W = .909.
^Community experience: Kendall's W = .788; Private Sector
Experience: Kendall's W = .929.
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either for centralization or decentralization in the Community)^ were
2all significantly similar (at .005 by X ) within each of these groups 
(see Tables 8.6, 8.7, 8.8 and 8.9). These classifications appear to 
have made no difference as to responses with three important exceptions. 
The rank order given by those who had had prior national civil service 
experience significantly differed with the rank order of those who had
g
no prior civil service experience (see Table 8.8). The same was true
for the sets of rank orders based on foreign policy centralization and
9multilateralist vs. bilateralists.
Generally, the rank orders exhibit the following characteristics: 
1) the Dutch are most always listed as first, the French and Italians 
nearer the bottom (eighth and ninth); 2) unlike the rank orders for 
European Union and foreign policy, the order does not appear to be a 
function of the size of the countries. Luxembourg and Ireland are often 
listed among the last three states while Germany and the United Kingdom 
frequently appear in the top half of the member states. The rank orders, 
then, do not appear to indicate that the smaller the member state, the 
less intense are external interests and, therefore, the more willing the 
member is to integrate (i.e., give up sovereignty).
^Federalists/Non-Federalists: Spearman’s rho = .850; Mondialists/ 
Regionalists: Spearman’s rho = .883.
g
Prior Civil Service: Spearman’s rho = .158.
Q
Centralists/Non-Centralists: Spearman's rho = .217; multi-
lateralists/bilateralists: Spearman’s rho = .533 (significance test found
P > .10).
Table 8.6 ~  Ratings of the Community's Member States from First (1) to Last (9) as to the Support Each Gives and





















Member States (n=13) (n=20) (n=17) (n»33) (n=38) (n=12) (n=50)
Belgium 2 (4.42) 2 (4.38) 6 (5.44) 2 (4.39) 5 (4,89) 3 (4.29) 4 (4.75)
Denmark 4 (4.84) 4 (4.95) 2 (3.03) 4 (4.91) 2 (3.99) 5 (5.17) 2 (4.27)
France 7 (5.81) 9 (6.48) 9 (7.74) 9 (6.21) 9 (6.89) 9 (6.21) 9 (6.73)
Ireland 8 (5.96) 6 (5.38) 5 (5.06) 7 (5.61) 6 (5.33) 7 (5.71) 6 (5.42)
Italy 9 (6.62) 8 (5.78) 8 (7.00) 8 (6.11) 8 (6.72) 6 (5.42) 8 (6.41)
Luxembourg 3 (4.77) 7 (5.60) 7 (6.24) 6 (5.27) 7 (5.50) 8 (5,92) 7 (5.60)
Netherlands 1 (2.38) 1 (2.90) 1 (1.62) 1 (2.70) 1 (2.17) 1 (2.83) 1 (2.33)
United Kingdom 6 (5.27) 5 (4.98) 3 (4.15) 5 (5.09) 3 (4.68) 4 (5.04) 5 (4.77)
West Germany 5 (4.92) 3 (4.48) 4 (4.74) 3 (4.65) 4 (4.82) 2 (4.25) 3 (4.68)
(mean responses appear in parentheses)
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Table 8.7 ** Ratings of the Community's Member States from First (1) to Last (9) as to the Support Each Gives and
























Member States (n=10) (n=14) (n=9) (n=33) (n=8) (n=9) (n=17)
Belgium 2 (4.15) 6 (4.89) 5 (5.33) 5 (4.79) 6 (5.38) 2 (4.06) 3 (4.68)
Denmark 5 (5.25) 2 (3.50) 4 (4.44) 2 (4.29) 2 (3.31) 5 (5.06) 2 (4.23)
Francs 7 (5.55) 9 (7.46) 7 (5.83) 8 (6.44) 9 (7.38) 9 (7.22) 9 (7.29)
Ireland 9 (6.00) 3 (4.64) 6 (5.78) 6 (5.36) 5 (5.13) 7 (5.89) 7 (5.53)
Italy 8 (5.90) 8 (7.11) 8 (6.28) 9 (6.52) 7 (5.94) 8 (6.44) 8 (6.21)
Luxembourg 6 (5.50) 7 (5.82) 9 (6.83) 7 (6.00) 4 (4.81) 4 (4.83) 4 (4.82)
Netherlands 1 (2.40) 1 (1.96) 2 (3.50) 1 (2.52) 1 (2.56) 1 (1.44) 1 (1.97)
United Kingdom 4 (5.15) 5 (4.79) 1 (3.17) 3 (4.45) 8 (6.13) 3 (4,72) 6 (5.83)
West Germany 3 (5.10) 4 (4.68) 3 (3.83) 4 (4.58) 3 (4.38) 6 (5.33) 5 (4.88)
(Mean responses appear in parentheses)
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Table 8.8 - Ratings of the Community's Member States from First (1) to Last (9) as to the Support Each Gives and









COMMUNITY EXPERIENCE PRIVATE SECTOR EXPERIENCE PRIOR CIVIL SERVICE
1 - 6
(n=32)
7 - 1 2
(n=6)










Belgium 5 (5.17) 2 (4.40) 5 (5.05) 4 (4.63) 2 (4.25) 5 (5.33) 5 (4.91) 4 (4.76) 4 (4.57) 2 (3.67) 5 (5.35)
Denmark 2.5 (3.50) 3 (4.67) 2 (4.03) 2 (4.06) 4 (4.83) 3 (4.54) 4 (4.81) 2 (3.63) 2 (4.50) 4 (5.11) 2 (3.76)
France 9 (7.67) 9 (6.38) 9 (6.88) 9 (7.22) 5 (5.17) 9 (6.21) 9 (6.84)8.5(6.50) 9 (6.90)8.5(6.68) 9 (6.76)
Ireland 6.5 (6.08)6.5(5.46) 6 (5.18) 6 (5.25)6.5 (5.67) 7 (5.75) 6 (5.31) 6 (5.37) 7 (5.60) 5 (5.37) 6 (5.45)
Italy 8 (6.50) 8 (6.31) 8 (6.50) 8 (6.59) 9 (6.17) 8 (6.04) 8 (6.66)8.5(6.50) 8 (6.03)8.5(6.68) 8 (6.24)
Luxembourg 6.5 (6.08)6.5(5.46) 7 (5.63) 7 (5.61)6.5(5.67) 6 (5.54) 7 (5.56) 7 (5.84) 6 (5.38) 3 (4.66) 7 (6.18)
Netherlands 1 (1.67) 1 (2.33) 1 (2.53) 1 (1.92) 1 (2.25) 1 (3.46) 1 (1.97) 1 (2.58) 1 (2.40) 1 (1.89) 1 (2.60)
United K i n g d o m 2.5 (3.50) 5 (5.02) 4 (4.85) 3 (4.63) 8 (5.92) 4 (4.58) 3 (4.50) 5 (5.18) 3 (4.53) 6 (5.39) 4 (4.39)
West Germany 4 (4.83) 4 (4.90) 3 (4.38) 5 (5.09) 3 (4.75) 2 (3.54) 2 (4.44) 3 (4.63) 5 (5.00) 7 (5.45) 3 (4.21)
(Mean responses appear In parentheses)
toCT>00
Table 8.9 - Ratings of the Community's Member States from First (1) to Last (9) as to the Support Each Gives and





















Member States (n=31) (n=19) (n=28)^ (n=20)^ (n=24)^ (n=9)^ (n=22)"^ (n=9)^ (n=50)
Belgium 2 (4.42) 5 (5.29) 2 (4.50) 3 (3.95) 2 (4.46) 4 (4.83) 2 (4.43) 6 (5.39) 4 (4.75)
Denmark 3 (4.52) 2 (3.87) 3 (4.66) 9 (6.85) 3 (4.71) 2 (4.00) 3 (4.59) 4 (4.39) 2 (4.27)
France 9 (6.42) 7 (7.24) 9 (6.77) 6 (5.73) 9 (6.85) 9 (7.28) 9 (6.68) 9 (7.11) 9 (6.73)
Ireland 6 (5.44) 6 (5.39) 7 (5.20) 7 (6.13) 7 (5.46) 7 (5.78) 7 (5.59) 5 (4.94) 6 (5.42)
Italy 8 (6.18) 9 (6.79) 8 (6.50) 8 (6.28) 8 (6.48) 8 (6.00) 8 (6.59) 7 (5.72) 8 (6.41)
Luxembourg 7 (5.53) 8 (5.71) 5 (5.05) 1 (2.40) 6 (5.33) 5 (5.06) 4 (5.07) 8 (5.94) 7 (5.60)
Netherlands 1 (2.50) 1 (2.05) 1 (2.34) 5 (4.70) 1 (1.94) 1 (2.17) 1 (1.61) 1 (3.33) 1 (2.33)
United Kingdom 5 (5.02) 4 (4.37) 4 (4.80) 4 (4.00) 5 ( 4.90) 3 (4.72) 6 (5.23) 3 (4.17) 5 (4.77)
West Germany 4 (4.98) 3 (4.18) 6 (5.18) 2 (3.50) 4 (4.79) 6 (5.17) 5 (5.11) 2 (4.00) 3 (4.68)
too\VO
Refers to handling of aid to developing countries.
**Not all respondents indicated preferences in these areas, 
(mean responses appear in parentheses)
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Strategies
The most important fundamental questions concerning a common 
development policy for the Community concern strategy. Should develop­
ment policy be centralized and all development assistance handled by 
the Community in a multilateral fashion only, or should the emphasis 
remain with national bilateral programs? Should Community aid programs 
be based on geographical regional arrangements or special economic 
relationships (as embodied in the Lome Convention and the Community's 
Mediterranean Policy), or should a world-wide policy ("mondialism") be 
adopted which offers the same advantages and arrangements to all develop­
ing states? The responses to these questions by the Eurocrats are sum­
marized in Table 8.10.
Although the respondents opted for different alternatives or 
combinations of alternatives, those who stated a preference for either 
mondialism or regionalism,^^ or multilateralism or
Those who opted for mondialism believed that any Community 
development policy should treat all developing countries of the world 
equally, i.e., provide all the same advantages and opportunity to secure 
development aid. Those who chose regionalism felt that developing states 
could and should be treated differently based on need, geography, history, 
and the like. As such, they favored the associate/non-associate dis­
tinction or the maintenance of special arrangements with the AC? and 
Mediterranean nations. It must be pointed out, however, that many who 
stated they were "regionalists" said they were not opposed to the mon- 
dialist idea, but were merely taking into account the limited Community 
development aid funds (one reason, for example, why the Asia Commonwealth 
states were not included in the Lome and given similar advantages). Other 
reasons exist. As one Italian official put it, "Italy is for mondialism 
except when it comes to the Mediterranean due to the large number of 
competitive agricultural products." (From interviews in Brussels, June- 
July, 1976).
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bilateralism,^^ were nearly evenly divided. Another important observation
is that 20 percent of the respondents stated no preference for any of the
Those who opted for a multilateral approach to development 
programs believed that all developing aid given by the Community member 
states should be given through Community channels and that all national 
bilateral aid programs should be ended. Those advocating the bilateral 
approach did not suggest an end to multilateral aid programs, but insisted 
that national bilateral aid programs should be equal or superior to multi­
lateral efforts in the Community.
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four strategies. Again, no clear consensus exists among the Eurocrats.
When these responses are analyzed by nationality of the respondents, no 
clearer pattern emerges (Table 8.11). Those indicating preferences in 
the Benelux and New Three Countries appeared slightly more in favor of 
mondialism and the Germans, French, and Italians more inclined to region­
alism. Given the historical and present positions of the Dutch, British, 
German, and French governments, the "Eurocrats" responses are what one 
might have expected. The same is not true for the multilateral/bilateral 
responses. Eighty percent of the respondents indicating a preference 
from the Benelux countries opted for multilateralism as one would have 
anticipated given their national government’s positions, but the 
existence of a majority of multilateralists in the France/Germany/Italy 
group and of bilateralists from the three new countries was not anti­
cipated. France has persisted in protecting its bilateral aid programs, 
and Germany has long been concerned by what it sees as its disproportionate 
share of Community development aid financing. The larger number of
British bilateralists may be a reflection of pique over exclusion of. a
large portion of the Commonwealth from associate status, but that does 
not account for the bilateralist position of two Irish Eurocrats who are
included in the New Three totals.
When the responses are analyzed by the institution of the res­
pondents, no significant differences are evident (Table 8.12). Again, 
the lack of consensus can be seen in the nearly equal distribution of 
mondialists/regionalists and multilateralists/bilateralists both in the 
Commission and outside the Commission. Similarly, where variables such 
as age and experience are considered, no patterns emerge in the responses
Table 8.11 - Preferences as to Development Strategies
Respondent's
Nationality Mondialist Regionalist No Preference Multilateralis t Bilateralist No Preference
Belgium 1 2 3 0 1 5
Netherlands 1 2 2 2 0 3
Luxembourg 2 0 0 2 0 0
Ireland 1 1 1 0 2 1
Denmark 1 0 2 1 1 1
United Kingdom 3 3 5 4 5 2
West Germany 1 3 4 2 2 4
Italy 3 2 1 3 1 2
France 1 4 1 3 2 1
Benelux Countires 4 4 5 4 1 8
Germany/Italy/France 5 9 6 8 5 7
New Three Countries 5 4 8 5 8 4
Original Six Countries 9 13 11 12 6 15
Total .14 17 19 17 14 19
Table 8.12 - Preferences as to Development Strategies
Institution(s) Mondialist Regionalist No Preference Multilateralist Bilateralist No Preference
Directorate General 1 4  3 3 2 3 5
Directorate General
VIII 6 5 3 7 4 3
Directorate General X/
Secretariat General 0 1 8  1 4 4
Total Commission 10 9 14 10 11 12
Economie & Social Com­
mittee, European 
Parliament, &
Interest Groups 3 1 4  2 1 5
Council of Permanent
Representatives 1 2  6 2 3 4
Total Outside Commission 4 3 10 4 4 9
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and only occasional differences occur (Table 8.13). For example, a 
large majority of those younger than 30 years of age and those having 
had prior business experience before coming to Brussels favored a 
regionalist approach to developing countries; those having had prior 
national civil service experience favored a multilateral approach, and 
the majority of those who had no prior civil service experience favored 
a bilateral approach. Again, Tables 8.10 - 8.13 serve to demonstrate 
that the alternative strategies are clear enough, but at least from the 
Eurocrats no consensus emerges.
Table 8*13 Preferences as to Development Strategies
àss.
Mondialist Regionalist No Preference Multilateralist Bilateralist No Preference
Below 30 1 4 1 1 2 3
30 - 39 8 6 10 9 8 7
40 and older 5 7 8 4 5 11
Experience Working 
in the Communityt
1 - 6  years 10 9 13 10 11 11
7 - 1 2  years 1 2 3 2 1 3
13 - 18 years 3 5 4 4 2 6
Experience before 
coming to work in or 
with the Community1
Professional 6 4 6 5 4 7
Business 2 5 12 5 4 10
No Prior Experience 6 7 2 6 6 3
Previous Civil 
Service Experience 6 6 7 8 3 8
No Previous Civil 




Are Present Policies Discriminatory?
The Eurocrats were asked if they felt that the present policies 
(as contained in the Lome Convention and various other agreements in the 
Mediterranean, Asia, and Latin America) discriminated against non-ACP develop­
ing states. The statement and the responses are depicted in Table 8.14.
Table 8.14 - "The development policies of the Community (trade, aid, and 
assistance to developing nations) favor the former colonies 
of the EC member states in such a way as to discriminate 
against the developing nations outside the ACP."
Strongly Mildly Mildly Strongly
Agree Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Disagree
5 (10%) 8 (15%) 11 (22%) 4 (8%) 12 (24%) 10 (20%)
Mean Response = 3.80 (where 1 = strongly agree; 6 = strongly disagree)
The fact that a total of nearly half the respondents agreed while just 
over half disagreed (and a mean response indicating something between 
no opinion and mild disagreement) again demonstrates that a variety of 
opinions exist among the Eurocrats. By nationality, the British, 
Luxembourgers, Irish, and French were the only groups to agree and to 
hold opinions which differed significantly with those who most disagreed, 
the Belgians and Danes (Table 8.15). Viewed by institution of the res­
pondents, only those in DG VIII (the development experts) clearly 
agreed. The DG VIII respondents differed significantly from those who
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Table 8.15 - "The development policies of the Community (trade, aid, 
and assistance to developing nations) favor the former 
colonies of the EC member states in such a way as to dis­
criminate against the developing nations outside the ACP."






United Kingdom 11 2.91




differs significantly from the British and French respondents 
(at .05 by t).
^Differs significantly from the Irish, Italian, British, and 
French respondents.
most disagreed, the DG X/SG and COREPER respondents (Table 8.16). 
Finally, those having had prior professional experience and those who 
had prior national civil service experience differed from the more nega­
tive respondents who had prior business and no prior civil service 
experience respectively (Table 8.17).
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Table 8.16 - "The development policies of the Community (trade, aid, 
and assistance to developing nations) favor the former 
colonies of the EC member states in such a way as to 
discriminate against the developing nations outside the 
ACP."
Institution(s) Number Mean Response
Directorate General I 10 4.20
Directorate General VIII 14 3.07*
Directorate General X/General Secretariat 9 4.44
Economic and Social Committee, 
European Parliament, and 
Interest Groups 8 3.25
Council of Permanent Representatives 9 4.33
Total 50 3.80
differs significantly from the DG X/SG and COREPER respondents 
(at .05 by t).
The responses to the statement in Tables 8.14-8.17 add credence 
to the conclusion previously stated, that no consensus exists among the 
Eurocrats concerning development policy. Further, these differences of 
opinion fairly accurately reflect differences between the member states, 
particularly between the Dutch, Germans, British, and French (see 
Chapter VII).
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Table 8.17 - "The development policies of the Community (trade, aid, 
and assistance to developing nations) favor the former 
colonies of the EC member states in such a way as to 
discriminate against the developing nations outside the 
ACP."





No Prior Experience 15 3.53
Previous National Government 
or Civil Service Experience:
Yes 19 4.42
No 31 3.42
differs significantly from responses of Business group, 
(at .05 by t).
The Future for a Common Community Development Policy: An Evaluation
Relative to the first fifteen years of the Community's existence, 
the move toward a common development policy has been substantial. Like 
political cooperation in the Community, it is an area still troubled 
with bumps and jolts but one in which significant progress is being made. 
The success of the Lome Convention and the fact that the structural 
arrangement at the North/South Dialogue means the Community now not only 
wishes but must speak with one voice, far outweigh the failure at Nairobi 
and a present wide diversity of opinions concerning the proper goals and
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means to those ends among Community officials and government leaders.
The assessments by the Eurocrats of the past five years and their 
expectations for the next five years support this conclusion.
In response to the self-anchoring scaling questions concerning 
a common Community development policy, the Eurocrats, as a group, rated 
(from the worst possible state, "0", to the best possible state, "10") 
the efforts to achieve a common development policy in the Community 
relatively low for the year 1971 (the mean response was 3.8) but indi­
cated that significant progress had occurred during the period 1971-1976. 
Their mean response for the present state of integration in this area 
was 5.96, over two steps above the 1971 rating. The expected rating for 
1981 was 6.94, only one more step in the ladder, but a higher rating than 
had been given European Union in general for 1981 (the mean response was 
5.48) and for foreign policy in 1981 (6.10) (Table 8.18).
When the responses were analyzed as to the nationality of the 
respondents, several differences were evident. The French were signi­
ficantly more positive in their assessment of the Community's develop­
ment policy for 1971 than were the Dutch, Irish, Germans, and British.
(One should remember that the British and Irish were not part of the 
Community in 1971 and that the Dutch and Germans advocated mondialism 
against French regionalism.) For the ratings of the present (1976), the 
very positive response of the Danes differed significantly with those of 
the Irish, Italians, British and French. Concerning the ratings for 1981, 
the Dutch respondents differed significantly in their more positive expecta­
tions from the Italians and British, the Danes also differed significantly 
from the Italians and British, and the Italians, in their collective
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Table 8.18 - Self-Anchoring Scaling (Mean) Responses for a Common
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1971 4.40 3.20 3.00 3.00 4.00 2.64 4.17 3.38 5.33 3.80
1976 5.80 6.80 4.50 5.53 8.00 5.36 5.83 6.38 5.83 5.96
1981 7.20 7.60 6.50 7.33 8.00 6.30 5.67 7.29 7.50 6.94
(N) 6 5 2 3 3 11 6 8 6 50
assessment that things would get worse in the future, differed signifi­
cantly from the Germans and French as well.
Generally, those who rated the Community lowest in the area of 
development policy five years ago, and highest for 1976, were those who 
were not in the Community five years ago, the British, the Irish, and 
Danish respondents. The responses of the New Three Countries group are 
different significantly from the responses of those from the group: France/
Italy/Germany (for ratingsof 1971 only). The New Three responses seem 
to suggest the belief among the Irish, British, and Danes that Community 
expansion had a positive effect on the development of a common Community 
development policy. The respondents from the Benelux Countries appeared 
to be the most optimistic concerning the Community’s development policies 
for the next five years (Table 8.19).
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Table 8.19 - Self-Anchoring Scaling (Mean) Responses for a Common
Development Policy Now, Five Years Ago, and Five Years in
the Future.
Year Benelux Countries Germany/France/Italy New Three Countries Total
1971 3.67 4.20 2.94 3.80
1976 6.00 6.05 5.82 5.96
1981 7.25 6.84 6.81 6.94
(N) (13) (20) (17) (50)
Differences between groups of respondents based on age, experi­
ence, etc. were not marked. Some slight differences could be seen, however, 
when the Eurocrats were grouped as to the institution in which they worked 
(Table 8.20). The ratings for 1971 of those in DG I (External Relations) 
were significantly higher than those in DG X/Secretariat-General. Also, 
the expectations for the next five years of those in DG VIII are signi­
ficantly higher than were those in the COREPER. This finding is not sur­
prising. Directorate General VIII is the development branch of the 
Commission, and the COREPER is made up primarily of national foreign 
ministry civil servants.
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Table 8.20 - Self-Anchoring Scaling (Mean) Responses for a Common
Development Policy Now, Five Years Ago, and Five Years
in the Future.
, Total
, Total ESC-Parl- Outside
Year DGI^ DG VIII DGX/SG*^ Commission Int. Groups COREPER Commission
1971 4.11 3.79 2.67 3.56 3.88 3.67 3.76
1976 5.89 6.36 5.56 6.00 6.13 5.67 5.88
1981 7.11 7.29 7.00 7.17 6.86 6.13 6.47
(N) (10) (14) (9) (33) (8) (9) (17)
a,..Directorate General I (external relations) of the Commission






rectorate General X (information) and Secretariat General 
Economic and Social Committee, Parliament, and Interest 
Council of Permanent Representatives to the Community
Summary
No real consensus exists in the Community today as to what the 
goal or goals of the Community's development policy should be or how 
that policy should be constructed. Whether one looks at official 
Community documents, the official positions of the governments of the 
member states, or the assessments and attitudes of Community bureaucrats, 
the sides appear equally divided between those wanting a centralized 
completely multilateral common policy and those preferring a more
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decentralized form favoring national bilateral programs. Equally
divided are those advocating mondialisa and those who prefer regionalism.
Differences exist as to the reasons for those preferences within each
"camp". There does appear to be a consensus that significant progress
has been made toward the achievement of a common development policy in
the Community, and that progress will continue at least for the next
five years. The Commission's assessment is a correct one:
At a time when it is in everyone's interest that the gap between the 
industralized countries and the Third World should be progressively 
narrowed, it is particularly significant that development cooperation 
has become one of the linchpins in the building of Europe and one of 
the fields in which Community action has been most tangibly 
successful.^ ̂
12Commission of the European Communities, "The European Community 
and the Developing Countries", European Documentation (1975/1), p. 17.
CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSIONS
The general theme of this entire work is that an ideological 
commitment to further European integration exists sufficient to stimu­
late continued integration in the European Community. However, in the 
1970's, the Community has stagnated internally while efforts at continued 
integration and collective action have been relatively successful in 
the Community's external political and economic relations. In order to 
support and explain this paradox, we must return to the theoretical 
model introduced in Chapter II.
Proposition I; Generally, the Community's internal policy sectors 
(economic, monetary, industrial, agricultural, transport, social, 
etc.) have been in a state of stagnation since 1970.
The first proposition is taken as a "given". The stagnation in 
the internal policy sectors can be demonstrated empirically, but this 
project was not undertaken in this work for a number of reasons. First, 
this general observation evokes much concern but little controversy in the 
Community. Indeed, there is consensus among both Community proponents 
and detractors that such a stalemate exists. Second, the many assessments
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by Community and national political leaders, bureaucrats, and Community
institutions reflect this consensus. The attitudes and barriers cited
in Chapter I are but a few examples supporting Proposition I. Third,
the perceptions of the "Eurocrats" further support this observation.
Their mean responses as to progress toward European Union in 1971 and
1976 were almost identical (See Table 4.47 and Table 9.3).
Proposition II: Support for continued integration in the European
Community is strong and widespread. It exists beyond the several 
reports on European Union and statements by national and Community 
leaders.
The reports on European Union (discussed in Chapter III) reflect 
strong support for continued integration (centralization) in the European 
Community. Strong institutional support was also indicated in responses 
by the Eurocrats. Ninety-two percent believed that their respective 
institutions supported both efforts to achieve European Union and a com­
mon Community foreign policy (see Tables 4.19 and 6.6). As a group, the 
Eurocrats themselves indicated strong support for continued European 
integration. Eighty percent of the Eurocrats felt that working toward the 
goal of European Union was necessary and proper (Table 4.1). In addition, 
eighty-four percent believed that the Community’s central institutions 
should be given more power to make foreign policy decisions for the member 
states (Table 6.20). Besides the strong support demonstrated by Community 
institutions and bureaucrats, public opinion in the member states further 
substantiates Proposition II. Although just 57 percent support further 
integration, the percent of those opposed is a much smaller 22 percent 
(Table 4.26).
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Sub-proposition lia; Support for further European integration 
will be stronger among citizens of the original six member states 
than among the Danes, Irish, and British.
Public opinion polls in the Community clearly support sub­
proposition Ila. Ireland, the United Kingdom, and Denmark ranked seventh, 
eighth, and ninth respectively in support of political union by 1980. 
Indeed, they were the only states in which public opinion support was 
less than 50 percent. (Table 4.26; Ireland, 44 percent; United Kingdom, 
34 percent; Denmark, 24 percent; total Community: 57 percent approved).
On the question of a common foreign policy, Ireland ranked much higher 
in percent of those approving, but again the United Kingdom (56 percent) 
and Denmark (37 percent) were eighth and ninth, and low when compared to 
the percent of those approving for the total Community (65 percent)
(See Table 6.13). The support indicated by the Eurocrats reflects the 
same pattern. In response to the question of whether it was right and 
necessary to work toward European Union, those from the Benelux countries 
had a mean response of 2.08 (indicating agreement), those from Germany/ 
France/Italy a mean response of 1.5 (indicating strong agreement), while 
those from the three new member states had a mean response of 2.88 (only 
mild agreement) (Table 4.2). In response to the question of giving more 
foreign relations competence to the Community’s central institutions, 
again the three new states’ respondents’ mean response was the least 
positive (2.47) compared to the Benelux respondents (1.88) and France/ 
Germany/Italy respondents (2.30) (Table 6.21).
Sub-proposition Ilb: The relative amount of member-state sup­
port for further integration is strongly associated with the 
relative size of the member states: the smaller states will be 
seen as favoring further integration more than the larger states.
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Rank correlations of the member states by size (population) 
and by rankings by the Eurocrats as to support for European Union, a 
common foreign policy, and a common development policy (toward the Third 
World) are indicated in Table 9-1:
Table 9.1 - Rankings of the Member States by Size (Population) and 
Perceived Support for Further Integration.
Rank as to Support for:
Rank by European Common Develop­
Nation Size& Unionb Foreign Policy^ ment Policy^
Luxembourg 1 1 2 7
Ireland 2 4 4 6
Denmark 3 7 7 2
Belgium 4 2 1 4
Netherlands 5 3 3 1
France 6 9 8 9
Italy 7 6 6 8
United Kingdom 8 8 9 5
West Germany 9 5 5 3





Rank correlations indicate a positive association between
size by population and ranking as to support for European Union and a
common foreign policy.^ No such association exists, however, between
2rank by size and rank by support for a common development policy.
There is, however, a positive association between rank by percent of 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in external trade and rank by support for
3a common development policy (See Table 9.2).
Table 9.2 - Rankings of the Member States by Percent of GDP in External
Trade and Perceived Support for a Common Community Development 
Policy.
Nation Rank by Percent of GDP in External Trade






West Germany 5 3




^Tlank Correlations by Spearman's rho = .550 and 530 respectively. 
2,Rank Correlation by Spearman's rho = -.03.
3Rank Correlation by Spearman's rho = .717.
291
The positive association between rankings by size (small to 
large) and rankings by support for European Union and a common foreign 
policy supports sub-proposition lib. The best explanation is that the 
smaller nations have less to lose in giving up sovereignity to the 
total Community and, perhaps, see substantial gains in doing so (i.e., 
increased voice in European and world affairs). Therefore, they are 
seen as having rendered relatively more support for Community integra­
tion. The rankings by support for a common development policy do not 
support the sub-proposition until those rankings are compared to rankings 
by percent of GDP in external trade. This rank correlation is more 
positive than the previous two.
Sub-proposition lie: Those working in or closely with Community
institutions strongly support continued European integration.
They favor further policy centralization, i.e., the goal of a 
federal state in which foreign political and economic decisions 
are made by Community central institutions.
As was previously indicated, 80 percent of the Eurocrats felt 
that moving toward European Union was both right and necessary. The 
Eurocrats also indicated definitive preferences for goals of the integra­
tion process. Seventy-four percent favored a federal state as the eventual 
goal for European Union (Table 4.9), and fifty-six percent felt that the 
Commission should be given more power to make foreign policy decisions 
for and on behalf of the member states (Table 6.4).
Sub-proposition Ild; The general publics of the Community's 
member states and Community officials prefer certain strategies 
to reach the goal of European Union. They agree that further 
integration will not come automatically, but requires an 
occasional push from political leaders or a shock from the 
external world. They favor:
(1) accelerating the process, pursuing economic and 
political union simultaneously.
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(2) combining foreign affairs ("high politics") and 
economic matters ("low politics") into the competence 
of the Community's institutions,
(3) establishing a European Community defense function,
(4) a mondialist, multilateralist approach to developing 
countries.
The Eurocrats demonstrated a positive attitude toward moving 
forward toward European Union. As has been previously reported, 80 
percent agreed and the large majority of those (54 percent of the total 
respondents) strongly agreed (Table 4.1). Public opinion polls indicate 
a similar pattern. Indeed, the largest group of respondents to the 
question, "Should the unification of Europe be speeded up, slowed down, 
or continued at present?", opted for speeding up the Community (40 
percent in favor; see Table 4.24).
Concerning the question of whether economic union or political 
union should precede or provide a necessary prerequisite for the other, 
the Eurocrats showed no collective preferences, indicating that both 
economic and political union ought to be pursued simultaneously (Tables 4-39 
and 4.43). In a related dichotomous issue, the Eurocrats favored ending 
the "high politics/low politics" schizophrenia in the Community. Fifty- 
eight percent of the Eurocrats believed that political cooperation must 
be merged into the central institutions of the Community.
Despite incorporation of proposals for a Community defense 
function in nearly all the reports on European Union, there was little 
support among the Eurocrats or general publics for its establishment. 
Fifty-four percent of the Eurocrats felt there is no need to establish 
any defense organization outside NATO. Public opinion in the Community
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does not indicate great concern about defense. Less than one-half (49 
percent) of the samples of the general publics in the Community res­
ponded that they felt strengthening military defense was important or 
very important. (Tables 6.26 and 6.28) The strategy option mentioned 
in sub-proposition lid concerning aid to developing countries was also 
not supported. In what appeared to be a lack of consensus among the 
Eurocrats, fewer than half of those indicating a preference opted for a 
mondialistic (world-wide) approach to developing countries, and just 
over half favored strict multilateralism over a mixture of Community and 
member-state bilateral aid programs. The large member expressing no 
preferences and the nearly even divisions (14-17 and 17-14 respectively) 
make findings concerning these strategies inconclusive.
An important theoretical question concerns whether the inte­
gration process "spills over" from one policy sector to another and, if 
so, whether that process is automatic or must be caused to occur. The 
Eurocrats appear to have supported the neo-functionalists' concept of 
"cultivated spillover". They agreed overwhelmingly (90 percent) that 
the process is not automatic, but requires conscious effort and planning 
by individuals willing and able to make it happen (Table 4.36). The 
Eurocrats did agree, then, that continued integration does require an 
occasional"political push", but they did not agree on the necessity for 
an external shock to dislodge the process from its present stagnated 
state. While agreeing that European integration had nearly reached a 
standstill, 56 percent of the Eurocrats felt that an external shock to 
the Community was not necessary to reactive the integration process 
(Table 6.31).
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Proposition III; Since 3970, the external relations efforts 
of the European Community have been relatively more successful 
than have other policy sectors in the Community.
Proposition III is central to the argument of this entire work.
In Chapters V and VII, an effort was made through mini-case studies 
and examples of structure-and-process changes to demonstrate successful 
events and impacts of the Community’s external relations. In addition 
to the increased annual trade, larger numbers of trade and preferential 
agreements, and increased participation as member states qua Community 
in international organizations, the Community has scored some substantial 
achievements. The Lome Convention, participation in the CSCE, and on­
going efforts in the Eur-Arab Dialogue and the Conference on International 
Economic Cooperation are, perhaps the best examples. Whether those 
accomplishments are relatively more successful than internal Community 
matters and, if so, whether the trend can be expected to continue is a 
difficult question indeed. The best answer to such a question comes from 
those most informed about the Community, the "Eurocrats". Their col­
lective (mean) responses to the self-anchoring scaling questions put to 
them offer comparative measurements on scales of their perceptions and 
expectations from what was for each the worst to the best possible states. 
Those responses are indicated in Table 9.3.
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Table 9.3 - Self-Anchoring Scaling (Mean) Values for European Union,
Foreign and Development Policies Now, Five Years Ago, and
Five Years in the Future.
Year European Union^ Foreign Policy^ Development Policy^
1971 4.38 2.82 3.80
1976 4.35 4.39 5.96




The responses indicate that perceptions of efforts to achieve European 
Union (all Community policy sectors included) have been stagnated over 
the past five years (indeed, the mean for 1976 fell by .03), and that 
only a slight increase is expected (hoped for) during the next five years. 
In contrast, efforts to achieve common foreign and development policies 
were placed relatively low in 1971 and have risen significantly in the 
period 1971-1976, surpassing the relative mean response for the total 
Community (European Union). Further, the expectations of the Eurocrats 
suggest linear progressions exceeding the expectations for European Union 
(or when all Community policy sectors are considered together). The 




















Self-Anchoring Scaling (Mean) Values for European Union, Foreign Policy, 
and Development Policy, Now, Five Years Ago, and Five Years in the Future.
The perceptions and expectation of the Eurocrats, as reflected 
in their collective responses to the self-anchoring scaling questions, 
clearly support proposition III. Those who are among the most knowledge­
able of the European Community assess significant improvement in the 
Community's external relations sectors, but stagnation when all policy 
sectors are considered together.
Proposition IV; Since 1970, the successes in the Community's external 
relations have had an integrative effect on the Community. This 
development can be explained, at least in part, by Schmitter's 
"Externalization Hypothesis".
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Philippe Schmitter hypothesized that intergovernmental regional 
actors would find themselves compelled to adopt common policies toward 
nonparticipant third parties once intermember policies are decided and 
operationalized. He further suggested that such actors will increasingly 
seek common external positions, and increasingly rely on central insti­
tutions to find those common positions.^ That all or even the majority 
of the Community's external relations are results of compulsive negotia­
tions of common positions by the member states would most certainly be 
difficult to substantiate. There are, though, instances in which the 
externalization hypothesis is most plausible. Although the Community 
nearly broke apart when the OPEC embargo and price hike occurred late in 
1973, the best examples of "externalization" are the Community's long­
term reactions to the Arab oil boycott.
There is a general consensus that the Community member states 
were motivated by the OPEC price hikes and Arab oil embargo to initiate 
the Eur-Arab Dialogue and to participate in the North-South Dialogue. It 
may be argued that they were compelled to do so by the sudden realization 
of their dependence on and vulnerability to energy and raw material pro­
ducers. It may also be argued that such considerations motivated, at 
least in part, the negotiations which led to the Lome Convention and in 
ongoing negotiations of the International Energy Agency of OECD. What is 
perhaps most interesting (and most supportive of Schmitter's Externalization
Philippe C. Schmitter, "Three Neo-Functional Hypotheses About 
International Integration," International Organization 23 (Winter, 1969),
pp. 161-166.
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Hypothesis) is that the Community member states decided to negotiate 
"with one voice" in all four forums. Further, they insured such an 
outcome through structural arrangements. In these cases and in several 
others, the member states do not take part in the direct negotiations with 
non-member countries but are represented by the Commission (as in the 
GATT and TEA) or by the Commission and Council of Ministers serving as 
Co-Chairmen or co-delegates (as in the Eur-Arab Dialogue and CIEC).̂  The 
structural arrangement requires the Community to negotiate based on a 
common position which, in turn, demands a two-level negotiating process. 
The Community member states may find themselves having to hammer out com­
mon positions daily at the Community level in reaction to events occurring 
at the negotiating level with non-member states.
A second important observation pertaining to externalization is 
the development of linkages between multilateral negotiations in which 
the Community is involved. Some doubt exists as to how much attention the 
Community (particularly the Commission) gave to similar types of negotia­
tions conducted with different countries during the same or different 
time frames. As was pointed out in Chapter VII, there appeared to be 
little or no institutional effort to acquaint Commission negotiators with 
the results of previous similar negotiations or with related events in 
other international forums. This may account, if only in a small way, for 
the frustration of the 19 African Yaounde associates and African, 
Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) states at seeing their trade advantages
France does not belong to the lEA and the United Kingdom for 
some time had not wanted to participate in the CIEC due to its oil interests 
in the North Sea. Both had or now have their interests represented in these 
forums through the Community delegations.
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eroded by Community agreements in GATT negotiations (which offered 
generalized tariff preferences to all developing states and consequently 
lessened the comparative advantage of associate and ACP exports). This 
phenomenon seemed to have been reversed dramatically in the Spring of 
1976. The Community member states made a decision to de-emphasize their 
involvement in the fourth general meeting of the United Nations Con­
ference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD IV), preferring instead to con­
centrate on the North-South Dialogue. When it appeared that a failure 
to reach any agreement at Nairobi in UNCTAD IV might jeopardize the 
North-South Dialogue, the Community member states (particularly Germany) 
scrambled for some (albeit symbolic) gesture of accomodation with the 
Third/Fourth Worlds. An important further observation is that the member 
states each represented themselves at UNCTAD IV, but are represented by 
the Community at the North-South Dialogue. The linkage between the two 
multilateral negotiators is unmistakable. Regardless of motivations, the 
apparent preference for the forum in which structural arrangements require 
a common voice supports the externalization hypothesis.
There are other examples of external relations events furthering 
integration among the member states and having an integrative impact on 
the Community. T^hile essentially an intergovernmental exercise, the 
political cooperation (Davignon Committee) machinery has further integrated 
the foreign ministries of the member states. The activities of the Group 
of Foreign Correspondents and the CORFU network (described in Chapter VI) 
are examples. The gradual incorporation of Commission observers into all 
but one of the political cooperation working groups and the expected 
establishment of a secretariat for political cooperation in the Council
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of Ministers’ General-Secretariat should enhance that integration. A 
further example may be found in the Lome Convention and its predecessors. 
The Community had always encouraged regional group formation among Third 
World countries, preferring to negotiate bloc-a-bloc. The Community 
was directly responsible for the creation of the AASM among the Yaounde 
associates, and indirectly responsible for the creation of the ACP 
states group. The Commission still disperses funds designed to encourage 
regional organization formation and maintenance for developing countries. 
The effect has been occasionally dramatic and unexpected. ACP soli­
darity during the Lome negotiations forced the Community member states to 
find common Community decisions they might not otherwise have attempted.
The conclusion relative to Proposition IV is that the Community's 
external relations do exhibit some integrative influence on the total 
Community. Perhaps nowhere is this more evident than in the Eur-Arab 
Dialogue, where the distinction betrfeen those things political (high 
politics) and those things economic (low politics) is being gradually 
eliminated. Should the trend continue, it may lead to the incorporation 
of political cooperation into the Community's institutional structure.
It is worth pointing out that this Community merger of politics and 
economics has caused similar mergers within the individual member states. 
The data are insufficient, however, to prove or disprove the externaliza­
tion hypothesis. They appear to support the hypothesis to such an 
extent that the conclusion here differs notably from that reached by 
Werner J. Feld. Feld concluded that Community coordination in the UN 
and other multilateral bodies would not enhance the cohesion of the
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Community or produce any measurable pro-integrative effects. While the
data presented above do not prove the externalization hypothesis, it
does not lead to the same negative conclusion.
Proposition V : The continued successful integration in the
Community’s external affairs can be explained by "encapsulation" 
or "spillaround".
Philippe Schmitter's strategic options for actors involved in 
regional integration were presented and discussed in Chapter II. Of 
those options, "encapsulation" (responding to a crisis by marginal modi­
fications within the zone of indifference) and "spillaround" (increasing 
the scope of authority (more coverage of issue areas) while holding the 
level of authority constant or within the zone of indifference)^ are the 
most useful to explain the continued success in the Community's external 
relations. A slightly different conceptualization of spillaround will 
also be presented below.
Sub-proposition Va; Progress in integration in the Community's 
external relations (relative to Community-wide stagnation) may 
be explained by "encapsulation".
Schmitter argues that encapsulation is the most likely strategic
option to be chosen by regional actors. Schmitter notes:
In their search among alternatives national actors will tend to arrive 
at that institutional solution (in terms of scope and level) which 
will meet minimal common objectives despite prevailing tensions and 
will subsequently seek to seal the regional organization off as much 
as possible from its environment thereby adopting a self-maintaining 
set of institutional norms. This "hypothesis of natural entropy"
^Werner J. Feld, The European Community in World Affairs (Port 
Washington, N.Y.: Alfred Publishing Co., 1976), p. 316.
^Philippe C. Schmitter, "A Revised Theory of Regional Integration" 
in Leon Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold (editors), Regional Integration: 
Theory and Research (Cambridge. Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971),
p. 242.
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suggests that all integration processes will tend toward a state 
of rest or stagnation —  unless disturbed by exceptional (i.e., 
unpredictable) or exogenous conditions not present in the original 
convergence or in the institutions themselves. Expressed in terms 
of strategies, the highest probability is that in any decisional 
cycle the actors will opt for encapsulation rather than spillover, 
spill-around, buildup, or spill-back.®
In light of what has happened in the Community during this decade, and 
given the data presented in the previous eight chapters, encapsulation is 
quite plausible. One can argue that national leaders in the Community 
did meet minimal common objectives in conceiving an institutional arrange­
ment for political cooperation related to but not part of the Community 
structures. Further, this course of action was preferable to amending or 
renegotiating the Treaties, particularly given the uncertainty caused by 
the enlargement negotiations and subsequent international economic con­
ditions. The "hypothesis of natural entropy" —  that the integration 
process would tend toward a state of rest or stagnation —  would have 
"predicted" the present state of integration in the Community's internal 
policy sectors. The success in external relations can also be explained. 
The oil embargo and subsequent ripple effects on Europe's political and 
economic health would certainly qualify as a disturbing exceptional and 
exogenous condition to which Community uecision-makers responded with 
nnrginal modifications within the zone of indifference. The "marginal 
modifications" included the Lome Convention (larger in scope but not a 
radical departure from the Yaounde agreements), the Eur-Arab Dialogue, and 
the North-South Dialogue (see Chapter VII). The zone of indifference was 
not violated as the costs involved in most of these agreements are
^Ibid., p. 243.
303
exportable or are postponed. For example, Italy is marginally compen­
sated in the CAP for ACP agricultural exports to the Community, Britain 
(as importer) and France (as a major producer) for the Sugar Protocol 
of the Lome Convention. Thus, unemployment that may be caused by any 
jobs that are "exported" through industrial cooperation concessions or 
tariff preferences without reciprocity will not impact for several years 
making those concessions politically possible now. The concept of 
"encapsulation" as a hypothesis is not proven by these events, nor does 
it completely explain or account for internal stagnation/external pro­
gress in European integration. l#iat it does is provide some basis on 
which at least a partial explanation is possible.
Sub-proposition Vb; Progress in integration in the Community's 
external relations (relative to Community-wide stagnation) may 
be explained by "spillaround".
In his use of the strategic option, "spillaround", Schmitter 
introduces an actor integration strategy in which decision-makers 
increase the scope of authority (to include more coverage of issue areas) 
without increasing the level of authority to the Community's central 
institutions. Schmitter's "spillaround" is applicable to the phenomenon 
suggested in Sub-proposition Vb. The scope of Commission authority in 
external relations has increased due to the expansion of the Community, 
the increase from 19 Yaounde associates to 52 ACP stc;-.es, the substantial 
increase in trade and aid agreements with non-member states an- accom- 
paning increase in mandates from the Council of Ministers. At the same 
time, the Commission's (and, for that matter. Council of Ministers') 
level of authority (operational autonomy) has not bee-- increased. Spill­
around does not apply to the internal policy sectors of the Community.
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In general, neither the level nor the scope of Community institutional 
autonomy has increased. The term "spillaround" has greater utility, 
however, when used in a slightly different manner than that suggested by 
Schmitter.
Sub-proposition Vc; Progress in integration in the Community's 
external relations (relative to Community-wide stagnation) 
may be explained by a different application of "spillaround": 
the "path of least resistance" hypothesis.
It has been established that 1) the Community is stagnated 
internally, 2) the stagnation is not due to a lack of ideological com­
mitment to European integration, and 3) integrative progress has been 
substantially more successful in the Community's external relations.
These observations support the "path of least resistance" hypothesis, 
which is graphically illustrated in Figure 9.2. An ideological commitment 
to further unite Europe presupposes a goal to which some progress ought 
to be made over a given period of time (e.g., the Werner Report antici­
pated economic and monetary union by 1980; the 1972 Paris Communique 
called for reports as to how to achieve European Union by 1980). Failure 
to progress (stagnation) is very often assessed as retrenchment; Community 
political leaders have tended to read (at least publicly) stalemate as 
failure. Once the attempt to find policies to further integrate the 
Community reach the policy decision stage (i.e., the agenda of the Council 
of Ministers), numerous barriers to the will to integrate block the 
ideological commitment to further integration in each policy sector.
These barriers are summarized below from the discussion in Chapter I:
(1) Political Barriers:
a. Different attitudes exist among the member states vis-a-vis 
various non-member states (e.g.,the Middle East nations, the 
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b. Different internal political pressures exist (e.g., Anti- 
Marketeer forces in Denmark, Scotish nationalism in Britain, 
large Communist Parties in France and Italy).
c. There are different national perceptions as to the equality of 
the member states (i.e., large vs. small states).
d. There are different national perceptions as to the question of 
collective security (e.g., Ireland advocates neutrality, France 
wants an alternative to dependency on the United States in NATO, 
Germany and Denmark would welcome more U.S. involvement).
e. National and Community-level interest groups exert political 
pressures on ideological and economic questions.
(2) Economic Barriers:
a. The member states have different economic problems: growth 
rates, strength of currencies, unemployment, and inflation rates 
vary greatly.
b. The states have different economic philosophies (e.g., France 
and Italy concentrate on keeping employment high, Germany and 
Denmark are more concerned with controlling inflation).
c. There are differences as to energy (e.g., France and Belgium 
want to minimize prices, Denmark has sought to guarantee sup­
plies of energy with less attention to price, Britain's attitude 
changes as it develops North Sea oil).
d. The member states differ in their various market mechanisms, 
labor structures, and consumer mentalities.
e. There is an element of uncertainty caused by the state of the 
world economy, particularly due to the Third World's demand for 
a New International Economic Order (see Chapter VII and the 
discussion of UNCTAD IV).
f. All the member states have been experiencing economic recession 
characterized by relatively high unemployment and inflation since 
1972.
These political and economic barriers have been of sufficient 
strength in all but one major policy sector to block further progress 
(integration) in those sectors. The one exception has been in the area 
of external relations. This is not to say that no such barriers exist in 
external relations; indeed, many have been substantial. However, the
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barriers have been relatively the weakest of all those in the Community's 
policy sectors. The drive toward continued integration in the Community, 
powered by the ideological commitment to European Union, has "spilled- 
around" those policy sectors in which the political and economic bar­
riers were strongest and has followed the "path of least resistance", 
in this case, the policy sectors having to do with external relations. 
Progress past the weaker "barriers" is often assisted by certain "facili­
tators";
a. Costs (such as loosing jobs) can be exported at present and 
postponed to the future.
b. External agreements can be argued as means to improve domestic 
economies through increased trade.
c. Assisting developing countries is supported on grounds of 
historical relationships, ideological or humanitarian concern, 
etc.
d. Collective security is a convincing argument in many of the 
states.
The "path of least resistance" hypothesis simply predicts that 
given sufficient political support, some integrative progress will occur 
even when strong political and economic barriers exist. Further, that 
progress will occur in policy areas where the barriers are weakest and 
the facilitators strongest. The political resolve to show progress of 
some sort will, then, follow the path of least resistance. Positive 
results then provide positive feedback both to that policy sector and to 
the ideological commitment to integrate further. It is strongly con­
tended here that the Community experience in the 1970s supports the 
"path of least resistance" hypothesis.
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Implications for Future Research 
At the time of this writing, the Eur-Arab Dialogue, the North- 
South Dialogue, and the Tokyo Round of GATT were still in progress. 
Institutionalized annual summits between the heads of government of 
Germany, France, and the United Kingdom were less than a year old (so 
far as Britain’s inclusion is concerned). West Germany had only recently 
become a member of the United Nations, and the decision for direct 
elections to the European Parliament was about mid-way between its making 
and its implementation. Many of the events upon which this dissertation 
is based are ongoing, and their culmination will most certainly alter 
some of the attitudes reported and conclusions made in this work. The 
prospects for future research in this area are enormously promising and 
important. What the Community does relative to the less developed 
states qua Community and individual nations is of great importance to 
those states and to the United States, Canada, and Japan. Its efforts 
at political cooperation in the European capitals and international forums 
such as the United Nations deserve scholarly investigation. This is 
particularly important the more interdependent international actors 
become, and the more important multilateral and bloc-a-bloc relations 
become relative to traditional nation-state-centered foreign policy­
making. It is probable that political cooperation and the Lome Convention 
are more than interesting intergovernmental experiments. The fact that 
the Stabex Scheme of the Lomé Convention was a major basis for negotia­
tion by the Third World states at UNCTAD IV, and that the Arab League has 
liberally borrowed much from the Community’s political cooperation "model" 
would indicate a far more important assessment is due the Community’s
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external relations structures.
The applicability of the Community's experience in the 1970s 
and, hence, the application of the "externalization" and "path of least 
resistance" hypotheses to other regional intergovernmental organizations 
is problematic, but should not be dismissed out of hand. The European 
Community is the most advanced regional intergovernmental organization, 
an assessment which implies that other groupings may experience the same 
difficulties as they reach the same level of development. There are sub­
stantial differences between the European Community and, for example, 
the Andean Common Market (ANCOM) and the Associated South East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), whose members are less developed states. However, their 
prospects for internal stagnation and simultaneous development in common 
external relations are in no way diminished due to their members’ less- 
developed status. Indeed, some regional intergovernmental organizations 
exist primarily for external relations benefits anticipated from negotiating 
"with one voice" in international negotiations (especially the OAU, Arab 
League, and ACP Group). The future should provide fertile ground on 
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Part I; SeIf-Anchoring Scaling
1. There exists now a great deal of interest in European Union.
What in your opinion would be the best possible state of European 
Union? What would be the worst possible state? On a scale of "0" to 
"10”, where would you place the Community today? Five years ago? Five 
years from now?
2. In the same fashion, what, in your opinion, is the best possible 
state for a common foreign policy for the Community? What would be the 
worst in your opinion? Again on a scale of "0" to "10", where would you 
place the Community today? Five years ago? Five years from now?
3. What do you believe would be the best possible policy by the 
Community toward the developing countries of the world? What in your 
opinion would be the worst possible development in this area? On a scale 
of "0" to "10", where would you place the Community today? Five years 
ago? Five years from now?
Part II; Ranking the Member States
1. Please rank the Community member states according to the support 
each gives and has given to efforts to reach a Community development 
policy on a world scale which is not limited to present "associate agree­
ments". Indicate the country you believe most supports this by "1", the 
next by "2”, and so on.
2. Please rank the Community member states according to the support 
each gives and has given to efforts to permit the Community's central 
institutions to make foreign policy decisions for and on behalf of the 
member states. Indicate the country you believe most supports this by 
"1", the next by "2", and so on.
3. Please rank the Community's member states according to the suppoi" 
each gives and has given to increasing the power of Community institutions 
in all areas to speak for the member states. Indicate the country you 
believe most supports this by "1", the next by "2", and so on.
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Part III: Likert-type Scaling
Here are some statements that various people have made concerning 
European Union and related subjects. Would you please read each card 
and place it on the agree-disagree scale where it belongs according to 
how much you agree or disagree with each statement.
(The cards contained the following statements:)
The institution/organization for which I work supports increased 
European Union.
The E.E.C. should be divided into a two-tiered Community in which 
the stronger economies march quickly toward integration while the less 
strong ones proceed more slowly to catch up when they are able.
The European Community, particularly the Commission, should be given 
more power to conduct foreign relations on behalf of the nine member states.
The goal of European Union should be a loose association of the 
states in which the central institutions of the Community are slightly 
strengthened, but the national identity of each state and its right to 
act independently of the others are preserved.
There is a need to establish a new European defense organization in 
order to counter the fact that not all Community members belong to or 
participate in NATO and other problems in NATO.
The best way to get the nine members of the Community to agree on
a position today is for the United States to oppose it.
European integration has nearly reached a standstill. It will take
a shock, such as a worsening of relations with the USSR or the unilateral
removal of US combat forces to reactivate it.
Economic and monetary union is possible, but only after political 
union has been achieved.
Political union is possible, but only after economic and monetary 
union has been achieved.
The goal of European Union should be a federal arrangement in which 
the Community’s central institutions have more power than do the individual 
member governments.
Increased European integration does not happen automatically or as 
a result of previous integration; it occurs through conscious effort and 
planning by individuals willing and able to make it happen.
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The development policies of the Community (trade, aid, and 
assistance to developing nations) favor the former colonies of the 
EC member states in such a way as to discriminate against the developing 
nations outside the ACP.
The institution/organization for which I work supports moving 
toward a common foreign policy for the Community.
A coordinated foreign policy for the Nine must take place in the 
context of the Community's external commercial and economic functions. 
Attempts at political cooperation through specially constructed machinery 
outside the major Community institutions will be unsuccessful.
The creation of the European Council (summits of heads of state and 
of government) is a sign of the disintegration of the Community.
The majority of the people in my country favor Europe's "speaking 
with one voice" to increase Europe's influence in the world.
The majority of people in my country support European Union.
Working steadily and very hard toward the goal of European Union 
is the right thing to do. It is also something that must be done.
As the economies of the nine countries become more fully integrated, 
further political integration becomes inevitable.
In foreign affairs, sovereignty is the ability to influence the 
external world; if Europeans want to establish a presence in foreign 
affairs, the way to do it is to unite.
Part IV: Demographic Information
































LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
Associated African States and Madagascar 
African, Caribbean, and Pacific States 
Andean Common Market
Association of South-East Asian Nations
Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg
Common Agricultural Policy of the EC
Conference on International Economic Cooperation
Council of Mutual Economic Assistance
Committee of Professional Agricultural Organizations
Council of Permanent Representatives
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Directorate-General
European f mmunity
European Court of Justice of the EC




Economic and Social Committee of the EEC
European Trade Union Confederation
European Atomic Energy Community
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Generalized System of Preferences (of the EC)












International Fund for Agricultural Development 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
Organization for African Unity
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
Organization for European Economic Cooperation 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
Unit of Account
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
Union of Industries in the European Community 
Western European Union
